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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I intro-
duce subjective and model-free measures of macroeconomic uncertainty, which
are based on belief distributions for future inflation and output growth from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters. I find that quantitatively important
uncertainty episodes are rare, but persistent. My estimates of macroeconomic
uncertainty exhibit strikingly different dynamics compared to existing uncer-
tainty measures, suggesting that much of the variation in these measures is not
driven by macroeconomic uncertainty. By re-examining recent empirical work
on the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and real economic ac-
tivity, I find that macroeconomic uncertainty shocks have a large and persistent
effect on real activity, without an evidence of subsequent overshooting. Due to
its model-free and subjective nature, I believe that my measure of uncertainty
provides a natural benchmark to distinguish among several competing hypothe-
ses about the association between macroeconomic uncertainty and economic
activity.
The second chapter investigates the effects of an expansionary monetary policy
shock that results in a 1% long-run increase in the price level on output, the
bilateral real exchange rate with the United States and the price level in devel-
oping economies with inflation targeting. With an empirical panel-VAR model,
we show that such a shock leads to a temporary increase in output, a temporary
depreciation in the real exchange rate with the United States and a half percent
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contemporaneous increase in the price level. A multi-sector model with a stag-
gered wage-setting mechanism and asymmetries among sectors with respect to
the frequency of price changes is capable of explaining these aggregate dynamics.
The third, and the last, chapter uses quotes on options written on crude oil fu-
tures to construct nonparametric risk-neutral probability distribution functions
(pdfs) for crude oil prices. Based on these pdfs, first, I show that the skewness
and the extreme percentiles of these distributions are affected by U.S. macroe-
conomic news surprises, but the mean is not. Second, I find that these pdfs
perform significantly better than density forecasts generated by popular time-
series models at 1 to 3 months horizons. Finally, I show that options-implied
volatility and skewness help with point prediction of future oil prices.
Primary Reader: Jonathan Wright
Secondary Readers: Jon Faust and Laurence Ball
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Evaluating its Impacts on
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
1.1 Introduction
The seminal contribution by Bloom (2009) and recent economic events have led
researchers to estimate and evaluate the role of time-varying uncertainty on eco-
nomic activity. Yet, uncertainty is an unobserved process. Therefore, to exam-
ine the relationship between uncertainty and economic activity, researchers have
relied on different proxies for uncertainty1. While a consistent theme of this lit-
erature is the negative association between uncertainty and real activity, studies
disagree on other empirical properties of uncertainty and its role in explaining
economic fluctuations. Furthermore, existing uncertainty measures are tightly
1See Leahy and Whited (1996); Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001); Bloom, Bond,
and Van Reenen (2007); Bloom (2009) for stock market related; Bloom (2009); Berger and
Vavra (2010); Kehrig (2010); Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012);
Bachmann and Bayer (2013) for firms related; Ferderer (1993); Leahy and Whited (1996);
Bomberger (1996); Giordani and Söderlind (2003); Popescu and Smets (2010); Bachmann,
Elstner, and Sims (2013); Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012) for cross sectional dispersion of
survey based forecasts related; and Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009); Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2012) for news related uncertainty proxies that are proposed in the literature.
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linked to agents’ perception of macroeconomic uncertainty only under very re-
strictive assumptions. For instance, option-implied stock market volatility, a
widely used uncertainty measure, can change due to reasons besides macroeco-
nomic uncertainty such as changes in expected stock returns or changes in risk
aversion. Similarly, changes in cross-sectional dispersion of subjective forecasts,
another widely used uncertainty measure, are reflective of disagreement, rather
than how uncertain forecasters feel when producing their subjective forecasts.
In this paper, I provide model-free measures of macroeconomic uncertainty that
are derived from the subjective density forecasts of experts from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) for future inflation and output growth. More
specifically, I extract the common subjective uncertainty component, which I
call the Subjective Consensus Uncertainty (SCU), across experts both for in-
flation and output growth. Consistent with uncertainty-based theories of the
business cycle, the SCU measure captures the common variation perceived by
all agents assuming the SPF truly elicits the subjective belief distribution of
experts. Accordingly, I use inflation and output growth SCU estimates as the
benchmark macroeconomic uncertainty estimates in my analysis.
I emphasize three novel features of the SCUs. First, they are ex-ante mea-
sures of economic uncertainty that capture common movements in the sub-
jective ex-ante predictability about future values of either inflation or output
growth. Second, the SCUs do not have to be tightly linked with fluctuations
2
in aggregate or idiosyncratic volatility of realized economic outcomes. Typi-
cally, empirical macroeconomic uncertainty measurement literature derives un-
certainty proxies that are associated with volatility in aggregate or idiosyncratic
conditions (e.g. see Bloom (2009), Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012), Bloom,
Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012), and Gilchrist, Sim,
and Zakraǰsek (2014)). However, in this paper, I estimate subjective macroe-
conomic uncertainty measures that are perceived by economic agents. Finally,
the SCUs are model-free in nature, so rather than assuming a specific model to
estimate macroeconomic uncertainty, the density forecasts of experts provide a
direct way to estimate these objects for inflation and output growth.
The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) provides density forecasts for
future deflator inflation and output growth for a panel of macroeconomic fore-
casters. In each quarter, experts assign their subjective probabilities to some
pre-assigned bins both for inflation and output growth. Naturally, the standard
deviations of these distributions represent how uncertain forecaster are when
making the forecast. However, it is not straightforward to work with these
density forecasts so estimation of the SCUs from these distributions involves
two key steps. First, following Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009), I fit a
generalized beta distribution to experts’ discretized subjective densities to back
out the standard deviation of each forecast distribution. Second, I estimate the
common component from these subjective forecast uncertainties by considering
several structural changes in the SPF that I explain in detail later on.
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The main results can be summarized as follows. First, I find significant in-
dependent variation in the existing uncertainty proxies as opposed to the SCU
estimates. I demonstrate that uncertainty episodes are far less frequent than
what is inferred from other commonly used uncertainty measures, such as the
option-implied stock market volatility, measures of cross sectional dispersion of
subjective forecasts or firms’ asset returns and profits. In particular, the SCU
estimates reveal four big uncertainty episodes in US macroeconomic history,
which coincide with the deepest recessions in the US: one during the 1973-74
recession, two during the 1980-82 recessions and one during the 2007-09 reces-
sion. Second, the SCU estimates are far more persistent than other conventional
uncertainty proxies. For instance, the inflation and the output growth SCUs
have an AR(1) coefficient of 0.96 and 0.92 respectively whereas the correspond-
ing values for conventional uncertainty measures are in 0.8 to 0.25 range. Third,
I show that during economic downturns the SCUs can explain approximately
half of the movements in the individual subjective forecast uncertainties of ex-
perts as opposed to one third during normal times. This is consistent with
uncertainty-based theories that predict agents discount new information more
heavily and adjust their subjective uncertainty slowly during economic down-
turns Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006); Orlik and Veldkamp (2013);
Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014). Overall, these findings
imply that a large fraction of the movements in popular uncertainty proxies,
such as implied stock market volatility or disagreement, are mainly driven by
factors that are not associated with ex-ante subjective macroeconomic uncer-
tainty.
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Turning to the dynamic relationship between uncertainty and economic activ-
ity, I estimate an 8-variable recursively identified VAR model where uncertainty
is ordered as the second variable as in Bloom (2009). A large disturbance to
uncertainty measured by commonly used empirical uncertainty proxies leads to
short-lived declines in the real activity followed often by a statistically signifi-
cant “volatility overshoot”, i.e. the rebound in real activity following the initial
decline after a positive uncertainty shock. In contrast, I show that uncertainty
measured by the SCUs leads to sizable and protracted declines in production
and employment without exhibiting the subsequent overshooting pattern. Us-
ing the 8-variable benchmark VAR model, I show that the SCU disturbances
account for 25 - 32% of the forecast error variance of industrial production
whereas implied stock market volatility and output growth disagreement can
account for a maximum 11.7 - 12% of the forecast error variance of industrial
production.
Yet, there are two major concerns regarding the identification of uncertainty
shocks in the benchmark empirical VAR analysis. First, the identification is
achieved purely by the ordering of variables assuming a particular causal chain,
i.e. shocks instantaneously affect first the stock market, then uncertainty, prices
and finally real variables. While this is one of the likely economic interpreta-
tions that may happen, other alternatives, such as the hypothesis that uncer-
tainty is more a consequence of depressed economic activity than a cause are
disregarded in this specification Bachmann and Bayer (2013, 2014). Second,
Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakraǰsek (2013) and Gilchrist, Sim,
and Zakraǰsek (2014) show that financial channel is key in the transmission of
5
uncertainty shocks, so including financial fragility along with uncertainty into
the same VAR substantially weaken the impact of uncertainty shocks on eco-
nomic activity. An obvious solution to this claim is to include financial fragility
to the 8-variable empirical VAR model. Due to contemporaneous feedback
mechanisms between uncertainty and financial fragility, however, it is hard to
defend identification of shocks to macroeconomic uncertainty that is based on
the ordering of variables in the VAR. In an attempt to make progress in these
aspects, I propose a small scale sign-identified VAR model that includes both
uncertainty measured by either inflation or output growth SCU along with a
proxy for financial fragility. I show that while the bigger fraction of the fluctua-
tions in production can be explained by innovations to financial conditions, the
structural shocks to uncertainty still leads statistically significant and persistent
declines in real economic activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the
SPF’s probabilistic data that I use to construct inflation and output growth
SCUs. Section 3 introduces the notion of subjective forecast uncertainty along
with the econometric methodology conducted to estimate the SCUs. Section
4 presents inflation and output growth SCU estimates, and compares their re-
lationship with commonly used uncertainty measures. Section 5 documents
the dynamic relationship between uncertainty and real economic activity under
two different identification schemes within the framework of a structural VAR.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
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1.2 The SPF Data
The belief distributions of agents that I use to compute the Subjective Consensus
Uncertainty (SCU) are rarely available for economic research. The Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) fortunately provides them for deflator inflation
and output growth for experts starting from 1968Q4 and 1981Q3, respectively.
This section briefly describes the survey question format and points out the
major properties of the probabilistic forecast data that I need to take into
account for the estimation of the SCUs.
1.2.1 The SPF Data Description
The American Statistical Association started and managed the SPF from 1968
to 1990 before the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took it over in 1990.
The panel of forecasters, which includes academics and researchers from both
industry and government, provides point forecast for various US macroeconomic
series in different horizons and at a quarterly frequency. In addition to these
point forecasts, the SPF also asks panel members to make probabilistic forecasts
of annual output growth and deflator inflation.
In each quarter during a calendar year, participants are asked to provide their
belief distributions for the percentage change in annual real GDP and GDP
deflator between previous/current years and current/next years. The former is
called the current year whereas the latter is called the next year probabilistic
forecast. The experts participating in the SPF assign their subjective prob-
abilistic forecasts of inflation and output growth to some pre-assigned bins.
7
Currently, the SPF provides 10 bins for inflation: (−∞, 0%), 8 intervals with
1% interval length from 0% to 8% and [8%, ∞). For output growth, the SPF
provides 11 bins: (−∞, -3%), 9 intervals with 1% interval length from -3% to
6% and [6%, ∞) at present. Therefore, the SPF’s probabilistic forecast cover-
age is always from minus to plus infinity, which requires the lowest and highest
intervals to be open-ended, i.e. bottom or top-coded.
The SPF experienced significant structural changes in its history2. First, while
survey participants were asked to report GNP deflator inflation and real growth
prior 1992Q1, afterwards they are asked for the GDP counterparts of these
variables. Second, for inflation, the number of available intervals were from
15 prior to 1981, to 6 throughout the 80s, and finally increased to 10 in 1992.
Furthermore, the typical interval width, which excludes the open-ended lowest
and highest extreme intervals, is equal to 1% except in the 80s when it was
equal to 2%. For output growth, probabilistic forecasts started from 1981Q3
and followed the same pattern as inflation, except that the available number of
intervals increased from 10 to 11 starting 2009Q2.
I restrict the empirical analysis to current year probabilistic forecasts for both
inflation and output growth because their time series dimension is longer. Fur-
thermore, I drop the surveys from the sample if (i) the assigned subjective
2 The table A.1 at the appendix roughly summarizes these changes both for deflator
inflation and output growth. For the history of the survey and other details mentioned in
this paragraph, see Croushore (1993); Lahiri and Liu (2006); Rich and Tracy (2010) and the




probabilistic forecasts do not sum to unity, and (ii) a respondent participated
just once in the life of the survey. After these restrictions, I have 6539 individual
probabilistic surveys for inflation and 4197 for output growth. This corresponds
to a quarterly average of 36 and 32 individual surveys for inflation and output
growth respectively (see table A.3 at the appendix for details).
1.2.2 Other Data Considerations
Agents’ belief distributions for future inflation and output growth are available
for calendar year forecasts, so they tend to be tighter mechanically as the year
progresses. For example, in February the calendar year forecast horizon is longer
than in May. Consequently, forecast uncertainty regarding the first quarter is
lower than the one in second quarter as more information is revealed about the
target variable in the second quarter. The suggested solution to this problem
is to execute deterministic seasonality adjustment (Lahiri and Liu, 2006; Rich
and Tracy, 2010; Andrade, Ghysels, and Idier, 2012).
The SPF embodies temporal variation in aggregate predictions partly due to
changes in panel compositions (Engelberg, Manski, and Williams, 2011). This
is not a problem for the interpretation of an aggregate statistic if forecasters
are selected randomly to the SPF and experience is not a significant determi-
nant of the forecasters’ performance. Nevertheless, if either of these conditions
does not hold, any aggregate statistic will conflate fluctuations in aggregate be-
haviour with temporal fluctuations in the survey structure (Engelberg, Manski,
and Williams, 2011). To illustrate the effects of a changing panel composition,
consider the following simple hypothetical example. Suppose there are four
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forecasters in the SPF, all of who expect annual growth of 2%, with two having
a standard deviation of 1% and the rest of 2%. This implies that the hypothet-
ical representative (i.e. average) forecaster expects annual output growth rate
is 2% with a subjective standard deviation of 1.5%. If in the next quarter, all
forecasters continue to hold the same beliefs, but the two forecasters (the ones
with lower standard deviations) fall out of the sample, expected annual output
growth rate would remain at 2% while the standard deviation would fall from
1.5 to 1%. While this is just an artifact of changing panel composition in the
SPF, the representative forecast makes it appear that forecasters have become
less uncertain about future inflation3.
Yet, in the absence of knowledge of the participation process of forecasters,
there is no direct evidence to justify how important this problem is in the SPF.
However, there are three pieces of evidence in the SPF showing that this effect
might be present. First, the survey size varies over time. For instance, the
survey size changed from about 100 in the late 60s to 14 in the early 90s for
inflation; 10 in early 90s to 50 in mid-2000 for output growth. Secondly, on
average 36 (33) forecasters participated, 10 (7) exited, and entered in each sur-
vey for inflation (output growth). This means that on average about 70 to 80%
of the forecasters participated in the former survey participates in the current
one, whereas the rest participated only once in either of these surveys. Finally,
while some experts participate the SPF regularly, other do so less frequently:
only 196 forecasters (out of 412) for inflation and 123 forecasters (out of 238)
3This example is tailored from Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2011) to address the
effects of changing panel composition for consensus subjective uncertainty in the SPF.
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for output growth participated more than 10 times in the SPF4.
The problem of changing panel decomposition and forecaster heterogeneity are
well documented problems for several other surveys besides the SPF such as
Michigan Household Survey, CESifo World Economic Survey or Confederation
of British Industry’s Small and Medium enterprises survey (see Pesaran and
Weale (2006) and Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2011) for details). In an
attempt to handle these problems, the panel structure of the SPF becomes cru-
cial and I will control for these effects with a set of dummy variables.
Abstracting from the problems stated so far, some surveys are not compara-
ble with others due to incompatible forecast horizons (Rich and Tracy, 2010).
Therefore, all the surveys in 1972:Q3, 1974:Q4, 1979:Q2-Q3, 1980:Q4, 1985:Q1
and 1986:Q1 are reported as missing in the estimation. To fill out these missing
observations, I proceed in two steps. First, I aggregate the surveys and provide
a macroeconomic uncertainty estimate either for inflation or output growth for
each quarter. Next, I propose a time series model in state-space form and esti-
mate these missing observations via Kalman filter and smoother (Harvey, 1993).
The details of this model appear in section 1.3.2 below.
1.3 Estimation Method
This section explains how I estimate the inflation and output growth Subjec-
tive Consensus Uncertainties (SCUs) from discretized probability distributions
provided by the SPF. To compute the SCUs, I proceed in three steps. First,
4See figures A.1 and A.2 at the appendix for details.
11
I estimate subjective forecast uncertainties of each expert in the SPF panel by
following the approach of Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009) who match
generalized beta distributions to the individual discrete histograms. I provide
some motivation and intuition for this procedure in subsection 1.3.1. In the sec-
ond step, I estimate the inflation and output growth SCUs from these subjective
uncertainties in subsection 1.3.2, briefly explaining how I control for potential
biases in the SCU estimates that are raised in section 1.2. In the final step, I
fill out the SCUs which are recorded as missing due to occasional errors made
by the SPF. Finally, in subsection 1.3.3, I discuss the motivation for using other
commonly used empirical uncertainty measures and compare them with the
SCUs.
To conserve some space, the full description of fitting generalized beta dis-
tribution to individual histograms, the estimation of the missing SCU values,
and several robustness exercises designed to check sensitivity of my results to
assumptions regarding the SCU estimates are provided in the Supplementary
On-Line Appendix in Karaca (2014)5.
1.3.1 Estimation of Subjective Forecast Uncertainties of
Experts
For illustrative purposes, suppose F hit(x) is the forecaster i’s subjective cumu-
lative distribution function conditional on date t information for the target
5The Supplementary On-Line Appendix can be downloaded from my webpage:
https://goo.gl/CG3uXs
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variable xt at horizon h quarters:
F hit(x) = P (xt+h ≤ x|Ωit)
where Ωit is the information set of individual i at time t. Moreover, let µit
and σ2i,t denote date t subjective mean and variance of the point forecast of the
target variable x at horizon h (notice that the target variable and the horizon











(xt+h − µit)2 dF hit
The subjective uncertainty (σi,t) defined above is the dispersion of the subjective
belief distribution of an expert. By definition, the notion of subjective uncer-
tainty differs from what is used in most of the uncertainty-driven business cycle
literature where uncertainty is associated with volatility about either idiosyn-
cratic or aggregate conditions. In this paper, rather than imposing any a priori
structure about the relationship between volatility and subjective uncertainty, I
allow for the possibility that subjective uncertainty could be high even if actual
volatility is low or vice versa.
I then construct an aggregate measure of macroeconomic uncertainty, i.e. the
SCU by aggregating subjective uncertainties (i.e. standard deviations) at each
date t for all forecasters:
σt = Ei [σit] (1.1)
where Ei is the expectation across individual forecasters i.
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The SCU defined in equation 1.1 has three important properties. First, fluctu-
ations in the SCU measure capture the common subjective ex-ante uncertainty
movements perceived by all agents. Assuming these belief distributions correctly
characterize the uncertainty that agents face, the SCU perfectly lines with most
uncertainty based theories of business cycles that require the existence of com-
mon movements which simultaneously affect all agents in the economy. Second,
fluctuations in the SCU do not have to be tightly linked with the fluctuations
in actual volatility. Typically, uncertainty is defined as the volatility of either
aggregate or idiosyncratic productivity shocks (e.g. Bloom (2009); Bloom, Floe-
totto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012)) but here I define it as the
standard deviation of agents’ beliefs about future macroeconomic developments.
This enables me to dissociate subjective uncertainty from volatility, so that with
the SCU, I allow the possibility of periods of high uncertainty with low volatility
or vice versa6. Finally, fluctuations in the SCU are model-free, so any structural
shock affecting subjective uncertainty of all experts will be recorded as a rise in
the SCUs. Therefore, SCUs allow me to consider all sources of fluctuations of
uncertainty rather than just focussing on volatility, which is just one aspect of
uncertainty.
The objective of this paper is to provide estimates for: (i) subjective uncer-
tainty of each expert, i.e. σi,t
7 and, (ii) the Subjective Consensus Uncertainty,
6Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014) show that option value of waiting
due to irreversibilities may lead to endogenous movements in subjective uncertainty resulting
long lasting recessions as in 2007-09 even if no volatility is observed in economic data.
7My approach in this paper relies on individual belief distributions on future inflation
and output growth. Alternatively, some researchers relied on aggregate (cross-sectional aver-
age) belief distributions and use its standard deviation as a measure of forecast uncertainty.
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i.e. σt. However, the estimation of these objects depends critically on the avail-
ability of belief distributions. Fortunately, the SPF provides the discretized
belief distributions of experts for two key macroeconomic variables: inflation
and output growth, so I can utilize these belief distributions to estimate ex-
perts’ subjective uncertainties. To make these belief distributions operational, I
estimate the continuous counterparts of these belief distributions and back out
the standard deviation.
I assume that the generalized beta distribution characterizes the discretized
belief distributions of experts (Engelberg, Manski, and Williams, 2009), and
estimate its parameters by minimizing the sum of squared deviations between
the empirical distribution (i.e. discretized belief distributions) and the contin-
uously distributed theoretical distribution. The generalized beta distribution is
an appropriate choice for approximating the empirical distribution of beliefs for
two reasons. First, it is flexible and parsimonious enough to characterize these
empirical distributions without any a priori restrictions on their higher order
moments. Giordani and Söderlind (2003), for instance, assume that experts’ be-
liefs are normally distributed. Not surprisingly, this assumption does not hold
in the data (see for example Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009), Andrade,
Ghysels, and Idier (2012) and Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2011) for an
evidence in favor of heterogeneity or time-variation in these moments).
However, as shown by Wallis (2005), the variance of aggregate belief distribution can be de-
composed into average forecast uncertainty and the disagreement among the participants.
Therefore, using aggregate distribution conflates disagreement with the subjective forecast
uncertainty, potentially masks the individual characteristics of the subjective distributions
due to central limit theorem type arguments.
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Second, the generalized beta distribution has bounded support. Therefore, if
an expert assigns a positive probability to either (or both) of the open-ended
intervals, this introduces one (or two) more parameter(s) to be estimated. Mean-
while, if an expert does not assign a positive probability to either of the open-
ended intervals, I take the support of the distribution to be the left and right
endpoints of the intervals with positive probability. While forecasters do not as-
sign a positive probability to these open-ended intervals 80% of the time, during
some economic downturns, notably during the 1980-82 and 2007-09 recessions,
most of the forecasters assign non-zero probabilities to the lowest open-ended
interval. For example, the (cross-sectional) average probability assigned to the
lowest open-ended intervals in these recessions jumps to 8 and 18 percentage
points respectively for inflation, whereas the same magnitudes for output growth
are 18 and 33 percentage points8. In this context, non-parametric fitting meth-
ods such as uniform smoothing, i.e. assuming probability mass in each interval
is uniformly distributed, are hard to defend. On the one hand, uniform smooth-
ing tends to inflate the standard deviations of the belief distributions of experts
during normal times (Rich and Tracy, 2010). On the other hand, during eco-
nomic downturns, particularly the 1980-82 and the 2007-09 recessions, standard
deviation estimates depend critically on how open-ended intervals are closed as
most of the survey participants assign positive probabilities to the open-ended
bins9.
8See figure A.3 at the Appendix A.1.2.
9Some researchers using SPF’s probabilistic data assume that the width of an open-ended
interval is equal to twice the size of a mid-interval (for example see Lahiri and Liu (2006);
Andrade, Ghysels, and Idier (2012)) and apply uniform smoothing to these histograms to
calculate the moments of these belief distributions. However, this assumption causes the
width of these open-ended bins to be 4% during the 80s and 2% after 90s due to changes in
the bin width in the life of the SPF. Noting that average cross-sectional probability assigned
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1.3.2 Estimation of the SCUs
Once I obtain the individual subjective forecast uncertainty estimates, the next
step is extracting their common component, i.e. the SCUs. As discussed in
section 1.2, the simple cross-sectional average (in line with equation 1.1) may
lead to biased SCU estimates. In this section, I briefly discuss how I handle
these problems and explain how I estimate the SCUs for inflation and output
growth.
Traditional practice of aggregate time series analysis of the SPF conflates changes
in the subjective expectations of individual forecasters with both changes in
panel composition (Engelberg, Manski, and Williams, 2011) and forecaster het-
erogeneity (Keane and Runkle, 1990). The possibility of systematic differences
due to different information sets or systemic biases in subjective expectations are
extensively studied in the literature (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Keane and
Runkle, 1990; Engelberg, Manski, and Williams, 2009). Frequent exiting and
entering behavior of professional forecasters adds another layer of complication
to the interpretation of an aggregate statistic, such as the consensus forecast
or the consensus uncertainty. For example, Engelberg, Manski, and Williams
(2011) compare the consensus inflation forecasts of two groups of forecasters in
the SPF: experts participated in at least two consecutive surveys against the
to these bins are approximately two times during the Great Recession, this assumption adds
another layer of complication to compare these numbers during different periods of the SPF.
Nonetheless, as a robustness check, the SCU estimates are also constructed from subjective
uncertainties of experts that are assumed to be characterized by a three parameter functional
form following (Clements, 2004). The parameters of these distributions are estimated by
minimizing the sum of squared deviations between the observed empirical distributions and
theoretical distribution.
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composite (consists of all participants). They find that the differences in the
inflation forecasts of these groups are sometimes as high as 0.5 percentage points
after 1992, a relatively low inflation period compared to the whole sample. Sim-
ilarly, by comparing the average (cross-sectional) standard deviations of these
two groups, I find that the difference is sometimes more than 0.5% both for
inflation and output growth10. In order to control for the temporal fluctuations
in subjective forecast uncertainties, I use the panel structure of the SPF and
include a set of respondent fixed-effects in equation 1.2.
I have already elaborated on the reasons for why experts’ subjective uncer-
tainties experience the mechanical intra-year declines as the year progresses
and how the changes in panel composition can lead to biased SCU estimates.
To explore how these two forces affect SCU estimates for different time periods
that are determined by the changes in the survey design (i.e. changes number
of bins and changes in bin width) further, I run two types of regressions: (i) the
panel regression of individual subjective uncertainties on seasonal and forecaster
fixed effect dummies and, (ii) the time series regression of cross-sectional aver-
age subjective forecast uncertainties on seasonal dummies. The former adjusts
for the temporal fluctuations in the survey by introducing forecaster fixed ef-
fects whereas the latter does not. Furthermore, I run these regressions both for
the whole and the different sub-samples determined by the structural changes
in the SPF11.
10This is more than 25% of the average subjective standard deviation of inflation or output
growth uncertainty of the composite sample. See figure A.4 in the Appendix A.1.2 for details.
11 If there is a change in the number of pre-assigned intervals by the SPF or if there is a
change in the length of intervals, I consider this as a structural change in the survey. Table A.1
demonstrates that there are 6 and 3 of such episodes for inflation and output growth subjective
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These regressions flesh out two properties regarding the deterministic seasonal-
ity coefficients. First, the coefficients from the panel and the time-series regres-
sions are significantly different form each other in the sense that 90% confidence
intervals do not overlap. Second, the estimated deterministic seasonality coef-
ficients across different subsamples are often significantly different from each
other, i.e. once again the 90% confidence intervals do not overlap. Therefore,
in order to provide comparable subjective uncertainties of experts between dif-
ferent periods, it is important to control for the three sources of potential bias
(i.e. seasonality, structural breaks, and changing panel composition) at the same
time. Consequently, in my preferred specification, in addition to forecaster fixed
effects and mechanical declines seasonality coefficients, I introduce 20 seasonal
dummies for inflation (4 per quarter, and 5 for changes in the SPF design) and
12 for output growth (4 per quarter and 3 for changes in SPF design) to take
effects of the structural breaks into account12.
To control for the panel composition, forecaster heterogeneity and structural
changes in the deterministic seasonality patterns, I estimate the panel regression
appearing in equation 1.2 both for inflation and output growth. The subjective
forecasts respectively. However, as 1973Q2-1974Q4 episode is too short to separately identify
the deterministic seasonality structure for inflation, so I treat 1968Q4-1973Q1 & 1973Q2-
1974Q4 as a single period. Therefore, I have 5 structurally different subsamples for inflation
probabilistic forecasts.
12Andrade, Ghysels, and Idier (2012) points out the time-variation in deterministic season-
ality coefficients only for average subjective uncertainty estimates. Apart from that, these
patterns in subjective forecast uncertainties are mostly overlooked in the literature. See tables
A.6 and A.7 for the exact seasonality coefficient estimates of the panel regression of individual
subjective uncertainties and the time series regression of cross-sectional average subjective
forecast uncertainties both for the whole and the subsamples.
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forecast uncertainty in regression 1.2 is in logs to prevent subjective forecast
uncertainty to be greater than zero at all times. Furthermore, forecasters who
participated just once in the SPF and the occasional survey error periods (see




















where Px is equal to 5 for inflation and 3 for output growth (see footnote 11
on how these values are determined), Dj is a seasonal dummy (equal to 1 in
quarter j), Bk is the interaction dummy (equal to 1 in subsample k), βjk’s are
deterministic seasonality coefficients that are allowed to change in different sub-
samples, Ix is the number of distinct forecasters (312 for inflation and 206 for
output growth uncertainties) in the SPF panel, and ûi,t are fitted values from
eq. The exponential of the error terms in equation 1.2 are subjective forecast
uncertainties that are adjusted for the three problems mentioned above. There-
fore, the cross-sectional averages of these terms are the benchmark inflation and
output growth SCUs (equation 1.3.3)13.
In the final step, I estimate the missing SCU observations. As I mentioned
in section 1.2.2, I report all individual surveys in some dates of the SPF as
13Instead of the cross-sectional average, I also explored taking the median. Unlike the
SCU estimates that are based on the averages, the ones based on the median are slightly
less persistent with AR(1) coefficients 0.91 for inflation and 0.89 for output growth. Apart
from this difference, the SCU estimates based on the median produce quantitatively similar
dynamics as the ones based on the mean so I don’t report median estimates in the paper to
preserve space.
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missing because of differences in the SPF’s intended and experts’ requested
forecast horizon14 which makes these dates incomparable with the rest of the
observations in the SPF. To fill out those missing values, I utilize the next year
inflation and output growth empirical forecast distributions provided by the
SPF. Following the same procedure that I have explained above, first, I esti-
mate the next year inflation and output growth SCUs (data starts from 1981Q3)
and then, I estimate a state-space model to fill out those missing values15.
1.3.3 Discussion
The existing empirical uncertainty literature has so far relied primarily on mea-
sures of volatility and dispersion as proxies or indicators of uncertainty. While
most of these measures have the advantage of being observable, there are vari-
ous factors besides economic uncertainty that cause changes in these indicators.
In this section, I classify these empirical measures into 4 categories and briefly
elaborate on their relationship with the SCUs.
Observed Empirical Proxies: The examples of observed proxies are option-
implied stock market volatility and mentions of phrases like “uncertain” and/or
“uncertainty” in the press16. Bloom (2009) used the VXO index, which mea-
sures the risk neutral expected stock market volatility with a horizon of 30
14 These dates are 1972:Q3, 1974:Q4, 1979:Q2-Q3 and 1980:Q4 only for current inflation;
1985:Q1 and 1986:Q1 for both current inflation and output growth. See Rich and Tracy
(2010) for details.
15I provide the details of the estimation method in the online appendix.
16Bloom (2009); Baker and Bloom (2013) use implied or realized stock market volatility to
measure uncertainty, whereas Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009); Baker and Bloom (2013) use
newspapers such as New York Times or Wall Street Journal to count “uncertainty-related”
keywords
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calender days (22 trading days) from options written on the S&P100 index to
proxy macroeconomic uncertainty17. While implied stock market volatility is
also model-free and ex-ante similar to the SCUs, it is most closely associated
with uncertainty about the stock market returns, not about the macroeconomy.
Additionally, time-varying risk aversion is an important component of the VXO
index (Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca, 2013), and certain events can cause
spikes in risk aversion but the not the uncertainty (see the subsection 4.2 about
a detailed discussion on this issue).
Subjective Cross-Sectional Dispersion (DIS): Several researchers used the
cross sectional dispersion in agents’ subjective point forecasts, i.e. disagreement,













where Nt is the number of participants at survey date t, x is the target vari-
able and Eit(xt+h) is the subjective point estimate of the target variable x at
date t for forecaster i. In order to make equation 1.4 operational, the h-period
ahead value of the target variable (xt+h) is replaced by the consensus forecast
(Ei (µit))).
There are several known drawbacks of subjective cross-sectional dispersions.
First, disagreement in surveys could reflect differences in opinions (Mankiw,
Reis, and Wolfers, 2004) or differences in firms loadings on aggregate shocks in
17The VXO index is unavailable before 1986, so Bloom (2009) combines it with actual stock
market return volatility.
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the absence of time-varying volatility (Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng, 2013) rather
than macroeconomic uncertainty. While disagreement is also subjective similar
to the SCUs, the relationship between disagreement and the average subjective
uncertainty is generally weak and unstable (Lahiri and Liu, 2006; Boero, Smith,
and Wallis, 2008; Rich and Tracy, 2010; Rich, Song, and Tracy, 2012). Second,
point forecasts of experts tend to be more optimistic than the central tendency
measures (mean/median/mode) of probabilistic belief distributions (Engelberg,
Manski, and Williams, 2009). As disagreement is computed from point fore-
casts as opposed to probabilistic distributions, it is also contaminated by these
inconsistencies.
Realized Cross-Sectional Dispersion (DISP):Alternatively, some researchers















where xt is the cross-sectional average of a particular variable at time t, xjt
is the realized value of the variable at time t for agent j (usually a firm) and
Nt is the total number of agents (i.e. panel dimension) at time t. In par-
ticular, Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and
Terry (2012) argue in favor of using unconditional cross sectional dispersion in
firm-level earnings (the Profits), sectoral industrial production (the QIQR) or
firms’ stock returns (the CRSP) to measure uncertainty. Unlike the SCUs, all of
these empirical measures of uncertainty are realized and several factors such as
heterogeneity in the cyclicality of firms business activity or heterogeneity in the
access to credit and firms’ financial conditions causes DISP to change without
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a change in macroeconomic uncertainty.
Time series estimates: Time series methods provide an alternative way of
measuring uncertainty. By specifying a parametric structure for the underlying
target variable and the volatility process, researchers can estimate the uncer-
tainty regarding the underlying target variable. Stochastic volatility or GARCH
type time series models are famous examples of this approach. In contrast to the
SCUs, assuming the postulated model is the correct representation of how the
world works, time series models provide ex-post uncertainty estimates based on
the information set of the econometrician, not the agents in the economy. Fur-
thermore, it is always a possible that the postulated model can be misspecified.
To overcome the problem of dependency of underlying uncertainty on param-
eters of a model, Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2013) construct an aggregate
uncertainty measure by extracting the common component in forecast errors in
hundreds of different economic time series. While their approach breaks reliance
of uncertainty estimates on a specific model, their macroeconomic uncertainty
measure is still based on the information set of the econometrician. On the other
hand, this paper focuses on the common component of the ex-ante subjective
uncertainties faced by experts, so it is complementary to Jurado, Ludvigson,
and Ng (2013)’s analysis on measuring macroeconomic uncertainty.
1.4 Empirical Subjective Consensus Uncertainty
Estimates
I now turn to the Subjective Consensus Uncertainty (SCU) estimates and docu-
ment three sets of findings about them. First, in contrast to one of the recurrent
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themes of the uncertainty measurement literature, in section 1.4.1, I demon-
strate that uncertainty episodes are less frequent and persistently negatively
correlated with economic activity. The deepest recessions in US macroeconomic
history coincide with large increases in the estimated subjective consensus un-
certainty, while the modest declines do not. I show, in section 4.2, that other
commonly used uncertainty measures, in contrast, frequent spikes, both during
recessionary and non-recessionary episodes. Second, in section 1.4.1, I show
that the SCUs can explain more than half of the fluctuations in the subjective
individual forecast uncertainties of experts during recessions. In normal times,
however, SCUs explain about 30-35% of the common movement in the subjective
forecast uncertainties. Finally, in section 4.2, I show that there are significant
independent variations in commonly used empirical uncertainty measures and
the SCUs, most of which cannot be attributed to fluctuations in macroeconomic
uncertainty.
1.4.1 Estimates of Subjective Consensus Uncertainty
Figure 1.1 plots time series estimates of inflation and output growth SCUs to-
gether with NBER recession dates represented by the shaded blue bars. The
matching color horizontal lines correspond to 1.65 standard deviations above the
mean for each series. Figure 1.1 shows that uncertainty represented by either
the inflation or the output growth SCU is strongly countercyclical. A bivariate
regression between the SCUs and NBER recession index or HP-detrended in-
dustrial production confirms a significant negative relationship that is observed
in figure 1.118. Moreover, inflation and output growth uncertainty estimates are
18Table A.8 in Appendix A provides bivariate regressions between the SCUs and several
HP-detrended macroeconomic variables such as the consumer price index, federal funds rate,
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moving in lockstep with a correlation coefficient equal to 75%. Even though,
I compute them from the empirical belief distributions of experts for inflation
and output growth separately, this observation suggests that aggregate ex-ante
predictability in inflation and output growth is mainly proxy the same factor,
which is the aggregate unobserved subjective macroeconomic uncertainty.
Figure 1.1: Inflation and Output Growth SCU Estimates

















Note: Inflation (solid black line) and output growth (dash-dot red line) subjective consensus uncertainty
(SCU) estimates are based on the methodology explained in section 1.3. Data for inflation and output
growth SCUs start from 1968Q4 and 1981Q3 respectively. Horizontal (dash or dash-dot) lines indicate 1.65
standard deviations above the unconditional mean of each series (matching colors and matching for inflation
and output growth SCU). The shaded blue bars are recessions defined according to the NBER Business Cycle
Dating Committee.
total employment in manufacturing sector and S&P500 index. Coefficient estimates from
these regressions suggest that unlike other commonly used empirical uncertainty measures,
the SCUs are significantly correlated with most of these macroeconomic aggregates.
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Interestingly, the SCUs experience a rise during all US recessions, but certain
recessions are more pronounced compared to others. The inflation SCU experi-
ence four heightened uncertainty episodes: one during the 1973-74, two during
the 1980-82 recessions and finally one during the 2007-09 Great Recession as
in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2013). On the other hand, the output growth
SCU estimate experienced only two of such episodes: one during the 1980-1982
recessions and the other one during the Great Recession19. During all height-
ened uncertainty episodes identified by the inflation SCU, uncertainty levels are
fairly close to each other, with the highest in the 1973-74 recession followed by
the 1981-82 as close second, and the Great Recession as third. In terms of the
output growth SCU, figure 1.1 shows roughly the same picture with one major
difference. That is, the Great Recession clearly represents the most striking
episode of heightened uncertainty while the 1981-82 episode is second. Due
to data availability, however, it is not possible to compare with the 1973-74
recession in terms of the output growth uncertainty as the empirical belief dis-
tributions of experts for output growth starts in 1981Q3. Overall, these findings
are consistent with the historical account of the 1973-74 energy crisis, 1980-82
global economic recession and contractionary monetary policy, and the 2007-09
global financial crises.
Table 1.2 lays out several salient features of the inflation and output growth
SCU estimates. First, both the inflation and output growth SCUs suggest
that macroeconomic uncertainty is a highly persistent process unlike what is
19I define heightened uncertainty episodes in excess of 1.65 standard deviations above their
HP-detrended mean following Bloom (2009).
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suggested by conventional uncertainty proxies. According to Table 1.2, the
estimates of the half-life of an innovation from a univariate autoregression of
inflation or output growth SCUs are 12.5 and 10 quarters, whereas the corre-
sponding values for the inflation disagreement and the implied stock market
volatility (VXO) are equal to 1.3 and 2 quarters. The half life estimates of the
SCUs are slightly higher than the ones in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2013),
where they estimate the half-life of macro uncertainty as 10 quarters. Second,
the SCUs are positively skewed but the kurtosis estimates are mostly smaller
compared to other measures such as the implied stock market volatility or mea-
sures of dispersion. This implies that the SCUs experience less frequent spikes
(less extreme values), which is also consistent with figures 1.1 and 1.220.
Third, the SCUs are persistently countercyclical with respect to industrial pro-
duction. In particular, their contemporaneous correlation with HP-detrended
industrial production is equal to -0.51 and -0.64 for inflation and output growth
respectively21. Even though most of the comovement between uncertainty and
economic activity is associated with their contemporaneous correlation, a signifi-
cant part of the comovement between them can also be attributed to uncertainty
both leading and lagging real activity22. For example, the correlation between
current uncertainty and 1 quarter ahead real activity is equal to -0.6 whereas
20Appendix A.2 provides figures for the standardized (i.e. with mean zero and standard
deviation one) commonly used uncertainty measures against the SCUs. Consistent with high
kurtosis and low AR(1) coefficient estimates, other commonly used empirical uncertainty
measures experience frequent spikes both during the recessions and normal times.
21I choose the smoothing parameter (i.e. λ) for the HP-filter as 129,600. However, the
bivariate regressions in table A.8 or cross-correlograms in figure A.5 quantitatively give close
results whether I utilize HP-detrended industrial production or the quarterly industrial pro-
duction growth.
22For details, see figure A.5 at the appendix A.5
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the same number for current real activity and 1 quarter ahead uncertainty is
equal to -0.61. Qualitatively, similar results hold for the inflation SCU as well.
That said, these are all unconditional correlations and do not tell us anything
about causality, but it seems that there is a strong relation between the SCUs
and real activity.
An interesting question about empirical analysis of uncertainty is whether uncer-
tainty shocks are persistent enough to explain prolonged periods of below-trend
economic growth. Typically, in models where uncertainty plays a key role in
explaining business cycle dynamics calibrate uncertainty as a strongly persistent
process (e.g. Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012);
Schaal (2012)). However, existing empirical uncertainty proxies such as the (im-
plied) stock market volatility, cross sectional dispersion in firms’ profits, stock
returns or production differences are not persistent enough to prolonged periods
of below-trend economic growth and unemployment, in particular (during and)
the post-Great Recession era. However, the SCU estimates suggest that sub-
jective uncertainty is a highly persistent process and is strongly associated with
industrial production, which also aligns with the macro uncertainty estimates
in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2013).
The SCUs are model-free macroeconomic uncertainty measures that are defined
as the common movements in the ex-ante predictability about future values of
inflation or the output growth. A question that may arise about this common
component is whether its explanatory power in summarizing the variations in
subjective forecast uncertainties of experts is constant in different subsamples.
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Table 1.1: Marginal R2s from Regression of Subjective Forecast
Uncertainties on SCUs
σits Whole Sample Non-Recession Recession
π Current Year 0.359 0.290 0.479
∆y Current Year 0.414 0.312 0.491
π Next Year 0.315 0.261 0.435
∆y Next Year 0.303 0.235 0.421
Note: Marginal R2 describes the proportion of variance of current/next year inflation or output growth
subjective forecast uncertainties explained by the SCU factor(s) alone. Regressing current/next year inflation
or output growth subjective forecast uncertainties, i.e. σi,t, on either fixed effects dummies (i.e. subsample




k=1 βjk Dj×Bk where Dj is a seasonal dummy interacted
with subsample dummy Bk and Px is equal to 5 for current year inflation and 3 for the others) or fixed effects
dummies and the current year inflation or the output growth SCUs respectively, I calculate the contribution
of SCUs on the increase in R2. These regressions discard forecasters participated just once in the SPF and
the occasional survey error periods similar to equation 1.2. Recessions are defined according to the NBER
Business Cycle Dating Committee.
To answer this question, I regress the current and the next year subjective
forecast uncertainties on the SCUs using the whole, the recession or the non-
recession samples. If the importance of the SCUs in explaining the proportion
of variance of inflation or output growth subjective forecast uncertainties, this
would be revealed in the estimated marginal R2 values.
Table 1.1 shows that the explanatory power of the SCUs on the current and
the next year subjective forecast uncertainties increases during recessions23. For
instance, inflation SCU increases the proportion of variance in current year in-
flation subjective forecast uncertainties of experts by 36% for the whole sample,
23As explained in section 1.2.1, the SPF also provides discretized belief distributions of
experts for the next year inflation and output growth probabilistic forecasts as well. Therefore,
I estimate the experts’ subjective uncertainties from the next year inflation and output growth
empirical belief distributions following the estimation methodology outlined in section 1.3.1.
The next year regressions provided in Table 1.1 use next year subjective forecast uncertainties
of experts as the dependent and the current year SCU as the independent variable.
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whereas during recessions, marginal R2 jumps to 48%. For the next year infla-
tion subjective forecast uncertainties of experts, the increase in the explanatory
power of the inflation inflation is approximately 12 percentage points as well,
i.e. from 31% to 43%. Similar tendency holds for output growth subjective
uncertainty of experts.
1.4.2 The SCUs versus Other Commonly Used Uncer-
tainty Proxies
Researchers so far have relied on various empirical uncertainty measures to doc-
ument the relationship between economic uncertainty and economic activity.
While implied or actual stock market volatility stands out as the most popular
one, other empirical uncertainty measures are also extensively used in the liter-
ature. In this section, I compare the empirical properties of the SCU estimates
with these uncertainty measures, particularly focusing on option-implied stock
market volatility and disagreement.
To compare the fluctuations in implied stock market volatility against the SCUs,
I update the VXO index used by Bloom (2009) and plot the standardized values
of these series in figure 1.2. Bloom (2009) constructed his benchmark measure
of uncertainty shocks by selecting 17 months with VXO that is 1.65 standard
deviation above its HP-detrended mean24. Here, I followed the same strategy
with the VXO index in quarterly frequency and I identified 9 quarters which
are shown as vertical lines in figure 1.2.
24Bloom finds 17 of such months in his paper. However, extending the sample period to
2013Q3 introduces one more spike in VXO that happened in September 2011, which seems
to be also apparent in quarterly frequency as well. Identified uncertainty episodes in terms
of monthly and quarterly frequency are reported in table A.9 at the Appendix.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Uncertainty Measured By:
Statistic π SCU ∆y SCU VXO EPU CRSP Profits QIQR π DIS ∆y DIS
AR(1) 0.95 0.94 0.71 0.81 0.71 0.85 0.76 0.58 0.25
Half-Life 14.07 11.34 2.04 3.31 2.03 4.25 2.57 1.26 0.51
Std 0.08 0.08 6.87 30.58 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.20 0.14
Skewness 0.47 0.82 2.00 0.83 1.45 0.37 2.36 1.17 0.85
Kurtosis 3.75 4.40 10.57 3.36 5.77 3.18 9.12 4.12 3.87
|corr(IP,U)| -0.44 -0.59 -0.36 -0.31 -0.43 -0.17 -0.52 -0.20 -0.41
maxk |corr(IP,U)| -0.45 -0.64 -0.40 -0.40 -0.43 -0.28 -0.52 -0.20 -0.41
k = -1 -1 1 -10 0 -3 0 0 0
Obs. 180 129 180 115 180 180 167 180 129
Note:
1. This table summarizes various descriptive statistics for the inflation and output growth SCUs along with
other commonly used empirical uncertainty measures. Commonly used empirical uncertainty measures pre-
sented in this table are: (i) the VXO index, i.e. the option-implied stock market volatility index derived from
options written on S&P100 stock market index, (ii) Google News index, i.e. the subindex that is the economic
uncertainty component of economic policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012), (iii) Profits,
i.e. the within-quarter cross-sectional spread of profit growth rates normalized by average sales (Bloom, 2009;
Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry, 2012), (iv) QIQR, i.e. the interquartile range of the
industrial production growth for manufacturing industries (Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and
Terry, 2012), (v) CRSP, i.e. the within quarter cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-level stock returns
for firms with 500+ months of data in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (Bloom, 2009) and, (vi)
π DIS and ∆y DIS, i.e. the cross sectional standard deviation of mean probabilistic forecasts for inflation or
output growth derived from the fitted distributions by the methodology explained in section 1.3.1.
2. The half-lives are based on the response of an uncertainty measure (U) governed by columns of table
1.2 to its own innovation from a univariate AR(1) model. |corr(∆(log IP ), U)| is the absolute contempo-
raneous correlation coefficient between HP-detrended log industrial production and the U . On the other
hand, maxk |corr(∆(IP),U)| is the absolute cross-correlation coefficient between U in period t and quar-
terly log industrial production growth in period t + k, i.e. |corr(∆(IP),U)| = max−8≤k≤8 |corr(IPt+k),Ut)|.
argmaxk |corr(∆(IP),U)| is the k that maximizes cross-correlation between HP-detrended log industrial pro-
duction and the relevant U . A positive (negative) k means the relevant uncertainty measure is correlated with
the future (past) industrial production growth. Finally, Obs. is the number of observations that I have for
each U .
While implied stock market volatility and the SCUs are positively correlated,
with correlation coefficients 0.35 and 0.55 for inflation and output growth re-
spectively, the VXO index experiences many sharp spikes. Interestingly, most
of these spikes in the VXO index are not picked up by the SCUs. For exam-
ple, “Black Monday” spike in October 1987, which includes the largest single
day decline recorded in stock market, is easily identified by the VXO index.
Although this may be an indication of a dramatic rise in stock market uncer-
tainty, the SCU estimates reflecting the subjective macroeconomic uncertainty
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barely increase in October 1987. More importantly, the level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which is proxied by the VXO index, is historically at its second
highest peak even if 1987 is not a recession year. Besides “Black Monday”,
there are other important episodes that the VXO index and the SCU estimates
substantially disagree. In particular, the VXO index surges during other non-
recessionary periods such as during the LTCM crisis in 1998Q3, Enron scandal
in 2002Q3 or the Debt-ceiling crisis in 2011Q3. While all of them can be con-
sidered as heightened stock market uncertainty episodes, it is hard to interpret
them as heightened macroeconomic uncertainty episodes.
Table 1.3: SCU Regressed on Other Uncertainty Proxies
Different Uncertainty Proxies
SCU: VXO QIQR Profits CRSP Google Disagreement
corr(π, U) 0.342 0.530 0.067 0.344 0.359 0.309
# of Obs. 180 167 180 180 115 180
corr(∆y, U) 0.555 0.607 0.210 0.556 0.412 0.495
# of Obs. 129 129 129 129 115 129
Notes: This table reports the correlations between either inflation (π) or output growth (∆y) SCU against
various empirical uncertainty measures (U) governed by each column of the table 1.3. These empirical un-
certainty measures are explained in detail in table 1.2 above. Disagreement in the last column of table 1.3 is
inflation disagreement or output growth disagreement matching inflation or output growth SCU measure.
There are various reasons for surges in the implied stock market volatility be-
sides economic uncertainty. First, these increases are mainly related with stock
market returns but rarely with macroeconomic variables. Second, implied stock
market volatility appears to have a large component primarily driven by factors
associated with time-varying risk aversion rather than economic uncertainty
Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013). To understand the role of time-varying
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risk aversion during the heightened uncertainty episodes, following Bekaert, Ho-
erova, and Lo Duca (2013), I project the future monthly realized variances (de-
rived by 5-minute returns of the S&P500 index) on the current realized volatility
and the implied volatility measured by the VIX index25. The fitted values from
this regression are time-varying uncertainty whereas the residual, i.e. the differ-
ence between the actual and the fitted volatilities, is time-varying risk aversion.
While the details of this procedure explained in Appendix A.2.1, Table 1.4
demonstrates the levels and the contribution of the time-varying risk aversion
and the stock market uncertainty to the jumps in the VIX index for some of
Bloom’s heightened uncertainty episodes.
Table 1.4: The Risk Aversion vs The Stock Market Uncertainty
RA RA/VIX (%) UC UC/VIX (%)
Average 7.42 26.99 17.72 73.01
1998Q2 19.54 50.93 18.83 49.07
2002Q2 15.63 31.52 33.97 68.48
2008Q1 9.84 29.38 23.65 70.62
2008Q4 30.82 35.94 54.94 64.06
2011Q2 16.32 41.87 22.66 58.13
Note: Table 1.4 presents the levels and part of the spike in the VIX index that is associated with time-varying
risk aversion and stock market uncertainty as a percentage of the VIX index for fairly recent heightened
uncertainty episodes identified by Bloom (2009). Time-varying stock market uncertainty is identified by
projecting future realized stock market variance (derived by 5-minute returns of the S&P500 index) into
current realized stock market variance and the squared VIX index. On the other hand, the time-varying risk
aversion is the residual of the difference between the squared VIX and the stock market uncertainty term.
The details of this decomposition appears in the Appendix A.2.1. The sample period for the estimation is
January 3, 1994 - December 31, 2013.
25The VIX index is constructed from the prices on a hypothetical at the money option
contracts written on the S&P500 Index rather than the S&P100 Index as is the case for the
VXO. Although the VIX and the VXO indices are slightly different empirical measures of
implied stock market volatility, they have quite similar time series properties. For instance,
the correlation level between these objects is equal to 98% and this is the main reason why I
treat these indices as close substitutes.
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Figure 1.2: SCUs and Implied Stock Market Volatility



















Note: The VXO Index, inflation and output growth SCU estimates are presented in standardized units.
Bloom counts uncertainty episodes by the number of times the stock market volatility index exceeds 1.65
standard deviations above its Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filtered trend in monthly frequency. Extending his
sample to current date and applying his methodology in quarterly frequency identifies 9 heightened uncertainty
episodes shown by black vertical lines in figure 1.2. Table A.9 at the appendix provides the heightened
uncertainty dates both in monthly and quarterly frequency. The horizontal (green) dashed-line corresponds
to 1.65 standard deviations above the unconditional mean of each series (which has been normalized to zero).
The shaded bars are recessions defined according to the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
Table 1.4 shows that time-varying risk aversion can explain approximately one
third of the fluctuations in the VIX index during the years 1993 - 201326. While
the lion’s share of the fluctuations in the VIX index can be attributed to stock
market uncertainty, the contribution of risk aversion as a percentage of the VIX
index significantly increases during Bloom’s heightened uncertainty episodes.
26Due to data availability, I only focus on the recent heightened uncertainty episodes iden-
tified by Bloom (2009).
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The spikes in risk aversion, for instance, can explain on average more than half
of the spikes in the VIX index in these episodes. In particular, during the LTCM
crisis in 1998Q2, 64% the jump in the VXO index is attributed to spike in time-
varying risk aversion. Even during the Great Recession, half of the jump in the
VIX index can be attributed to the jump in risk aversion. On the other hand,
the SCUs experience minor increases during these episodes except for the Great
Recession. All said, it seems the jumps in the risk aversion explain significant
portion of the spikes in the VIX index, so heightened uncertainty episodes iden-
tified by Bloom (2009) are mainly driven by fluctuations in the risk aversion
rather than stock market uncertainty.
Another commonly used empirical uncertainty proxy is disagreement27 even
though, the evidence regarding the relationship between the two is generally
weak. While the contemporaneous correlation in these series seem to be in the
0.33-0.48 range, similar to the VXO index, both inflation and output growth
disagreement series experience frequent spikes as presented in Figure 1.3. For
instance, 1986-1988 episode, which includes “Black Monday”, stands out to be
a period of high disagreement but low macroeconomic uncertainty (as measured
by either of the SCUs).
One simple way to summarize the differences in opinions and subjective uncer-
tainties at a point in time is to create a two-dimensional plot with subjective
27Several papers including Ferderer (1993); Leahy and Whited (1996); Bomberger (1996);
Giordani and Söderlind (2003); Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008); Popescu and Smets (2010)
and Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012) used disagreement as a proxy for macroeconomic uncer-
tainty.
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Figure 1.3: Non-Zero Probability Assigned to the
Lowest-Extreme Bin

































Note: Figure 1.3a present inflation disagreement and inflation SCU estimates, whereas figure 1.3b present
output growth disagreement and output growth SCU estimates in standardized units. The horizontal (green)
dashed-line corresponds to 1.65 standard deviations above the unconditional mean of each series (which has
been normalized to zero). The solid lines in both these figures are disagreement whereas the dashed lines are
the SCU estimates. The shaded bars are recessions defined according to the NBER Business Cycle Dating
Committee.
mean point forecast in one axis and the subjective forecast uncertainty in the
other. To illustrate the differences in opinions against subjective forecast uncer-
tainties, figure 1.4 presents two separate plots for inflation and output growth
in 1987Q4. In each figure, I plot the subjective forecast uncertainties of ex-
perts that are adjusted for forecaster heterogeneity and structural changes in
the deterministic seasonality patterns (i.e. equation 1.3.3) on the y-axis against
the subjective mean probabilistic forecast that are derived from empirical belief
distributions of experts on the x-axis. Therefore, each point represents a unique
forecaster participated in the SPF in 1987Q4 survey. The intersection of the
two straight lines in these figures represent the historical average of inflation or
output growth SCU estimate against the consensus forecast in 1987Q4 about
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the next year’s inflation or output growth. When the points are dispersed hori-
zontally, disagreement in the central tendency of forecasts is high, whereas if the
points cluster towards the top, forecasters tend to feel more uncertain compared
to historical averages of the SCUs. Consistent with the time series estimates of
the disagreement and the SCUs, figure 1.4 confirms that forecasters in the SPF
highly disagree about the next year’s inflation and output growth in 1987Q4.
However, majority of the points are below the historical averages of the relevant
SCU measure, suggesting that they feel less uncertain about their subjective
mean point forecast.
Figure 1.4: Subjective Forecast Uncertainty against Subjective
Mean Forecast: 1987Q4
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(a) Inflation


































Mean Point Forecast (%)
(b) Output Growth
Note: Scatter plots of subjective forecast uncertainty and subjective mean point forecasts of experts both for
inflation and output growth in 1987Q4. Subjective forecast uncertainties are the exponential of the error terms
in equation 1.2 whereas subjective mean point forecasts derived from the fitted generalized beta distributions
explained in section 1.3.1. The vertical red lines are the consensus forecasts (cross sectional averages) of the
next year inflation or output growth subjective mean point forecasts. The horizontal lines are the historical
averages of either the inflation or the output growth SCU estimates.
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Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the descriptive statistics and correlations between com-
monly used uncertainty proxies against the SCUs. First, realized cross-sectional
dispersion measures (derived from micro level firm data) exhibit mostly lower
and/or less persistent correlation with the HP-detrended industrial production.
Second, their correlation with the SCUs are in 0.1 - 0.57 range but they all
experience more frequent spikes than the SCUs. For instance, almost all of
these empirical uncertainty measures experience a major spike during 2001,
even though this recession is less severe than the 1980-82 or 2007-09 recessions.
On the other hand, the SCUs experience a minor increase compared to their
unconditional average. Taken together, these findings suggest that commonly
used uncertainty measures are weakly associated with movements in macroe-
conomic uncertainty, whereas factors such as heterogeneity in the cyclicality of
firms business activity, disagreement in opinions or time varying risk aversion
seem to be important drivers in these proxies.
1.5 Economic Uncertainty and Macroeconomic
Dynamics
Apart from uncertainty proxies being countercyclical, the existing empirical re-
search on uncertainty often finds important dynamics between fluctuations in
economic uncertainty and real activity. In subsection 1.5.1, I compare the dy-
namic relationship between the SCUs and other commonly used uncertainty
measures against macroeconomic aggregates. To do so, I use an 8 variable
recursively identified VAR model that has been previously employed in the un-
certainty literature as in Bloom (2009). In his work, Bloom (2009) found a
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strong countercyclical relationship between real activity and uncertainty mea-
sured by the VXO index. His VAR estimates suggest that an innovation to
uncertainty first sharply depresses real activity with effects remaining signif-
icantly below the long-run trend for the first six to seven months, and then
real activity significantly overshoots its long-run trend in the medium term.
While this pattern is consistent with the predictions of the theories that con-
sider uncertainty as a driving force of business cycle fluctuations, I show that
this empirical prediction depends on the empirical uncertainty measure that
is used to proxy macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast to Bloom (2009), I
demonstrate that an innovation to uncertainty measured by either of the SCUs
leads to sizable and protracted declines in production and employment without
exhibiting a “volatility overshoot”.
An important unresolved issue for empirical analysis of uncertainty concerns
whether heightened economic uncertainty is a symptom rather than a cause
of macroeconomic fluctuations (e.g. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006),
Bachmann and Moscarini (2012), Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakraǰsek (2014) and Cal-
dara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakraǰsek (2013)). However, the baseline
specification that is presented in subsection 1.5.1 implicitly assumes that un-
certainty is cause. To make progress with this problem, in subsection 1.5.2, I
propose a small scale sign-identified VAR model that identifies structural un-
certainty shocks conditioning on financial fragility. The results suggest that
while innovations to uncertainty leads to protracted declines in production, the
magnitudes of the declines are much smaller compared to baseline VAR esti-
mates. In fact, the bigger fraction of the fluctuations in production can be
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explained by innovations to financial conditions rather than the innovations to
uncertainty similar to Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakraǰsek (2013).
Furthermore, online appendix28 provides results of a large number of robust-
ness exercises ranging from alternative ordering schemes for Cholesky identifi-
cation to broad macroeconomic variables rather than using manufacturing sec-
tor related variables as in this section. Overall, results presented in the online
appendix are qualitatively consistent the ones presented in this section.
1.5.1 Benchmark VAR
In this section, following the existing empirical research, I use VARs to in-
vestigate the dynamic relationship between two key macroeconomic variables:
production and employment against an innovation to macroeconomic uncer-
tainty which is either measured by the inflation or the output growth SCUs.
To put these results into perspective, I re-estimate the same VAR with differ-
ent empirical uncertainty measures that are presented in subsection 30, and
compare the results with the ones generated by the SCUs. I generally refer
these innovations as uncertainty shocks, but this depends on the ordering of
the variables as identification achieved by Cholesky orthogonalization. Bloom
(2009) traced out the responses of production and employment to a 4 standard
deviation shock to uncertainty, which is measured by the VXO index, from a
VAR that consists of the following 8 variables: the log of the S&P 500 index,
an uncertainty measure, federal funds rate, log of wages, log of Consumer Price
Index, log of hours worked, log of employment and log of industrial production
28Provide the link for the online appendix from my webpage.
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index in that order. Here, I take his identification scheme as given and use
several uncertainty measures as well as implied stock market volatility.29.
Figure 1.5 shows the dynamic responses of industrial production and employ-
ment in the baseline recursively identified 8 variable VAR model. Shocks to
uncertainty are measured either by inflation or output growth SCU lead to
slowly-building and economically significant declines in production and employ-
ment with effects remaining statistically significant up to 4 years. The solid red
(with cross) and green (with diamond) lines compare the point estimate of the
responses of the same variables when either the VXO index or disagreement
(inflation disagreement for the first row of figure 1.5 whereas the output growth
disagreement for the second row) is used as a proxy for uncertainty. While both
of these proxies lead to contractions in real activity measures and the initial re-
sponses generated by them are statistically indistinguishable, the difference in
magnitude and the persistence of the responses of production and employment
strikingly different from each other particularly after the third quarter that un-
certainty shock hits to economy. This once again underscores two findings of
the section 4.2: (i) the persistent nature of SCUs compared to other uncer-
tainty proxies, (ii) the persistent correlations of the SCUs with the economic
activity30. In particular, the response of employment to a VXO or disagree-
ment disturbance is barely statistically different when the shock is realized31
29All VARs reported in this section have 4 lags and for each case identification is achieved
by recursive ordering. Finally, similar to Bloom (2009), I detrend all variables besides the
empirical uncertainty measure by using Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter with the smoothing
parameter λ = 129, 600.
30See table 1.2 in section and figure A.5 in appendix A.2 for details.
31Instead of providing the confidence intervals of employment or production response to
VXO or disagreement shock, I provide point estimates of the impulse responses to make these
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Figure 1.5: IR of Production and Employment: Shock to the















































































Note: The baseline VAR estimation consists of 8 variables identified by Cholesky decomposition. The order
of variables is log of S&P 500 index, uncertainty proxy, federal funds rate, log of wages (manufacturing sector),
log of Consumer Price Index, log of hours worked (manufacturing sector), log of employment (manufacturing
sector) and log of industrial production index. Impulse response functions trace out the dynamics of Industrial
Production and manufacturing employment to a 4 standard deviation shock to the relevant uncertainty proxy,
which can be either the inflation (π) or the output growth (∆y) SCU, VXO or the disagreement (i.e. the
inflation disagreement for figures in the first row and the output growth disagreement otherwise). For all
figures, the coverage of dark shaded areas are 66% while the coverage of dark and light shaded ones are 90%
confidence intervals using Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
but they quickly rebound within 2 to 3 quarters. However, as also documented
by Bloom (2009), a shock to VXO index leads statistically significant “volatility
magnitudes comparable to the ones generated by the SCUs.
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Note: The baseline VAR estimation consists of 8 variables identified by Cholesky decomposition. The order
of variables is log of S&P 500 index, uncertainty proxy, federal funds rate, log of wages (manufacturing sector),
log of Consumer Price Index, log of hours worked (manufacturing sector), log of employment (manufacturing
sector) and log of industrial production index. Impulse response functions trace out the dynamics of Industrial
Production and manufacturing employment to a 4 standard edition shock to the relevant uncertainty proxy:
(i) the inflation (π) or the output growth (∆y) SCU, (ii) the Google News index (Baker, Bloom, and Davis,
2012), (iii) the Profits, i.e. the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm profits (Bloom, 2009), (iv) the
QIQR, i.e. the interquantile range of the industrial production growth for manufacturing industries (Bloom,
Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry, 2012), and (v) the CRSP, i.e. the within quarter cross-
sectional standard deviation of firm-level stock returns for rm with 500+ months of data in the Center for
Research in Securities Prices (Bloom, 2009). The details of these uncertainty proxies are provided in section
30. For all figures, the coverage of dark shaded areas are 66% while the coverage of dark and light shaded
ones are 90% confidence intervals using Kilian (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
overshoot” in both the real activity and the employment following the initial de-
cline after a positive uncertainty shock. Interestingly, this “volatility overshoot”
pattern generated by a VXO disturbance is a robust finding that continues to
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hold under different VAR specifications32.
On the other hand, figure 1.6 documents the responses of the same macroe-
conomic variables to an innovation to uncertainty measured by other empirical
uncertainty proxies, besides implied stock market volatility or disagreement.
Overall, these measures generate broadly similar responses in production and
employment as the VXO index. In particular, the initial responses of employ-
ment and production are statistically indistinguishable during first two to three
quarters. Once the maximum decline in economic activity is materialized, de-
pending on the uncertainty measure, production either goes back to its long
run level or overshoots it33. For employment, on the other hand, innovations
generated by different uncertainty measures have roughly the same pattern as
production. Besides the QIQR, all empirical uncertainty measures generate
small increases in employment. This finding, however, sharply contrasts with
uncertainty innovations originated from the SCUs which are in line with the
type of employment and production responses that Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng
(2013) documents in their VAR applications. Finally, the responses to uncer-
tainty shocks governed by other commonly used uncertainty indices are not as
large as the ones generated by the SCUs.
To evaluate the importance of uncertainty shocks in explaining macroeconomic
dynamics, table 1.5 documents the forecast error variance decomposition for
32These results are presented in the online appendix.
33While I do not present the confidence intervals for employment and production responses
to an innovation to either one of the commonly used uncertainty measure, the overshooting
responses of production are mostly significant in 66% confidence intervals.
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production and employment for the baseline recursively identified 8 variable
VAR. In this table, h represents the forecast horizon where I report the fraction
of the VAR forecast error variance that is attributable to different uncertainty
measures. Specifically, each column represents a VAR using different uncer-
tainty measure. Finally, Max is the greatest fraction of VAR forecast error
variance of the employment and production that can be explained by an uncer-
tainty disturbance at the horizon h (denoted by h at Max in the table 1.5).
Table 1.5 reports that the SCU shocks are associated with much larger frac-
tion of the variance of in real activity then with other empirical uncertainty
proxies. For instance, shocks to implied stock market volatility are associated
with a maximum of 11.7% of the forecast error variance in production and 7.6%
of the forecast error variance in employment. On the other hand, the corre-
sponding values for the inflation and output growth SCUs are in the 25% -
33% range, which are almost twice the size of the forecast error variance that
can be explained by the implied stock market volatility. Broadly speaking, this
pattern holds for all other commonly used uncertainty measures. Furthermore,
the explanatory power of the SCUs on the forecast error variance of production
and employment is slowly building up which is once again consistent with the
persistent nature of these series.
Of course, the variance decomposition results presented in Table 1.5 are specific
to ordering of the variables that are included in the VAR. An alternative ap-
proach is to place uncertainty as the last variable and document the effects of
uncertainty shocks once I remove the endogenous variations that are attributed
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to other variables. These results are presented at the online appendix but I
discuss some of them here. When I order uncertainty as the last variable in the
8 variable VAR presented above, innovations to uncertainty measured either by
inflation or output growth SCU can explain approximately 15-20% of the fore-
cast error variance in production and employment, which is approximately the
twice the size of the forecast error variance that can be explained by anyone of
the commonly used uncertainty proxies. These variance decomposition results
are quantitatively similar to ones reported here even if I include both the in-
flation (or output growth) SCU and another commonly used uncertainty proxy
and re-estimate the VAR with 9 instead of 8 variables34. From such VARs, it
seems that shocks to any one of the commonly used uncertainty proxy mainly
explained by shocks to itself rather than shocks to either inflation or output
growth uncertainty. For the 9 variable VAR specification, on the other hand,
the SCU (either inflation or output growth) can explain bigger fraction of the
forecast error variance in production and employment compared to anyone of
the commonly used uncertainty proxies.
These results reinforces two important findings. First, fluctuations in commonly
used uncertainty proxies are driven largely by shocks other than fluctuations in
macroeconomic uncertainty. Second, the effects of uncertainty shocks can still
explain a non-trivial share of forecast error variance of production and employ-
ment, which aligns with the theories showing macroeconomic uncertainty has
important implications for economic activity.
34For these VARs, the commonly used uncertainty proxy is ordered as the second whereas
the SCU (either inflation or output growth) is ordered as the third variable.
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Table 1.5: Relative Importance of Different Uncertainty Measures in the VAR
π SCU ∆y SCU VXO CRSP Google Profits QIQR DISInf DISGrw
Industrial Production
h = 1 1.15 6.81 0.38 1.97 4.49 0.97 11.66 2.47 3.55
h = 4 4.43 24.72 4.20 1.38 4.38 0.90 10.74 1.10 9.20
h = 8 18.68 32.27 11.72 0.95 3.34 4.65 6.53 0.79 12.02
h = ∞ 24.86 22.53 10.34 1.08 13.35 6.05 5.36 3.27 8.86
Max 25.82 32.80 11.74 2.67 13.35 6.32 16.15 3.74 12.02
h at Max 16 8 10 3 24 14 3 1 9
Employment
h = 1 1.71 3.07 2.15 1.53 5.65 0.55 8.00 4.24 2.42
h = 4 4.04 20.78 1.52 0.67 2.76 0.34 8.79 1.16 5.15
h = 8 17.54 35.75 6.10 0.39 1.37 3.46 5.46 0.63 8.34
h = ∞ 23.74 24.68 7.64 1.17 17.20 5.88 3.91 3.62 6.57
Max 25.74 35.75 7.64 1.53 17.20 6.31 12.14 5.86 8.41
h at Max 14 9 24 2 24 15 3 1 10
Note: The baseline VAR estimation consists of 8 variables, all of which (beside the empirical uncertainty mea-
sure) detrended by the filter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997), identified by Cholesky decomposition. The order
of variables is log of S&P 500 index, uncertainty proxy, federal funds rate, log of wages (manufacturing sector),
log of Consumer Price Index, log of hours worked (manufacturing sector), log of employment (manufacturing
sector) and log of industrial production index. The uncertainty proxies are: (i) inflation (π) or output growth
(∆y) SCU, (ii) Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012), (iii) Profits is
the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm profits (Bloom, 2009), (iv) QIQR is the interquantile range of
the industrial production growth for manufacturing industries (Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten,
and Terry, 2012), (v) CRSP is the within quarter cross-sectional standard deviation of rm-level stock returns
for rm with 500+ months of data in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (Bloom, 2009) and, (vi)
disagreement is the mean point forecasts of density histograms adjusted for deterministic seasonality where
first row is the inflation and second row is the output growth disagreement. Each column shows the fraction
of forecast-error variance of the variable given in the panel title at VAR forecast horizon h that is explained
by the uncertainty measure named in the column. The row denoted “max” gives the the maximum fraction of
forecast error variance that uncertainty variable named in the column explains forecast error variance of either
industrial production or employment in the manufacturing sector. The raw “h at Max” gives the horizon h
that fraction of the maximum forecast error variance explained at “max”.
48
1.5.2 Sign-Identified VAR
There are two fundamental concerns regarding the identification of the struc-
tural uncertainty shocks by a recursively identified VAR. First one is about
which variables to be included into the empirical method. While the baseline
VAR specification presented in subsection 1.5.1 closely follows Bloom (2009),
this empirical specification assumes that fluctuations in uncertainty is a cause
rather than the result of macroeconomic fluctuations. However, several re-
searchers suggest alternative mechanisms leading to endogenous increases in
macroeconomic uncertainty (e.g. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006),
Bachmann and Moscarini (2012), Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakraǰsek (2014), and
Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2014)). A promising mecha-
nism that has been suggested by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) and Caldara,
Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakraǰsek (2013) is the role of financial fragility
for generating endogenous increases in macroeconomic uncertainty. However, as
documented by Stock and Watson (2012), financial distress and macroeconomic
uncertainty are highly contemporaneously correlated, this makes the identifi-
cation of structural uncertainty and financial fragility shocks a hard problem
to solve. In particular, as the indicators of these variables are relatively fast
moving, it is highly controversial to identify these shocks by means of equality
restrictions as in the recursively identified VAR.
Second, Bloom (2009) assumes that causality starts from an innovation to un-
certainty, which is controlled by first moment shocks that are captured by stock
market, then runs into the prices and finally affects the real variables. Even
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without including a variable that measures the financial conditions, zero re-
strictions in this setup not easy to defend in economic grounds.
Instead of leaning on the equality restrictions as in subsection 1.5.1 which are
rarely supported by economic theory, here I provide an alternative identification
mechanism to recover the structural uncertainty shocks with an empirical VAR
model. The identification strategy relies on economically motivated inequality
(sign) restrictions on the impulse response functions. However, this strategy
comes with a cost; that is, I can only achieve a set identification that consists
of several structural models whereas Cholesky decomposition provides a unique
model.
To recover the structural uncertainty shocks, I employ a quarterly 5-variable
VAR of lag order 4. The variables in the empirical VAR model consists of log
of CPI, log of production, FFR, either the inflation or the output growth SCU
and the Excess Bond Premium (EBP) index of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
to capture the dynamics in the financial fragility. Similar to benchmark VAR
estimates, I detrend all variables besides the SCU and the EBP. I normalize
both the sign and the scale of the contemporaneous impact of structural shocks
on their own variable. Finally, I explore the dynamic effects of a 4 standard
deviation shocks to uncertainty and financial fragility on production.
Rationale for This Specification
There are three variables that are included in the VAR model to capture the
macroeconomic dynamics in the US: consumer prices and industrial production,
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representing the non-policy block and the federal funds rate, representing the
policy block. While most of the literature has preferred larger sets of variables,
there are a few existing papers that characterize the macroeconomic dynamics
with only three variables similar to mine35. Here, the choice is mostly due to
computational reasons, whereas the alternative would be to use a wider set of
variables at the cost of the computational time. I extend this framework by in-
cluding the baseline uncertainty measure (the SCU) and a variable that captures
the conditions in financial fragility, i.e. Excess Bond Premium - EBP (Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek, 2012). In short, a previously studied small scale VAR allows for
the use of sensible, relatively well-understood identification techniques to par-
simoniously estimate the dynamic impacts of structural shocks to uncertainty
or financial fragility on the production.
Potential Identifying Restrictions
There are three sets of restriction that recover two structural shocks in the 5-
variable VAR presented above. These structural shocks are either structural
uncertainty or financial fragility shocks identified by the following restrictions:
1. Effects of Uncertainty on Production and Financial Conditions:
I assume that a positive structural shock to uncertainty does not raise
35See Primiceri (2005) and references therein for the papers that identifies monetary policy
shocks in small and large scale empirical VAR models.
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production and does not improve the financial conditions36. In intu-
itive terms, these set of sign restrictions are easily justifiable on the ba-
sis of economic theory. In theory, as long as there is a curvature in
the objective function of an agent and actions are at least partially ir-
reversible, increases in uncertainty depresses hiring, investment, or con-
sumption (Bloom, 2014). When uncertainty increases, either due to risk
aversion or real option dynamics, agents become more cautious and wait
uncertainty to dissolve. On the other hand, in the presence of financial
constraints, a rise in uncertainty leads tighter financial constraints which
binds the investment or consumption expenditure of agents (Meghir and
Pistaferri, 2004; Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe, 2012).
2. Effects of Financial Conditions on Production and Uncertainty:
A positive structural shock to financial fragility does not raise production,
does not decrease economic uncertainty and does not tighten monetary
policy.
These sign restrictions can also be justified on the grounds of economic
theory. To the extent that an increase in the excess bond premium reflects
a reduction in the effective risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector,
this leads a contraction in the supply of credit (He and Krishnamurthy,
2013). As a result, consistent with the financial accelerator mechanisms
36I also try to impose a positive structural shock to uncertainty does not tighten the mone-
tary policy. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, however, the results do not seem to change
with or without this restriction. Therefore, I prefer not to impose this restriction in the
baseline case
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emphasized in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999), the reduction in credit availability significantly contracts
real activity. The non-tightening nature of responses of the federal funds
rate to a shock to financial fragility is consistent with a systematic easing
of monetary policy in reaction to lower economic activity. Consequently,
this can be rationalized easily within the framework of the workhorse fi-
nancial accelerator model as in Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
3. Effects of Production on Uncertainty and Financial Fragility: A
negative shock to production does not decrease uncertainty and does not
improve financial conditions.
The third class of restrictions entertains the possibility that a slowdown
in production cannot improve the financial conditions and macroeconomic
uncertainty. In theory, a decline in production due to a negative aggre-
gate demand or productivity shock implies a deterioration in financial
conditions due to a decline in the net worth of borrowers (financial ac-
celerator mechanism at work) or a deterioration in asset prices (feedback
effect to agents balance sheets from fire sales prices). Therefore, even a
small decline in production is enough for generating a negative feedback
mechanism between financial conditions and real activity (Krishnamurthy,
2010). The recent literature on learning and business cycle dynamics pre-
cisely underscores how uncertainty is endogenously generated due to sharp
53
contractions in real activity (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006; Fa-
jgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel, 2014). When economic
activity slows down, the diffusion of information among agents also slows
down. This leads to an increase in the subjective uncertainty which is
measured by belief distributions of agents.
Estimation Method
I impose the sign restrictions in 4 steps following the general methods of Faust
(1998) and Uhlig (2005) as modified by Inoue and Kilian (2013)37. In the first
step, I address the estimation uncertainty in the parameters assuming a diffuse
prior over the reduced form VAR coefficients so the resulting posterior has a
closed form solution. In the second step, I draw a large number of structural
models following the methodology provided by Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and
Zha (2010). Third, I throw out all the models that do not satisfy the sign re-
strictions provided above and compute the posterior likelihood of the remaining
structural models. Finally, I construct the 90% confidence interval from the
models whose posterior probability sum to 90% of the total probability mass.
The outer envelope of the set of most likely remaining (admissible) structural
models is the joint confidence set that are presented in figure 1.7.
By characterizing the posterior probability of each structural model, I address
two shortcomings of the standard, point-wise summaries of results. First, for
sign-identified models, point-wise measures of central tendency are misleading.
Consider the most commonly used point-wise measure of central tendency, i.e.
37The details of the computational algorithm appears in the online appendix.
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the median. The median response function is constructed by taking the median
of the distribution of all admissible models at each horizon, and stacking the
medians into a single vector. However, it is very unlikely for this structural
model to be actually observed in the data. Moreover, even if the point-wise
median does correspond to a single structural model, there is no compelling
reason to focus on that particular model as it is just one of many admissible
models. Second, the point-wise confidence sets are misleading and may un-
derstate the true uncertainty regarding impulse response functions. Therefore,
point-wise sets do not take into account the dependence of impulse responses
across horizons, whereas joint confidence sets do.
Estimation Results
The set of sign restrictions demonstrates that limited, easily justifiable restric-
tions are adequate to identify economically important impacts of the structural
uncertainty and financial fragility shocks on production. However, the magni-
tudes of the responses in production to a large uncertainty shock are much lower
compared to the benchmark 8 variable recursively identified VAR.
In the empirical analysis, I apply three sets of sign restrictions on the impulse
responses to an exogenous 4 standard deviations shocks to either uncertainty
or financial fragility and trace out the responses of the industrial production in
figure 7. In brief, it appears that a surprise increase in uncertainty lowers the
industrial production initially, and it takes approximately 1 year for production
to reach its lowest level. Then, production gradually recovers and it takes ap-
proximately 4 years for production to go back to its initial level. This pattern
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holds for both the 90% nominal coverage intervals and the modal (most likely)
model. Interestingly, the production responses to a structural shock to uncer-
tainty either measured by the inflation and the output growth SCU produce
exactly the same pattern for industrial production.
On the other hand, a surprise shock to financial fragility leads to a substan-
tial drop in industrial production. Similar to a structural uncertainty shock,
the decline in production slowly builds up and the lowest level is achieved in
the sixth quarter after the shock. Then, production gradually goes back to its
initial level and the 90% nominal coverage intervals of the impulse response of
production continues to stay below the pre-shock level 4 years after the struc-
tural shock.
Figure 7 also provides the impulse responses of an uncertainty shock from the
recursively identified 8-variable VAR model. While the magnitudes of the un-
certainty shocks are the same in whether inflation or output growth SCU is used
to proxy macroeconomic uncertainty, the responses of production from the sign
or the recursively identified models are quite different in magnitudes. This is not
surprising mainly because of two reasons. First, sign identified VAR introduces
the EBP which has a contemporaneous correlation with the SCUs in 0.45-0.55
range, so it picks up some of the variation in uncertainty that is attributable to
shocks to financial fragility. Second, I do not impose zero restrictions about the
timing of the variables besides the contemporaneous sign restrictions, so the
variation in uncertainty that is attributable to shocks to the macroeconomic
block in the 5 variable VAR also pick some of the effects in uncertainty shocks
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as well.
Besides the possibility that causality is running in both directions between pro-
duction and uncertainty, financial fragility appears to be a key channel to un-
derstand how the structural uncertainty shocks are affecting the business cycle
dynamics. In particular, introducing the EBP index into a small-scale VAR
model significantly reduces the effect of a structural shock uncertainty on pro-
duction. For instance, the point estimate of the response of production to a
structural uncertainty shock identified by the benchmark VAR (solid black line
in figure 1.7) causes a 4% decline in production approximately in 8 quarters. At
that point, the sign identified modal model shows that the maximum decline in
production to a structural uncertainty shock is approximately 2% in 4 quarters
after the shock.
Therefore, the results suggest that while uncertainty shocks have a significant
on effects on production, compared to benchmark (8 variable VAR) estimates,
the impact of uncertainty shocks on economic activity is substantially attenu-
ated. Furthermore, structural shocks to financial fragility significantly reduces
the production where effects remain significant up to 3 to 4 years with magni-
tudes (based on sign-identified modal model) higher than the structural shocks
to uncertainty.
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Figure 1.7: Production Responses to a Structural Shock to SCU
or EBP
















































































Note: The sign-identified VAR estimation consists of 5 variables: the inflation or the output growth SCU,
federal funds rate, log of Consumer Price Index, log of industrial production index and the Excess Bond
Premium. Impulse response functions trace out the dynamics of the industrial production to a 4 standard
deviation structural shock to either the uncertainty or the financial fragility. The bold blue lines are the modal
model and the confidence intervals in blue are 90% nominal coverage intervals whereas the black lines are the
responses of production to an uncertainty shock derived from recursively identified 8-variable VAR model
presented in figure 1.5. In the first row, the inflation SCU is the uncertainty measure used in the estimation
whereas the output growth SCU used in the second.
58
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I introduced new measures of macroeconomic uncertainty that
were derived from subjective density forecasts for inflation and output growth
provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. I estimated these subjective
macroeconomic uncertainty estimates in several steps in order to ensure that
the problems in the SPF such as structural changes in survey, the fluctuations in
the panel composition (due to frequent entering and exiting behavior of experts)
or occasional errors do not lead any biases in my subjective macroeconomic es-
timates. I estimated the macroeconomic uncertainty perceived by agents which
is the common subjective uncertainty component, i.e. Subjective Consensus
Uncertainty (SCU), perceived by all agents in the economy. Furthermore, I also
revisited the recent empirical work on the relationship between macroeconomic
uncertainty and real economic activity.
I demonstrated that the resulting SCU estimates display surprisingly differ-
ent dynamics compared to commonly used measures of uncertainty that are
derived from implied stock market volatility, disagreement in survey forecasts,
or realized cross sectional dispersion of firm’s activities. In particular, I showed
that the SCU estimates imply fewer important uncertainty episodes compared
to other popular measures of uncertainty. Bloom (2009) documented 17 months
of important uncertainty episode based on option-implied stock market volatil-
ity (i.e. VXO index) in US macroeconomic history. By extending his analysis
to the current date and changing it to quarterly frequency, I show that there are
9 quantitatively important uncertainty episodes based on the VXO index, most
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of which are not apparent in the SCU estimates. Based on the SCU estimates,
I recover four quantitatively important uncertainty episodes: the 1973-74 re-
cession, two during the 1980-82 recessions and the 2007-09 recession. Further
investigation on the empirical properties of other commonly used uncertainty
proxies show that there are other factors besides economic uncertainty that
drive fluctuations in these proxies. For instance, time varying risk aversion in
the case of stock market volatility, or differences in opinions rather than fore-
cast uncertainty in the case of survey based forecasts are important reasons to
observe large fluctuations in these series rather than macroeconomic uncertainty.
In terms of dynamics, the SCU estimates reveal a strong negative association
between measures of real activity and economic uncertainty. I show that while
all empirical uncertainty measures recover the negative relationship between
production and uncertainty in the short term, only the SCU estimates leads
to sizable and protracted declines in production and employment without a
“volatility overshoot” as in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2013). The SCU es-
timates reveal that macroeconomic uncertainty can explain about a quarter of
the VAR forecast error variance in production and employment which is twice
as much as other proxies can explain. Overall, as opposed to other conven-
tional uncertainty estimates, subjective macroeconomic uncertainty estimates
are more persistent, and shocks to them can explain larger fraction of the fluc-
tuations in real activity.
While it is already hard to defend zero contemporaneous restrictions postu-
lated by the ordering of the variables in a VAR, several researchers (e.g. see
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(Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakraǰsek, 2014; Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and
Zakraǰsek, 2013)) suggested that fluctuations in uncertainty is a symptom of
financial fragility, which leads to even further problems in identification of un-
certainty shocks. In an attempt to make progress in these aspects, I propose a
small scale sign-identified VAR model that includes both the SCU along with a
proxy for financial fragility. I show that while the larger fraction of the fluctua-
tions in production can be explained by innovations to financial conditions, the
structural shocks to uncertainty still leads statistically significant and persistent




Shocks in Developing Countries:
Evidence Based on Long-Run
Restrictions
2.1 Introduction
There are many developing countries that have been exploring alternative mon-
etary regimes after years of high and variable inflation. However there remains
considerable debate regarding the appropriate framework for analyzing mone-
tary policy in such an environment. Our goal in this paper is to develop a model
which is appropriate for monetary policy analysis in developing economies.
When developing such a model, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998)
suggest applying the Lucas program. In our paper, we follow their advice and
apply the Lucas program using monetary shocks. This involves three steps.
First, we isolate monetary shocks in developing economies which adopted an
inflation targeting regime. In the second step, we study the dynamic behavior
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of output, the real and nominal exchange rates, and the price level in develop-
ing economies following an expansionary monetary shock that results in a 1%
increase in the price level in the long-run. In the last step, the same experiment
is conducted in two different model environments and the outcomes in these
models are compared with those in the actual economies.
Now, we elaborate on each of these steps. In the first step, we make two as-
sumptions to identify monetary shocks in developing countries adopted inflation
targeting regime. First, we assume that monetary shocks have no effect on the
level of real variables in the long-term. This assumption is consistent with a
broad class of models where monetary shocks have no long-run effect on real
variables. Second, we assume that monetary shocks in developing economies do
not affect the aggregate price level in the United States in the long-term. This
assumption is in conformity with the small-country assumption for developing
economies which is often made in the literature. With these assumptions, we
show that monetary shocks can be isolated.
Having isolated monetary shocks in developing economies, we characterize our
experiment in the second step of the Lucas program. We study how output, the
bilateral real and nominal exchange rates with the United States, and consumer
prices move in developing countries under inflation targeting after an expan-
sionary domestic monetary shock that results in a 1% long-run increase in the
price level. We find this shock is characterized by a temporary rise in output, a
short-lived depreciation in the real exchange rate, a sizable overshooting of the
nominal exchange rate, and a 0.5% contemporaneous increase in the consumer
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prices in these countries.
Our findings of short-lived effects from monetary shocks on output and the real
exchange rate in developing economies contrast sharply with the persistent ef-
fects of monetary shocks on such variables in advanced economies. For example,
while Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) find the effect of a monetary
shock on output in the United States dissipates in about three years, we find
the effect of monetary shock on output becomes negligible in less than one year
in developing economies. Furthermore, we also show that shocks to the real ex-
change rate in developing economies have a half-life of less than a year whereas
Rogoff (1996) documents that they have a half-life of three to five years in de-
veloped ones.
Another difference between developed and developing countries is the speed of
price adjustment. While the inertial character of inflation results in a slow price-
adjustment in advanced countries, we find price-adjustment is fast in developing
countries. Specifically, prices adjust half-way, or more, within the same period
as the shock and the full price-adjustment occurs in only one year.
There are three potential reasons to explain such short-lived real effects and
faster price adjustment following a monetary shock in developing economies:
(i) the higher pass-through of exchange rates into imports’ prices, (ii) the less
persistent shocks to monetary policy, and (iii) the more frequent changes in
prices. The role played by the second and third factors leading to less persis-
tent real effects of monetary policy shocks in developing economies are easy to
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understand. Yet, the role played by the first factor is more subtle and may
occur if monetary policy is represented by a Taylor rule. Specifically, note that
an unanticipated fall in interest rates is likely to be followed by rapid nominal
depreciation. However, due to a larger exchange rate pass-through coefficient,
this results in a stronger increase in inflation leading central banks in developing
economies to raise their policy rates soon after they cause them to fall unex-
pectedly. Clearly, this behaviour of interest rates induces less persistent effects
on output and the real exchange rate compared to ones in advanced economies.
In the last step of the Lucas program, we turn to assess the ability of two
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to explain these find-
ings. The first model is a one-sector model with identical firms that have the
same frequency of price changes. In contrast, the second-model is a multi-
sector model with heterogeneous firms which have different frequencies of price
changes, so that prices can frequently change only in some sectors. Yet, they do
not change frequently in other sectors. The common features in these models
are: (i) Calvo-type nominal price contracts, (ii) heterogeneity in the frequency
of price changes between the home and foreign countries, (iii) the price rigidity
in terms of the price that firms set their prices regardless of firm being domestic
or foreign, (iv) incomplete insurance of households in home and domestic coun-
tries, (v) variable capacity utilization, and (vi) a novel staggered wage-setting
mechanism of households.
Yet, since it is standard practice in the literature to assume wages in develop-
ing economies respond fast to shocks, our staggered wage-setting assumption
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may invoke debate. In this regard, it is useful to discuss some evidence which
supports the staggered wage-setting assumption in developing economies. To
illustrate, a half of workers with social security benefits is paid the minimum
wage which remains unchanged over a quarter in Turkey. Similarly, Kzdi and
Knya (2009) note that 70% of wages are re-set in a specific month of a year in
Hungary, which suggests that these wages are unchanged over one year duration.
Such evidence supports our assumption that wages in developing economies have
some rigidity.
Besides aligning with the wage-setting practices in developing economies, the
staggered wage-setting assumption also helps the models successfully account
for the findings in Li (2011). That is, with wage-setting mechanism that we
introduce in this work, developing economies have an average contemporaneous
correlation of 0.41 between detrended real wages and real GDP and that real
wages are responsive to business cycles and lag the cycle by an average of one
quarter. As a matter of fact, dropping the staggered wage-setting assumption
and assuming instead wages are flexible results in the models predicting real
wages and real GDP have an almost perfect correlation and that real wages
closely follow business cycles without any lag.
After the discussion of the models’ features, we compare the outcomes in the
one- and multi-sector models to those in the actual economies after the mone-
tary shock which causes a 1% long-run increase in the price-level. We find the
latter is particularly accurate in accounting for the aggregate dynamics in the
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actual economies. A striking difference between the one- and multi-sector mod-
els is that the full price-adjustment takes a shorter duration in the one-sector
model compared with that in the multi-sector model after the monetary shock.
Regarding output and the real exchange rate, in line with the finding in Car-
valho and Nechio (2011), we show that output and the real exchange rate in the
one-sector model show less persistent dynamics than those in the multi-sector
model.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 presents our empirical
strategy for isolating monetary shocks in developing economies and reports our
findings on the consequences of monetary shocks in developing economies with
the inflation targeting regime. Section 2.3 introduces two dynamic stochastic
sticky-price small-open economy models. Section 2.4 describes the estimation
and calibration of the models’ parameters. Section 2.5 evaluates the success of
the models in accounting for the outcomes of a domestic monetary shock in the
actual economies that are reported in Section 2.2. The last section concludes.
2.2 Empirical Section
The goal of this section is to develop an empirical model for studying the dynam-
ics of output, the real exchange rate and the price level in developing countries
under inflation targeting following a positive monetary shock. We introduce two
different empirical models to identify these shocks. The former model closely
follows the empirical strategy introduced in Clarida and Gali (1994) without
seperetaly identifying monetary shocks in developing countries and the United
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States. In latter one however, we develop an empirical model that separately
these shocks in both developing countries and United States.
2.2.1 Empirical Models
2.2.1.1 Empirical Model I
By employing a Blanchard and Quah (1989) type decomposition, Clarida and
Gali (1994) identify various structural shocks in four developed countries. In
contrast to their concentration on developed countries, our focus is on developing
economies. We first consider an empirical model based on the strategy in Clarida
and Gali (1994). However, as opposed to estimating a VAR model for each
country as in Clarida and Gali (1994), we estimate the following panel VAR





BpXi,t−p + µi + ui,t (2.1)
where µi is the time-invariant country-specific fixed-effect term and pmax denotes
the number of lags included in the panel VAR regression. We use both quarterly
and monthly data to estimate (2.1) with the lag lengths chosen to be four and
twelve, respectively. The endogenous variables in the panel VAR system of









where ∆Yi,t−∆Y∗t is the difference between the log changes in economic activity
in the country of interest and the United States. For the quarterly data, we
measure ∆Yi,t − ∆Y∗t with real GDP differences in Economy i and the United
States as in Clarida and Gali (1994). For the monthly data, on the other hand,
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we measure it with the differences in industrial production indexes between
Economy i and the United States.1. The second variable in (2.2), ∆Qi,t, de-
notes the percentage change in the bilateral real exchange rate of the country of
interest with the United States. Qi,t is defined as the cost of the consumption
basket in the United States relative to that in the country of interest in the
same currency.2 Lastly, ∆Pi,t −∆P ∗t denotes inflation differences in consumer
prices between the country of interest and the United States.
Clarida and Gali (1994) presume three different structural shocks which account
for the movements of the variables in Xi,t. These are: supply difference shocks
in the country of interest and the United States (εpi,t − εp
∗
t ); demand difference
shocks in the United States and the country of interest (εd
∗
t − εdi,t); and, money
difference shocks in the country of interest and the United States (εmi,t − εm
∗
t ).
Demand shocks can be regarded as government spending shock or any other
demand shock apart from money shocks.
The identification of structural shocks is achieved by placing restrictions on
the long-run response matrix. To explain the identification method, let ui,t ∼
N(0,Ω) where Ω is the non-diagonal variance-covariance matrix of ui,t. Also,
1Where data for seasonally adjusted series are available, we used these series. Other-
wise, we obtained seasonally adjusted series from non-seasonally adjusted series by using the
Demetra+ program from Eurostat.
2Let Ei,t be the home currency price of the United States dollar in economy i. Also
denote P ∗t and Pi,t as indexes of the consumption basket in the United States and Economy i,





. Hence, a rise in Qi,t is associated with a depreciation
of the real exchange rate vis-a-vis the United States.
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suppose that ui,t is related to the structural shocks in the following way.






























where C0 is a 3 × 3 matrix of the contemporaneous responses of the variables
to shocks. It is notable that due to the assumption of independence among





is diagonal. Furthermore, under the normalization that the variance-covariance
matrix of structural shocks is an identity matrix, the following equality has to
hold:
C0C0
′ = Ω (2.4)
Clarida and Gali (1994) identify structural shocks by imposing restrictions on
the effects of these shocks on the level of the output difference, the real exchange
rate and the price level difference in the long-run. Denoting the matrix of the
long-run impulse responses by D, Clarida and Gali (1994) isolate structural


















The ordering of the variables in (2.2) implies only supply shocks influence the
level of the output difference in the long-run. Neither demand nor money shocks
have a permanent effect on the level of the output difference. Regarding the
real exchange rate, its level is affected permanently by supply or demand shocks.
Lastly, all three shocks have a long-run impact on the level of the CPI difference.
Yet, the lower triangularity of the long-run matrix is not enough to uniquely
recover structural shocks. Accordingly, we impose sign restrictions on D as well.
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In particular, we assume that a larger supply and monetary shock in Economy
i compared to the United States are assumed to increase the long-run levels of
GDP and CPI in Economy i relative to the United States, respectively (d11 > 0,
d33 > 0). In addition, a larger demand shock in Economy i compared to the
United States is assumed to appreciate the long-run level of the real exchange
rate of Economy i relative to the United States (d22 > 0). This can happen if
government spending mostly fall on non-traded goods.
Some restrictions on the long-run impact matrix in Clarida and Gali (1994) are
debatable. For example, the sign restriction that an expansionary fiscal shock in
Economy i appreciates the real exchange rate in the long-run should necessarily
be taken with a grain of salt (For example, see Ravn, Schmitt-Groh, and Uribe
(2007) for counter evidence). Similarly, the exclusion restriction in Clarida and
Gali (1994), that the fiscal shocks have no long-run effect on the level of output,
is subject to criticism because it is quite likely that fiscal shocks such as spending
shocks on education and infrastructure impact the long-run output level in a
country. Based on these considerations, we slightly modify the long-run impact
response matrix. Indeed, as in Clarida and Gali (1994), we assume monetary
shocks have a long-run impact on neither output level nor the real exchange
rate level. Yet, we do not place any restriction regarding the long-run impact
of productivity and demand shocks on the level of any of the variables. Let ~D
denote the modified long-run impact matrix of structural shocks with the above










































The modified long-run impact matrix of structural shocks, ~D, has seven free
parameters whereas ~D~D
′
is symmetric so it has only six independent elements.
Hence, it is not possible to uniquely recover all the parameters of the ~D matrix.
In particular, an analysis of the dynamic responses of the variables following
productivity and demand shocks necessitates knowing the elements in the first
and second columns of (2.6), respectively. Yet, such an analysis is not feasi-
ble as the elements in these columns are unidentifiable given the structure of
~D. However, the third column can be uniquely recovered. This allows us to
investigate dynamic responses of the variables to monetary shocks. To prove
this, note first that since the model is not uniquely identified, there are many
matrices satisfying (2.7). Letting ~D and ~DA be two of such matrices (i.e. both
~D and ~DA are block lower-triangular as stated in (2.6) and satisfy (2.7)), we
can always find a square block lower-triangular orthonormal matrix ~ω such that
(2.8) holds.
~DA = ~D~ω (2.8)
One can show the reason for ~ω matrix to be block lower-triangular and orthonor-
mal in three steps. First, we show ~ω is orthonormal. Since ~D and ~DA satisfy





Multiplying both sides with ~D−1 from the left and with ~D−1
′
from the right
yields ~ω~ω′ = I where ~D is invertible by assumption. The implication being that
~ω has to be an orthonormal matrix.
Second, note that ~ω = ~D−1~DA. Since the product of two block lower-
triangular matrices has to be block lower-triangular, ~ω has to be block lower-


















Third, multiplying both sides of (2.8) with ~ω′ and using the fact that ~ω is
orthonormal yields ~DA~ω
′
= ~D. Since ~DA
−1




−1 ~D, ~ω′ must also be block lower-triangular. This implies ~ω31 and ~ω32
are equal to zero as well. Furthermore, since ~ω is orthonormal, ~ω has to be in


































Lastly, the final step in uniquely identifying the monetary shock requires the
assumption that an expansionary monetary shock results in a permanent rise in
price level differences between the developing economies and the United States.3
This sign restriction uniquely identifies the third column by ensuring ~ω33 = 1.
Therefore, even if there are many matrices satisfying both (2.7) and (2.9), their
third column must be the same. Identifying the elements of the third column
this way enables us to analyze dynamic responses of the variables to monetary
3Therefore, ~d33 is positive in (2.6)
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shocks.4
2.2.1.2 Empirical Model II
Clarida and Gali (1994) employ their strategy for isolating structural shocks in
developed economies. In comparison to developed countries, an analysis of the
dynamic responses of variables to structural shocks in developing countries may
require more demanding assumptions. In particular, note that Clarida and Gali
(1994) isolate differences in structural shocks between the country of interest
and the United States, εmi,t − εm
∗





t . When only differences in shocks are isolated, a 1% expansionary monetary
shock in the country of interest is implicitly assumed to induce the same dy-
namics as a 1% contractionary monetary shock in the United States. Under the
symmetric-country assumption, this may be a plausible assumption if one stud-
ies the movements in Yi,t − Y∗t , Qi,t and Pi,t − P ∗t between a developed economy
and the United States. Yet, it is not realistic to maintain the symmetric-country
assumption for a developing economy and the United States. For example, the
coefficients of exchange rate pass-through into import and consumer prices in
4Here, it is natural to ask whether structural monetary shocks can be identified by plac-
ing restrictions only on the long-run responses matrix to monetary shocks. By writing the













Since monetary shocks are ordered as the third element of εi,t, recovering them requires
the third row of the inverse of ~D in (2.12). Yet, the third row cannot be identified by
placing restrictions only in the long-run effects of monetary shocks on the level of output
differences and the real exchange rate between the United States and the developing country.
Consequently, structural monetary shocks are unidentifiable in Empirical Model I.
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developing economies and the United States are markedly dissimilar. Further-
more, the frequencies of price changes among sectors in developing economies
contrast with those in the United States. These asymmetric features may cause
the dynamics of Yi,t − Y∗t , Qi,t and Pi,t − P ∗t between developing economies and
the United States to differ significantly between a 1% expansionary monetary
shock in developing economies and a 1% contractionary monetary shock in the
United States.5
For this reason, we believe it is more plausible to study the consequences of
monetary shocks in developing economies and the United States separately. To
achieve this, we consider the same panel VAR model in (2.1), yet the vector of




















Here, ∆Y∗t (∆Yi,t) and ∆P
∗
t (∆Pi,t) denote the log change in output and the
consumer price level in the United States (the country of interest), respectively.
Fluctuations in the vector of variables in Empirical Model II are assumed to be
driven by five structural shocks in the following order:
1. Supply shocks in the United States (εp
∗
t )
2. Supply shocks in developing economies (εpi,t)
5Apart from these asymmetric features, a difference in the monetary shock process between
developing economies and the United States may also result in the dynamics of Yi,t − Y∗t ,
Qi,t and Pi,t −P ∗t between developing economies and the United States differing significantly
between a 1% expansionary monetary shock in developing economies and a 1% contractionary
monetary shock in the United States.
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3. General preference shocks (εdi,t)
4. Monetary shocks in the United States (εm
∗
t )
5. Monetary shocks in developing economies (εmi,t)
Our goal is to analyze dynamic responses of the variables to monetary shocks
in the United States and developing countries separately. This can be achieved
if the following assumptions are made regarding the Ď matrix which shows the
long-run level responses of the variables in developing economies to each shock












ď11 ď12 ď13 0 0
ď21 ď22 ď23 0 0
ď31 ď32 ď33 0 0
ď41 ď42 ď43 ď44 0












In the structure of (2.14), monetary shocks in the United States have been con-
strained to have no impact on the long-run level of output in both economies
and the real exchange rate. In addition to these constraints, monetary shocks
in the developing economies are restricted to have no permanent impact on the
price level in the United States. This assumption is consistent with both the
small-country assumption for developing economies and the standard practice
of modeling the United States as a closed economy in the literature. In fact,
our maintained assumption in Empirical Model II regarding the effect of domes-
tic monetary shocks in developing economies is weaker than the small-country
assumption in our theoretical models presented in Section 2.3. Indeed, while
the assumption in Empirical Model II constrains domestic monetary shocks in
developing economies to have no long-term impact on the price level in the
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United States, the small-country assumption in our theoretical model imposes
that they have a negligible impact on the price level in the United States in the
short- and long-terms.
Now, we aim to separately analyze the dynamic responses of the variables to
monetary shocks in the United States and developing economies. This can be
achieved if the elements of the fourth and fifth columns of (2.14) are known. By
following the same arguments in Section 2.2.1.1, it can be shown that Empirical




















By following exactly the same arguments in Section 2.2.1.1, it is easy to show
that any two such matrices Ď and ĎA have the same fourth and fifth columns.
This results from the fact that the orthonormal square matrix, ω̌, linking these












ω̌11 ω̌12 ω̌13 0 0
ω̌21 ω̌22 ω̌23 0 0
ω̌31 ω̌32 ω̌33 0 0
0 0 0 1 0












Having identified the fourth and fifth columns of (2.14) this way, an analysis of
the dynamic responses of the variables to the monetary shocks in the United
States and the developing economies is straightforward.
Lastly, before discussing our empirical findings, it is notable that as an alterna-
tive to long-term restrictions in our paper, one may suggest using the recursive
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assumption which identifies monetary shocks with short-run restrictions on the
contemporaneous response of variables. At this point, it is useful to discuss the
reasons why adopting the recursive assumption may be unsuitable for isolat-
ing monetary shocks in developing countries. In the recursive assumption, the
monetary authority is assumed to set its operating instrument by observing the
movements in two different sets of variables. The first set of variables contains
variables that may respond only with a lag to monetary policy shocks and whose
current values are known to central banks before a decision on its operating in-
strument is made. The second set of variables, on the other hand, consists of
variables that may contemporaneously respond to monetary policy shocks and
whose current values are unknown to central banks before setting its operating
instrument. The necessity of including variables in one of these sets lies at the
root of the controversy over the recursive assumption for identifying shocks to
monetary policy in developing economies. For example, in which set should the
price level be included? Including it in the first set implies prices are sluggish in
responding to monetary policy shocks. Such an assumption would be in conflict
with the fact that a considerable share of prices change in a typical month in
developing economies. Additionally, because of the fast response of exchange
rates to monetary policy shocks and the strong pass-through of exchange rates
into import prices in developing countries, it is plausible to assume that mon-
etary shocks affect prices contemporaneously through their effect on exchange
rates. Consequently, including the price level in the first set of variables is ques-
tionable. Including it in the second set of variables is also questionable since
including the price level in this set implies central banks set their operating
instrument without knowing the current price level. However, they collect data
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on a large volume of prices and are likely to predict the general trend in prices
over any period. In our view, the price level in developing economies belongs
to neither the first nor the second set of variables. Yet, since the recursive as-
sumption requires it to be included in either of the two sets, we have abandoned
this strategy and identified monetary shocks with the long-term restrictions.
2.2.2 Empirical Results
This section presents our findings on the responses of domestic economic ac-
tivity, the bilateral real exchange rate with the United States and prices after
domestic monetary shocks in developing countries under an inflation targeting
regime. Since the adoption dates of the inflation targeting regime were not the
same among the countries in our sample, we have an unbalanced panel data.
As stated in Arellano and Bond (1991), this does not fundamentally change
our analysis since we only require the assumption that observations are inde-
pendently distributed in the initial cross-section and that subsequent additions
and deletions occur randomly. Table 2.1 reports the adoption dates of inflation
targeting in the developing countries contained in our sample for which we have
quarterly or monthly data.
Our source of data on the level of economic activity, bilateral nominal exchange
rates with the United States and consumer prices in our sample of countries
is the IMF’s International Finance Statistics data. Our data spans the post-
inflation targeting period for each country until March, 2013. Due to data
limitations on industrial production index for some developing countries at the
monthly frequency, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines
and South Africa are dropped from the sample at the monthly frequency. Instead
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Table 2.1: Adoption Dates of Inflation Targeting in Developing
Economies
Monthly Data Quarterly Data

















of the industrial production index, real GDP is used at the quarterly frequency.
Since the series of real GDP are available for most sample countries, our quar-
terly data contains a larger sample of economies.6
6Before presenting our results, it is essential that logged real exchange rates of developing
economies compared to the United States, Qi,t, the logged real GDP and CPI in Economy i and
the United States (denoted by Yi,t, Y
∗
t , Pi,t and P
∗
t , respectively) all have unit roots. For the
series pertaining to developing economies, we estimated a panel auto-regression equation with
country-specific fixed effects containing four and twelve lags for the quarterly and monthly
data, respectively. With the level specification, we perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
The unreported results indicate that one cannot reject the null that all five series contains a
unit-root at the 5% significance level. With the growth specification, on the other hand, the
null is rejected strongly at the 5% significance level. Hence, we conclude that all five series
have unit roots.
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Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The solid
lines indicate the estimated point-wise impulse responses. The area between the dashed lines
shows the 90% confidence interval estimated using the Bayesian method suggested by Sims
and Zha (1999).
We now study the aggregate dynamics after an expansionary domestic mone-
tary shock in developing economies using Empirical Model II. 7 These aggre-
gate dynamics are displayed in Figure 2.1. It is evident from this figure that
an expansionary monetary shock in developing economies (i) causes a modest,
short-lived impact on output in the United States, (ii) induces an increase in
the level of output in developing countries relative to its undistorted path which
7We study aggregate dynamics following monetary shocks in Empirical Model I and fol-
lowing monetary shocks in the United States in Empirical Model II in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses in Each Country to Monetary Shocks in
Developing Economies
(The VAR Model with Monthly Data)
(a) Yi















































Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The solid
line marked with circles indicates the median of the estimated point-wise impulse response
functions in the group in each period. The dot-dashed line shows the country-specific impulse
response functions separately estimated for each country in the group using the VAR version
of Emprical Model II.
lasts for about one year, (iii) depreciates the real exchange rate on impact, im-
plying that the goods from the developing economies is worth less in terms of
the goods from the United States8, (iv) leads to either a small, temporary in-
crease or no change at all in the price level of the United States, and (v) results
in a permanent increase of the price level in the developing economies.
Such findings only show the average impulse response functions for the group
of developing countries which adopted an inflation targeting regime. However,
the impulse response functions of the variables to an expansionary domestic
monetary shock in each country in the group differ radically from the average
8The dissipation of the shock takes about one and half years both at the monthly and
quarterly frequency.
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Figure 2.3: Conditional Movements of the Real and Nominal Exchange
Rates
(Empirical Model II with Monthly Data)
(a) ∆Qi and ∆Ei


















(b) Qi and Ei


















Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The dot-
ted lines marked with circles in Panel (a) and Panel (b) indicate the log-change and the
level impulse response functions of the real exchange rate to the domestic monetary shock,
respectively. The dot-dashed lines marked with asterisks in Panel (a) and Panel (b) show
the log-change and the level impulse response functions of the nominal exchange rate to the
domestic monetary shock, respectively.
impulse response functions. Figure 2.2 illustrates this point. The impulse re-
sponse functions of output, the real exchange rate and the price level to an
expansionary monetary shock in each country is obtained separately by con-
sidering the country-specific VAR model version of Empirical Model II with
monthly data. The size of the shock in each country is normalized to induce
the same long-run response in the price level. It is evident from this figure that
the impulse response functions of all three variables in the individual countries
differ radically from the median impulse functions in the group.
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2.2.2.1 The Conditional Co-movements of the Real and Nominal
Exchange Rates
Next, we show the co-movements of the real and nominal exchange rates condi-
tional on the domestic monetary shock in the Empirical Model II with monthly
data. The impulse response functions of the nominal exchange rates (Ê) are ob-
tained as Q̂+ P̂ − P̂ ∗. It is evident from Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 that conditional
on the domestic monetary shock, the deviation (in percent) of the log-change in
the nominal and real exchange rates from their undistorted path follow a similar
pattern. Such co-movements are also noticeable from the common pattern of
the impulse response functions of the level nominal and real exchange rates in
Panel (b).
2.3 Theoretical Models
In this section, we present two small-open economy DSGE models. Specifically,
we study the consequences of a monetary shock that causes a 1% increase in
the price level in the long-term for each model, and compare the outcomes in
these models with those in the actual economies to the same shock. The details
of how we derive these models as well as their extension in positive inflation
steady-state environments are provided in Karaca and Tugan (2015)9. We start
by presenting models with the problem of Home and Foreign households.
9In deriving statedly state equations, we assume that steady-state inflation rate for devel-
oping countries is also zero like the United States. However, this may a strong assumption
and we would like to thank to anonymous referee to brought this extension to our attention.
The Supplementary On-line Appendix can be downloaded from the following link:
https://goo.gl/kLq0XU
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2.3.1 The Problem of Home and Foreign Households
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived households in each country with a mass
of one and indexed with h. Each household is comprised of two members.
They aim to maximize their joint lifetime discounted utility with the discount
factor given by β. In period t, the members of the hth household in the Home
country have to make a sequence of decisions. First, they have to choose how
much to consume from the home-country non-traded final consumption good
(Ct). Second, they optimally choose how intensively they supply their capital
(ut) in each period. Third, they decide on the amount of investment (It), and
therefore, on the next period’s capital stock (Kt+1). Fourth, they have to decide
on the amount of optimal holdings of a one-period risk-free foreign bond (Bt+1)
which pays a gross nominal return of RBt . Lastly, only one of the household
members obtains a chance to renegotiate its wage contract each period. The
wage contract made in any period lasts for two periods and has to be signed
before observing the shock. The problem of the Home household can be put



















where ñt,i and nt,i are the hours worked by the members of the household whose
wage-contracts are signed in period t and t − 1, respectively. σc and σn stand
for the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the Frisch-





Ct+s + It+s + a(ut+s)Kt+s
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+ Et+sBt+1+s






In writing (2.18), we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and as-
sume that increasing capacity utilization (ut) involves real costs in units of the
final good denoted by a(ut).
10. The price of the home non-traded final good is
denoted by Pt. Et stands for the nominal exchange rate between the currency
of the home-country () and the foreign-country (∗). Rkt denotes the rental
rate of capital paid to the owners of capital stock. The gross nominal return on
the holdings of last period’s foreign risk-free bonds is shown with RBH,t−1. xt,i
and xt−1,i in (2.18) represent the hourly-wage earnings of the household member
who negotiates his wage in period t and t − 1, respectively. Lastly, Πt shows
the profits of firms which belong to the household. In sum, the representative
household earns wage, capital, profit and interest income. The household uses
its resources to finance purchases of the final consumption good, investment,
the cost associated with varying ut and purchases of foreign bonds.
The law of motion for capital in the home-country is given as:











Kt shows the additional capital-stock which new investment in
10Let the bar symbol over the variables show the steady-state values of these variables.
At the steady-state, capital is fully-utilized, ū = 1. The function a(u) has the following
properties: a(1) = 0, a′(u) > 0 and a′′(u) > 0.
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the current period makes available for the next period.11.
The problem of the foreign household is similar. Her optimization problem and































































where the variables denoted with the superscript ∗ represent the foreign-counterparts
of the home variables. It is notable that the gross nominal return pertinent to
the holdings of the risk-free bond in the foreign-country in (2.21), RBF,t−1, may
differ from RBH,t−1 in (2.18). Following Devereux and Smith (2005), we assume
that countries face a debt-elastic interest rate. Let the net position of the home-
country in the risk-free bond be given as Bt. The debtor country has to pay a
higher interest rate than the lender country due to upward-sloping bond supply
in international financial markets. The differential between RBF,t−1 and R
B
H,t−1










satisfies Θ (0) = 1 and Θ′ (.) < 0. Since there is a contin-
uum of households in both countries, bond holdings of any individual household
(Bt+1) has only a negligible effect on the net position of countries’ bond-holdings





has the following properties. φ (δ) = δ,
φ′ (δ) = 1, φ′ (.) > 0 and φ′′ (.) < 0. The last assumption implies that φ′′ (.) is concave that
emanates from the fact that new investment is subject to adjustment costs.
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(Bt+1). Thus, households do not internalize the interest rate country faces.
12.
The optimality conditions for the Home household with respect to Ct, ut, It,
Kt+1 and Bt are given as:


































where λt and r
k
t are the marginal utility of nominal income and the real rental
price of capital in the home country, respectively. µt, on the other hand, stands
for the shadow value of having one more unit of next period’s capital stock. In
other words, it shows the amount of the final good the household is willing to
forgo in the current-period to have one more unit of capital stock in the next-
period. The condition (2.23) states that the household equates the marginal
utility of consumption with its marginal cost. As well, the condition (2.24) im-
plies that incremental variations in ut would cost a
′(ut)Kt in resources but since
it allows the household to supply more capital services in the current period,
12Assuming a debt-elastic differential in the two countries’ interest rates is a standard way
to circumvent the problem of multiple steady-states in imperfect financial markets. Without
such an assumption, stationarity of the model would not be ensured as when a shock is
introduced into the model, the model oscillates between different steady-states without ever
reaching a stable equilibrium. For a more complete description, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003) and Boileau and Normandin (2008) who describe the problem of multiple steady-states
in the small- and large-open economy models with imperfect financial markets, respectively.
They also evaluate different methods to circumvent this problem.
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the real income of the household rises by rktKt. At the optimal ut, these two
should be equal. In (2.25), the left-hand side is the opportunity cost of invest-
ing an incremental amount. At optimum, this is equated to the utility gained






more capital in the next period. The condition (2.26) indicates that
the marginal utility of having an extra unit of capital stock in the next period
is the sum of three terms. −βλt+1Pt+1a(ut+1) is the utility cost associated with
the deviation of the capacity utilization rate in the next period from its steady-
state. The second term, βλt+1R
k
t+1ut+1, indicates that having an extra unit of
capital stock in the next period would increase nominal income by Rkt+1ut+1.















ity gain of retaining the extra unit of capital in period t+2. Lastly, the optimal
bond holdings equation in equation (2.27) states that purchasing an extra unit
of foreign risk-free bonds would cost Et in period t and would yield R
B
H,tEt+1 of
nominal income in period t + 1. Regarding the equivalent problem of house-
holds in the foreign country, all of the first-order conditions, except that of the
bond-holdings, are similar. The optimality condition for the foreign-household’s






Using (2.23) and (2.27) along with their counterparts for the foreign-household,
the equation for the real exchange rate between the home- and foreign-country
















. In our paper, the bars and hats over the variables stand for
the steady-state values and the log-deviation of the variables from their steady-




Ȳ is the steady-state value of the aggregate final-good output. Defining B̂t+1
this way makes it convenient to take a log-linear approximation of the domestic
budget constraint.
2.3.1.1 Aggregate Wage Equation
It is notable that the existing models of staggered-wage setting such as the
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Huang and Liu (2002) models are not
particularly suitable for studying developing countries. The reason is that these
models require a complete financial markets assumption, whereas financial mar-
kets in developing economies are infant and lack sophistication. For this reason,
we develop a novel structural staggered wage-setting model with incomplete
insurance. To explain the difficulty of incorporating staggered wages with in-
complete insurance, suppose households hold only non-state contingent bonds.
Since workers renew their wage contracts in different periods under the stag-
gered wage setting, their wage income must differ after a monetary shock. This,
together with the absence of state-contingent bonds with incomplete insurance,
results in budget-constraints being different among households. Consequently,
the problem of households in the economy with incomplete insurance might not
be reduced to that of the “representative-household” since households’ budget
constraints would not be alike after the shock. Solving such a model involves
the difficult task of following the non-degenerate income distribution period-by-
period which can be computationally demanding.
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Both Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Huang and Liu (2002) circumvent
this problem by assuming complete financial markets. Under complete insur-
ance, state-contingent assets are traded to eliminate idiosyncratic risks among
households. In staggered wage-setting environments, these risks are associated
with uncertainty about the timing of wage contract renewals. For example,
when an expansionary monetary shock happens, in the absence of full insur-
ance, workers whose contracts are renewed soon may be in an advantageous
position compared to workers whose contracts are renewed late. However, un-
der complete financial markets, these idiosyncratic risks are eliminated since
income transfers through state-contingent bonds exactly offset wage income dif-
ferences among households so that they have the same income in all periods. In
other words, there is a single budget constraint among households and income
distribution is degenerate with complete insurance.
To the best of our knowledge, what is left unexplored in the literature is that
idiosyncratic risks under staggered wage-setting can be eliminated even when
insurance is incomplete. This can be explained as follows: In our DSGE model,
households contain two members, the wife and the husband, who negotiate their
wages with employers in even and odd periods, respectively. Since some wages
may not be re-contracted immediately after a monetary shock, wage adjustment
in our model is staggered. Despite this, households’ budget constraints in our
model will be identical after a monetary shock. To explain this, firstly note
that since wives in all households re-contract their wages in the same period,
their wage income will be alike after this shock. By the same logic, the wage
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income of husbands in all households will also be the same. Since households?
total wage income is equal to the sum of wives? and husbands? wages, even
in the absence of income transfers through financial assets, households? total
income will be alike in all periods after the monetary shock. Consequently,
there is a single budget-constraint among households and the income distri-
bution of households is degenerate since they all have the same income. This
allows us to consider only the problem of the “representative-household” instead
of considering household-specific maximization problems. Achieving staggered
wage-setting without sacrificing the incomplete financial market assumption in
developing countries adds realism to our model.
Now, we describe the home wage-setting environment in detail. Our model
of staggered wage-setting is a modified version of the Huang and Liu (2002)
model. Indeed, while households contain one member in the Huang and Liu
(2002) model, they contain two members, the wife and the husband, in our
model. There is a continuum of employment-offices with a mass of one in the
home economy. They combine the differentiated hours of work supplied by the
members of households (ñt,i and nt,i)
13 into a composite labor of (Nt) and sell it


























where, because of the assumption of a continuum of employment offices, indi-
vidual offices do not have an effect on the aggregate wage (Wt) and the wages
13For definitions of ñt,i and nt,i, see (2.17).
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set by the owners of the differentiated labors in period t and t − 1 (xt,i and
xt−1,i). Employment offices’ demand for differentiated labor of workers whose












From (2.32), it is clear that θw is the wage-elasticity of substitution among
differentiated hours. In period t, one member of the households sets his wage
before observing the shock that will remain fixed in period t and period t + 1.


















Having renegotiated his wage in period t, the household member must supply
differentiated hours of work as demanded by the employment offices due to the
binding wage-contract in period t and period t + 1. Due to the continuum of
differentiated hours supplied, each individual worker has negligible effect on the
aggregate wage. Using this and the fact that households’ budget constraints are
identical, the contracted wage in period t for all workers is the same, allowing

















14It is notable that in our notation, the hours supplied by the workers who do not renegotiate
their wages are shown without a tilde over n. Since it is not possible to renegotiate the wage
in period t + 1 once wage is set at period t, the hours supplied by the worker in the next
period who set a wage at period t is shown with nt+1,i not with ñt+1,i.
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By using (2.30), (2.32) and the fact that all of the contracted wages are equal,









The wage-setting behavior of the owners of differentiated labor types in the
foreign-country is the same, yielding similar equations for the contracted and
aggregate wages.
2.3.2 The Objective of Firms in the Home- and
Foreign-Country
2.3.2.1 Firms Producing the Final Good in the Home- and Foreign-
Country
The non-traded final goods in both of the countries are produced by a continuum
of perfectly-competitive firms. Firms produce the final goods by using the















where Yt and Yk,t denote the amount of the final good produced by firms and
the output of Sector k, respectively. fk, η and kmax denote the sectoral weight,
constant elasticity-of-substitution for sectoral goods in the final good production
and the total number of sectors in the home-country, respectively. It is easy to





















where Pk,t denotes the aggregate price index of sector k. Since the final-good
firms in the foreign-country solve a similar problem, for the sake of brevity, we
omit writing the equations for the sector-specific foreign-demand (Y ∗k,t) and the
foreign aggregate price (P ∗t ).
2.3.2.2 Firms Producing Sector k Output in the Home and Foreign
Countries
In both countries, sectoral goods are produced by an infinitely large number of
perfectly-competitive firms. The home-firms producing sectoral goods combine
domestic-goods (YH,k,t) and import-goods (YF,k,t) to produce sectoral output
















where ψ and ρ represent the steady-state weight of the import-good in the home
country and the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and import-
goods, respectively. It is straightforward to show the demands for the domestic
goods and those imported by the home country in sector k are given as:











where PH,k,t and PF,k,t denote domestic and import price indexes in sector k in
the home country, respectively. Using (2.39) and (2.40), one can write the sector
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k price index in the home country (Pk,t) as the weighted average of domestic











Sector k’s good in the foreign-country is again produced by perfectly-
competitive firms. Yet, the technology combining home and foreign-goods in
sector k to produce its output may involve a lower steady-state share of imports
































, which is smaller than the steady-state import-share in the home-country
ψ when τ≥1. This assumption is convenient since it allows us to study small-
and large-open economies within the same model. Indeed, for a large economy,
one can take τ = 1. For a small economy, on the other hand, one can assume
τ is arbitrarily large as the size of its trading-partners is much larger compared
to its size.
We also give sector k’s price index and the demands for the foreign- and home-










































where the variables denoted with asterisks (∗) show the foreign counterparts of
the home-variables.
2.3.2.3 The Invoice Currency and Pricing of Internationally Traded
Goods
The home-import good in sector k (YF,k,t) is produced by perfectly-competitive
home- import firms. Producing the home-import good involves combining in-
termediate foreign-goods which are invoiced in different currencies. Indeed,
while some intermediate goods are invoiced in the home-currency (), others
are invoiced in the foreign-currency (∗). In producing the home-import good
in Sector k, the home-import firm combines output from the foreign firms which
set prices in the home- and foreign-currency (denoted by YF,,k,t and YF,∗,k,t,



















where θp stands for the elasticity-of-substitution between intermediate foreign-
goods invoiced in different currencies and ω∗
∗
denotes the steady-state weight
of the foreign-currency-invoiced intermediate foreign-goods in the home-import
price index of sector k. It is easy to show that the price index for the home-
import good (denoted by PF,k,t and expressed in the home-currency) and the































where PF,,k,t and PF,∗,k,t represent the prices set for the intermediate foreign-
goods that are invoiced in the home- and foreign-currency, respectively.
The home-export good is produced similarly. Indeed, perfectly-competitive for-
eign importers in sector k combine output from the home firms which set prices
in the home- and foreign-currency (denoted by Y ∗H,,k,t and Y
∗
H,∗,k,t, respectively)















where ω is the steady-state share in sector k’s foreign-import price index of
the home-currency-priced intermediate home-export goods. The foreign-import
price index (denoted by P ∗H,k,t and expressed in the foreign-currency) and the

































where P ∗H,,k,t and P
∗
H,∗,k,t denote the prices set for the intermediate home-export
goods whose prices are invoiced in the home- and foreign-currency, respectively.
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2.3.2.4 Home- and Foreign-Firms Producing Varieties for Interme-
diate Goods
The intermediate domestic and import goods in both the home and foreign
countries are composite goods composed of a variety of goods produced by
firms engaging in monopolistic competition. The production technology used











where YH,k,j,t denotes demand for variety j of the firm producing the domestic
intermediate good in the home-country in sector k. One can show that YH,k,j,t
and the price-index for the domestic-intermediate good in the home-country in

















where PH,k,j,t is the price set by the monopolistically-competitive firm producing
variety j of the domestic intermediate-good. When producing variety j, the firm
employs the composite labor (NH,k,j,t) together with capital (KH,k,j,t) and uses







where χ is the steady-state share of labor in the home-country. In each period,
only a fraction of the firms producing different varieties in sector k obtains a
price-change signal. When firms obtain such a signal, they set prices with their
intermediate domestic-goods suppliers. These prices remain constant until a
new price-change signal is obtained. During this time, firms are obliged to
supply any quantity demanded of their varieties. In the one-sector model, it
is assumed sectors have the same frequency of price-change which is given by
the weighted average of the frequencies of price-change in sectors. In the multi-
sector model, on the other hand, the probability of receiving such a signal differs
by sector. For the varieties of domestic sector k’s good in the home country,
let 1 − αk indicate the probability of receiving the price-change signal in each
period. Then, the objective of the firm producing variety j which obtains a









where XH,k,j,t denotes the contracted-price for the home-variety j in sector k’s






































Since the objective-function is identical across the firms that produce differenti-
ated goods in sector k and that obtain a price-change signal in the same period,
their contracted prices are the same (XH,k,j,t = XH,k,t). This, together with the
Calvo-type randomization assumption, implies that PH,k,t can be rewritten as:
PH,k,t = (1− αH,k)XH,k,t + αH,kPH,k,t−1 (2.58)
Similar to the domestic intermediate-good, the home-export goods are compos-





















where the demand for the home-export variety of j priced in home-currency
(the foreign-currency) is denoted by Y ∗H,,k,j,t (Y
∗
H,∗,k,j,t).
The monopolistically-competitive firm producing variety j and the aggregator
firm demanding this variety invoice in the same currency. It is also notable
that while the varieties produced for the home-export firms are allowed to be
invoiced in different currencies in the model, the demand elasticity between any
two home-export varieties is not affected by the invoice currency. Indeed, the
demand elasticity between any two home-export varieties is equal to θp, regard-
less of whether they are priced in the same or different currencies.15.
Next, we write the maximization problem of the firm that produces variety j
15See Equation (2.45) and (2.59).
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for the home-exporters and that set prices in the home-currency (the foreign-


























where 1-α∗k is the constant probability of receiving a price-change signal in the
foreign-sector k, which is allowed to differ from that in the home-sector k (1-
αk). In writing (2.60) and (2.61), we make an important assumption that the
invoice currency of monopolistically-competitive home-export firms also deter-
mines the price-rigidity which the firms face. Indeed, while the prices set in the
home-currency remain fixed with the probability of αk in each period, those set
in the foreign-currency are subject to the price-rigidity in the foreign-sector k
and remain fixed with the probability of α∗k. We also make an analogous as-
sumption for the monopolistically-competitive home-import firms.
One can show that the optimal prices set for the home-export varieties j which
are invoiced in the home-currency (X∗H,,k,j,t) and the foreign-currency (X
∗
H,∗,k,j,t)





























































where Λ∗H,,k,t+s and Λ
∗




































The maximization problem of foreign-firms can analogously be written.
2.3.3 Closing the Model
Our first approach to close the model is to assume the growth of nominal spend-
ing follows an exogenous process in both countries:
logZt − logZt−1 = ρz(logZt−1 − logZt−2) + εzt εzt ∼ N(0, σz
2
ε )
logZ∗t − logZ∗t−1 = ρz(logZ∗t−1 − logZ∗t−2) + εz
∗










t denote nominal spending in the home- and
foreign-country, respectively.
2.4 Calibration and Estimation
This section discusses calibration of the models’ parameters. It should be noted
that since monthly frequencies of price changes are readily available, whereas
quarterly frequencies are not, we assess the ability of the models by comparing
the outcomes from the models with those in the actual economies using monthly
data. In Table B.1 of Section B.2 of the appendix, we present calibrated pa-
rameter values along with a source on which we base our calibration for these
parameters. We start with θp. It is taken to be equal to 11, implying an average
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markup of 10%, which is the estimated markup rate for the auto-industry of
the United States in Bresnahan (1981). We set δ = 0.008, implying an annual
rate of depreciation of 10%, which is the estimated annual rate of deprecia-
tion in the United States in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). We calibrate
the values for σc, σn, σa, σφ, Θ
′Ȳ , ρ, η and χ directly from the sources outlined
in Table B.1. β is set to 1.03
−1
12 , which implies an annual real interest rate of 3%.
Next, we calibrate the frequency of price changes in each sector. It is notewor-
thy that since the main trading partners of developing economies are advanced
countries, the price-stickiness parameters and sectoral weights in the foreign-
country (denoted by α∗k and fk) need to be calibrated as those in advanced
countries when we study aggregate dynamics following monetary shocks in de-
veloping economies in our model. When calibrating these parameters, we rely
on the estimates reported in Carvalho and Nechio (2011).16 They estimate the
weighted average of the frequency-of-price adjustments (
∑67
k=1 fk(1−α∗k)) in the
United States as 0.21. Based on this, we take the foreign price-stickiness, α∗k,
in the one-sector model as 0.79.
The home frequency of price changes, 1−αk, in the one-sector model is calibrated
as 27.2%. That is, on average, 27.2% of prices change in each month in devel-
oping economies, which is in line with the estimates of the mean frequency of
price changes in Mexico in Gagnon (2009) when inflation remained between 4%
16It is notable that while Carvalho and Nechio (2011) use the data from Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) who report the frequency of price changes and the expenditure share for 271
categories of goods and services in the United States, to make their model computationally
manageable, Carvalho and Nechio (2011) only include 67 sectors in their model by aggregating
some sectors.
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and 14%. We do not have estimates of sectoral frequency of price-adjustments
in developing economies. In calibrating sectoral price-stickiness in developing
economies for the multi-sector model, we ensure that
∑67
1 fk(1 − αk) = 0.272.
We also assume that the expected duration of price contracts in a home sector
is shorter than that in its foreign counterpart by some factor, say by D. If D is
taken as 1.45, we find that the aforementioned condition is met. That is, if sec-
toral prices in these economies changes 1.45 times more frequently than those in
the United States, the condition that
∑67
1 fk(1−αk) = 0.272 is met. With such
an assumption, the sectoral frequency of price changes in the home-country can
be calibrated using the following steps. First, estimate the expected duration




Second, estimate the expected duration of sectoral price contracts in the home-









Even if the frequency of price changes is calibrated for 67 sectors, we only in-
clude 3 sectors in our multi-sector model. The reason is that we have to estimate
some parameters using minimum distance estimation in our paper and it is not
computationally feasible to do estimation with 67 sectors. In reducing the num-
ber of sectors to three, we first order the sectors according to their frequencies




of price changes. Next, we include the sectors whose frequency of price changes
lies in [0, 33],[34, 66] and [66,100] percentiles of frequencies of price changes in
the first, second and third group, respectively. The frequency of price changes
that represents each group is approximated by the median frequency of price
changes in each group. The expenditure share of each group (fk), on the other
hand, is taken as the sum of the expenditure shares of the sectors forming the
group.
In calibrating the shares of final consumption (sc), investment (sm) and home-
imports (ψ) in GDP, we use data for these series from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators in 2002. sc, sm and ψ are taken as the median values
in the group. τ which denotes the economic size of the foreign-country rela-
tive to that of the home-country is taken as 1000. τ is set to be very high for
developing economies, in line with the common small-country assumption for
these countries in the literature. It is notable that setting τ to a large value
for developing economies, together with the assumption of no international bor-
rowing at the steady-state, requires that the steady-state shares of exports and
imports in the foreign-country be only 1
τ
as big as those in the home-country.
This is the essence of the small-country assumption in our model. The share of
the home-exports priced in the home-currency (ω) and the share of the home-
imports priced in the foreign-currency (ω∗

) are calibrated based on the findings
in Section B.2.1 for Turkey.
Lastly, in order to calibrate ρz, which represents the persistence in the exoge-
nous nominal spending growth process in (2.66), the Panel AR(12) model for log
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changes in the monetary aggregates M1 and M2 are estimated for our sample
using monthly data with country-fixed effects. The sum of AR coefficients for
M1 and M2 are estimated as 0.35 and 0.29, respectively. Based on this, we set
ρz = 0.32.
To study dynamics after nominal spending shocks, both models are log-linearized
around the zero-inflation and zero-debt steady-state.
2.5 Quantitative Results
In this section, our aim is to evaluate the ability of the one- and multi-sector
models to account for the dynamics of output, the price level, the real and
nominal exchange rates after monetary shocks in developing economies which
adopted an inflation targeting regime.
2.5.1 Output and Price Level Dynamics
Figure 2.4 displays the model- and panel-VAR-based impulse response functions
of output (Ŷt) and the price level (Pt) in the home-country.
18 In this figure, the
dashed lines with pentagrams and dotted line with squares show the impulse
response functions to a domestic expansionary shock in the one- and multi-sector
models, respectively. The panel-VAR-based impulse responses of the variables
in developing economies obtained in Empirical Model II with the monthly data
18It is notable that real spending (denoted by Yt) differs from domestic output. We denote

















Figure 2.4: Model- and VAR-Based Impulse Responses of P and Y to εz
(a) Price Level (P )



























Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statis-
tics. The dotted lines with pentagrams and the dashed lines with squares in-
dicate the model-based impulse response functions in the one- and multi-sector
models, respectively. The solid lines show the estimated point-wise panel-VAR-
based impulse response functions. The area between the dotted lines shows the
90% confidence interval estimated with the method suggested by Sims and Zha
(1999).
are displayed with the solid lines. Lastly, the area between the dotted lines show
the 90% confidence interval of the panel-VAR-based impulse response functions
estimated with the method suggested by Sims and Zha (1999). It is notable
that for both the model- and panel-VAR-based impulse response functions, we
consider a monetary shock in developing economies that results in a 1% long-run
increase in P .
We first discuss the price level dynamics. A striking observation in Figure 2.4 is
that the price level responses in the multi-sector model stays muted compared to
those in the one-sector model. This point is explained succinctly in Nakamura
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and Steinsson (2013) for the case of no strategic interaction among firms. Sup-
pose that an economy has two sectors. Let the first sector have a low frequency
of price changes so that it takes quite a while for firms in this sector to respond
to an aggregate shock (the sticky-price sector). Let the second sector have high
price-flexibility so that prices may respond fast to an aggregate shock in this
sector (the flexible-price sector). It can be argued that firms in the flexible-price
sector might have a chance to change their prices several times before firms in
the sticky-price sector do so for the first time. However, apart from the period
in which firms in the flexible-price sector obtain a chance to change their prices
for the first time, the price adjustment in this sector in accompanying periods
adds little to the aggregate price adjustment since firms adjust fully to the shock
when they first obtain a chance to respond. In other words, apart from the first
responses, all other price responses in the flexible-price sector are “wasted”. For
the complete aggregate price adjustment, it is crucial that firms in the sticky-
price sector obtain a chance to change their prices at least once after the shock.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) note that if it were possible to have a more even
distribution of the frequency of price changes among sectors, the aggregate price
adjustment would be much faster. This conjecture is supported by our findings.
Indeed, in the one-sector model, by taking the weighted average of the frequen-
cies of price changes among sectors as the frequency of price changes in the
economy, some price changes are implicitly re-allocated from the flexible-price
sector to the sticky-price sector. As a result, it is not surprising to observe a
stronger contemporaneous response of the aggregate price level and faster price
adjustment in the one-sector model than in the multi-sector model.
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Regarding output, it is clear in Figure 2.4 that output shows less persistent
dynamics in the one-sector model than the multi-sector model. This can be
accounted for by a faster price adjustment in the former.
2.5.2 Real and Nominal Exchange Rate Dynamics
Figure 2.5 displays the dynamics of nominal and real exchange rate in the one-
and multi-sector models along with their panel-VAR-based dynamics.19 It is
evident that the nominal exchange rate undershoots its new long-run level,
which contrasts with a sizable overshooting of the nominal exchange rate in
the actual economies shown in this figure. This mainly results from the muted
initial impulse response functions of the real exchange rate.
Our findings regarding the models indicate that both the one- and multi-sector
models are of limited ability in explaining the aggregate dynamics in developing
economies following a monetary shock. Indeed, some impulse response functions
stay out of 90% confidence intervals. Particularly, nominal exchange dynamics
in the actual economies are poorly predicted by these models.
How can the predictions of the one- and multi-sector models be improved? We
show in the next section that when adjustment costs of new capital are so large
that they prohibit investment, the extent to which the exchange rate overshoots
19To obtain 90% confidence intervals for the impulse response functions of the nominal
exchange rate, we first obtain 1000 randomly generated impulse response functions of the
nominal exchange rate over 36 months (Ei) as Ei = Qi − P i − P ∗i where Qi, P i, P ∗i denote
randomly generated impulse functions of the real exchange rate, the price level in developing
economies and the United States, respectively. The area that stays within the 5th and 95th
percentile of the distribution of randomly generated impulse response functions of the nominal
exchange rate is reported in Figure 2.4 as the 90% confidence interval for the impulse response
functions of the nominal exchange rate.
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Figure 2.5: Model- and Panel-VAR-Based Impulse Responses of E and Q
to εz
(a) Nominal Exchange Rate (E)
















(b) Real Exchange Rate (Q)

















Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statis-
tics. The dotted lines with pentagrams and the dashed lines with squares in-
dicate the model-based impulse response functions in the one- and multi-sector
models, respectively. The solid lines show the estimated point-wise panel-VAR-
based impulse response functions. The area between the dotted lines shows the
90% confidence interval estimated with the method suggested by Sims and Zha
(1999).
increases and the models’ performance improves to a certain degree.
2.5.3 One- and Multi-Sector Models without Investment
To understand the reason for the limited degree of exchange rate overshooting
in the models, it is useful to consider the real exchange rate equation in the
model. It can be shown from (2.29) that the % deviation of the real exchange



























Figure 2.6: Model- and Panel-VAR-Based Impulse Responses of P , Y, E
and Q to εz
(Without Investment)
(a) Price Level (P )



























(c) Nominal Exchange Rate (E)
















(d) Real Exchange Rate (Q)

















Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The dotted
lines with pentagrams and the dashed lines with squares indicate the model-based impulse
response functions in the one- and multi-sector models, respectively. The solid lines show
the estimated point-wise panel-VAR-based impulse response functions. The area between the
dotted lines shows the 90% confidence interval estimated with the method suggested by Sims
and Zha (1999).
Since we maintain the small-country assumption, the impulse response functions
of foreign consumption should be negligible after a monetary shock in developing
economies (Ĉ∗t ≈ 0). This, together with the small value of calibrated interest
elasticity of foreign debt (Θ′(0)Ȳ ), implies that
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Q̂t ≈ σcĈt (2.68)
From (2.68), the weak contemporaneous response of the real and nominal ex-
change rates in the models can therefore be traced to a weak contemporaneous
response of consumption. Put differently, should the contemporaneous response
of consumption have increased, the undesirable outcome of exchange-rate un-
dershooting in the models would be avoided. To this end, it is useful to consider
the resource constraint in the home country:








ût = Ŷt (2.69)
where sC and sI are the steady-state shares of consumption and investment in
real spending in the home-country, respectively. We conjecture that by increas-
ing the contemporaneous response of Ct for some given Yt, excluding investment
in the models may result in a more profound contemporaneous response of Qt,
which may help the models to predict an overshooting of the exchange rates
after monetary shocks.
Figure 2.6 offers supporting evidence for our conjecture that when investment is
excluded from the models, Qt gives a stronger contemporaneous response. This
helps the models predict the nominal exchange rate overshoots its long-run level
after the monetary shocks as found in the actual economies. Moreover, unlike
the price dynamics in the one-sector model, the price dynamics in the multi-
sector model never stay out of 90% confidence intervals of the impulse-response
functions of the aggregate variables in the actual economies when investment is
too costly to make.
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Lastly, one may argue that instead of excluding investment, the one- and multi-
sector models without a variable rate of capacity utilization (ut) would produce
a higher exchange rate overshooting in the real and nominal exchange rates
since the contemporaneous response of consumption would be stronger without
a variable capacity utilization. However, we find excluding the variable ut has a
negligible effect on the extent of overshooting. The reason is that when capacity
is fully utilized in all periods (ût = 0), the rental rate of capital increases
immediately when an expansionary monetary shock occurs, causing a stronger
contemporaneous response of the price level and a weaker contemporaneous
response of real spending. Consequently, when capital is assumed to be fully
utilized in all periods, both ût and Ŷt fall, causing a small change in Ĉt. This
results in the nominal and real exchange rate overshooting being limited after
the monetary shock (see (2.68)).
2.5.4 The Real Wage Dynamics in the Multi-Sector Model
Before concluding the paper, we analyze the real wage dynamics in the multi-
sector model under both staggered and flexible wage-setting. In Table 2.2, we
present the estimates of the correlation between real wages and real GDP in
developing economies reported in Agnor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) and
Li (2011) along with those in the multi-sector model under both staggered and
flexible wages. The correlation under flexible wages is almost perfect which
contrasts with a moderate correlation of 0.49 or lower in data. The correlation
of 0.59 under staggered wages may also be regarded as high compared to that in
the data. Yet, it is clear that our staggered wage-setting assumption brings the
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Note: HP and BP refer to the estimates of the quarterly correlation between real wages and
real GDP which are filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott and band-pass filters, respectively. In
both Agnor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) and Li (2011), the reported correlations denote
the simple mean of the correlations in the developing economies contained in their sample.
We estimate the quarterly model-based correlations using the 3-month average of the monthly
impulse responses of the real wage and output in the multi-sector model under both staggered
and flexible wages.
correlation in the model closer to the estimates of the correlation in the data.
We also study the co-movements of the real wage and output in the multi-sector
model under flexible and staggered wages in Figure 2.7. Under flexible wages,
workers’ ability to respond fast to shocks results in the real wage increasing
strongly in tandem with output following the shock. Consequently, the move-
ments in the real wage closely follow those in output in the multi-sector model
under flexible wages. Yet, while output strongly increases, the real wage falls
under staggered wages as wages are predetermined and prices increase after the
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Figure 2.7: Model-Based Impulse Responses of w and Y to εz
(a) Flexible Wages



































Note: The dashed lines with squares and the dotted lines with pentagrams indicate the
model-based impulse response functions of output and the real wage in the multi-sector model,
respectively.
shock. In the accompanying two months, since workers obtain a chance to re-
set their wages at least once after the shock, the real wage increases and peaks
about a quarter after the peak in output following the shock, which is consistent
with the finding in Li (2011) that real wages lag business cycles by a quarter in
developing economies.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied what happens to output, the price level, the
real and nominal exchange rates after a positive domestic monetary shock in
developing economies under an inflation targeting regime. We have found such
a shock causes a short-lived rise in output, a temporary real exchange rate de-
preciation, a sizable overshooting of the nominal exchange rate and an increase
in the price level in the short- and long-terms in these countries. Then, we have
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compared these findings with the outcomes in the one- and multi-sector mod-
els under staggered-wages. When adjustment costs of acquiring new capital is
low, neither the former nor the latter can successfully account for the nominal
exchange rate overshooting following domestic monetary shocks in the actual
economies. However, when such costs are large, we have found the multi-sector
model can successfully explain the aggregate dynamics following domestic mon-
etary shocks in developing economies.
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Chapter 3




Financial markets provide a wide range of instruments that enable market par-
ticipants to speculate or hedge against potential changes in asset prices. As
these instruments provide rich and timely information that is inherently for-
ward looking, researchers and practitioners frequently analyze financial data
to infer market participants’ beliefs about future movements in asset prices or
probabilities of certain outcomes. Options, in particular, are a powerful source
of direct market-based measures of investors’ beliefs about the price of an under-
lying asset. So far, many researchers have attempted to estimate these densities
for stock market indices, exchange rates, interest rates or even inflation, but
only a few have estimated these densities for commodities, particularly crude
oil.
Yet, crude oil options written on oil futures are particularly interesting for at
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least three reasons. First, crude oil is one of the key variables in generating
macroeconomic projections and in assessing macroeconomic risks. As famously
argued by Hamilton (2008), almost all of the U.S. recessions since World War
II were preceded by a spike in the oil price. Therefore, gaining further insights
about the expected path of crude oil prices can be helpful in predicting the fu-
ture course of the US economy. Second, one of the widely accepted reasons for
the upward trend in oil prices since 2000 is the surge in global demand (Kilian,
2009). This means, a better understanding of the expected crude oil prices can
be useful for inferring the expected global economic conditions. Third, fluctu-
ations in oil prices are relevant for the way to conduct monetary policy. For
instance, whether a shock to crude oil prices is temporary or permanent is vital
for policy makers to update their current stance on monetary policy. Pooling
information from market participants about the expected path of oil prices can
shed light on the nature of these shocks.
In this paper, I estimate an options-implied probability distribution function
(pdf) for Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures and document
the empirical properties of its first 4 moments as well as its extreme percentiles.
Second, I investigate the dynamics of these pdfs around particular events and
evaluate their reactions. As an extension, I implement an event-study analy-
sis and assess the effects of U.S. macroeconomic news on these pdfs. Finally, I
evaluate the information content of these pdfs by designing forecasting exercises
in two different but complementary directions. In the former one, I treat these
pdfs as density forecasts and compare their predictive accuracy against other
density forecasts generated by popular time-series models. In the latter one, I
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evaluate both in-sample and out-of-sample information content of these pdfs in
point forecasting of oil prices.
My contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I demonstrate that while
the expected price of oil futures (i.e. the mean of the options-implied oil pdf)
does not significantly respond to U.S. macroeconomic news, especially at short
maturities as in Kilian and Vega (2011), the skewness and the 95th percentile
of these pdfs do react to U.S. macroeconomic news at almost all maturities.
Market perceptions of oil price risk do react to surprises in U.S. macroeconomic
fundamentals, even if the short-term futures or spot prices do not. Second, I
show that options-implied oil pdfs are generally better density forecasts than
their standard time-series counterparts, particularly at shorter horizons (i.e. less
than 6 months). This provides evidence that pooling agents’ perceptions about
future oil prices can provide useful density forecasts. Finally, the fluctuations
in options-implied volatility and skewness contain valuable information in the
point forecast of oil prices. In particular, I show that these moments improve
the out-of-sample predictive performance of the common oil price forecasting
models. While the predictive content of higher order moments has been docu-
mented in the context of equities or stock market indices (Bollerslev, Tauchen,
and Zhou, 2009; Goyal and Saretto, 2009), the possibility of such a link has not
been explored for crude oil. This paper quantifies several aspects of oil price
risk including volatility and skewness using options-implied pdfs and fills these
gaps for crude oil.
I derive the options-implied pdfs in two steps following Ait-Sahalia and Duarte
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(2003). In the first step, I filter the options data, by replacing the price of
options by the closest prices that satisfy convexity and shape restrictions. In
the second step, I compute options-implied pdfs by estimating a locally linear
regression function.
The appeal of extracting densities from options prices to assess the market based
expectations is not new. The first examples of this kind go back to Breeden
and Litzenberger (1978). However, this literature mostly focussed on options on
foreign exchange market (Campa and Chang, 1996; Campa, Chang, and Refalo,
2002), interest rates (Amin and Ng, 1997; Longstaff, Santa-Clara, and Schwartz,
2001), and stock market indices or individual equities (Gemmill and Saflekos,
2000; Kang and Kim, 2006; Kostakis, Panigirtzoglou, and Skiadopoulos, 2011).
There are only handful of papers that have extracted options-implied pdfs for
commodities (for crude oil Melick and Thomas (1997); Pan (2012), and Datta,
Londono, and Ross (2015), and for agricultural commodities Fackler and King
(1990)). While Datta, Londono, and Ross (2015) examined the performances of
these pdfs around important market events like this paper, all of these papers
remain silent about the systematic reaction of these pdfs to U.S. macroeco-
nomic news announcements and their information content in predicting future
oil prices. This paper fills these gaps in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I provide details
of the estimation method and introduce the options data that is used in this
paper. In Section 3.3, I document several empirical regularities of options-
implied moments, their reactions to U.S. macroeconomic news, and finally their
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information content in predicting future oil prices. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Option-Implied PDFs
In this section, I briefly discuss how I estimated the options-implied pdfs for oil
futures. Then, I discuss how to estimate the key moments and percentiles from
these distributions along with some discussion about the robustness of these
measures. Finally, I introduce the options and futures data that are used to
estimate these oil pdfs.
3.2.1 Estimating Options-Implied Pdfs
In forming the option-implied pdfs, I follow the well known approach introduced
by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). Suppose at time t, there is a European call
option, C, written on a futures contract Ft,T maturing at time T with the strike
price X. We usually rely on the price dynamics of underlying assets under the
risk-neutral measure and under this measure, a European call option is priced
by equation 3.1:
C(X, T ) = e−rT
∫ ∞
0




(ST −X) f(ST ) dST (3.1)
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) demonstrate that the second derivative of the
price of a call option with respect to the strike price represents the risk-neutral





where r is the risk-free rate and T is the maturity of the option. Equation 3.2 is
derived for European calls, but the variables of interest, i.e. options written of
WTI futures, are American calls and puts. In the benchmark method, I assume
that this relationship holds also for American options, so I treat them as if they
are European options1.
In general, out-of-the money options are more liquid compared to their in-the-
money counterparts (see Voit (2003) for a discussion about the differences be-
tween in-the-money and out-of-the-money options). Consequently, researchers
prefer to use out-of-the money puts rather than in-the-money calls in estimating
options-implied pdfs. Yet, equations 3.1 and 3.2 are both derived for call op-
tions. In practice, it is always possible to find the price of a call as long as there
is a put option with the same maturity and the strike price. This is achieved
by the put-call parity relationship2.
1One implication of this assumption is that the prices of European and American options
would be the same. Yet, in theory (and also in practice) the price of American option is slightly
higher than a European one. However, this assumption implies that it is never attractive to
exercise the American call which is indeed a reasonable assumption for short horizons and
low interest rates (Chaudhury and Wei, 1994; Melick and Thomas, 1997). For commodity
options, particularly in a liquid market such as crude oil, Trolle and Schwartz (2009) show
that the approximation errors, due to the treatment of American options as Europeans, are
approximately zero in maturities less than 3 months and they are approximately less than
one fifteenth of the price of the option for maturities longer than one year.
2Notice that the original put-call parity equation holds only for European options. Since
American options can be exercised at any time prior the expiration date, the same put-call
parity cannot be used for American options. However, it is possible to rearrange this equation
into an inequality for the American options too. It will give us upper and lower bounds for
the price of the American put option with the same maturity date and strike price as the
American call option. Here is the formula that defines these limits:
S0 −X ≤ C(X,T )− P (X,T ) ≤ S0 −X e−r T
Because I am treating American options as if they were European, I need to choose either of
the two available choices with different shortcomings: (i) I can either use more liquid options
(i.e. out-of-the money puts instead of in-the-money calls) and introduce a noise due to the
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Options-implied pdfs are formed based on equation 3.2, which is the second
derivative of the price of the call option price with respect to its exercise price.
In practice, however, call prices are available only for a discrete number of
strike prices, so I need an approximation to derive the risk neutral pdfs from
the observed prices of options. Secondly, options have fixed expiration dates,
so the options-implied pdfs mechanically shrink (i.e. the uncertainty regrad-
ing oil futures goes down) as we approach to expiration date. Throughout the
paper, besides the event study analysis of option implied moments in subsec-
tion 3.3.3 and forecasting exercises that are provided in subsection 3.3.4, I use
fixed-horizon options-implied pdfs to derive time-series estimates of the relevant
percentiles and their moments3.
Consider a set ofM crude oil call options in ascending order with respect to the
strike price on a given day at a given maturity. Let Ci be the price of the i
th
call option4 with a strike price that is equal to Xi. The estimation problem is
then first to replace the actual call prices with the ones that satisfy no-arbitrage
conditions. This is the constrained least squares estimation step of Ait-Sahalia
and Duarte (2003). Next, I approximate the price of a call option written
form of the put-call parity for American options, (ii) I can stick just with the calls (and drop
all the puts from the sample) and introduce another type of noise due to liquidity differences
between in-the-money calls and out-of-the-money puts. As there is no perfect fix to this
problem, in the benchmark estimation, I continue to treat these options as European and
implement the put-call parity as usual.
3The literature provides several ways to interpolate option implied pdfs across time. In
this paper, I use total variance interpolation method as described in Carr and Wu (2010). In
simple terms, it is a weighted average of two pdfs where one has a shorter, the other has a
longer maturity compared to hypothetical fixed maturity pdf.
4For the notational simplicity, instead of writing C(Xi, T ), I suppress the maturity and
the strike price for the call option and write it as Ci.
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on oil futures at a strike price X ′ in a neighbour around X. The estimation is
conducted by a locally linear function β0(X)+β1(X) (X
′−X), which is the local
polynomial regression step of Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003). The parameters
of interest, i.e. β0(X) and β1(X), can be estimated by using the following kernel
regression:









where K(.) is the kernel function and h is the bandwidth. The second partial
derivative of the call price, C, with respect to exercise price, X, (i.e. options-
implied risk neutral pdf) is given by β̂′1(X) which the first derivative of β̂1(X)
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where k′i = K
′ ((Xi −X)/h) /h, i.e. first derivative of the kernel function with
respect to X.
The estimation of equations 3.3 and 3.4 hinges on (i) the functional form for
the kernel function (K(.)) and (ii) the bandwidth (h). Following the standard
practice in the literature, I assume a Gaussian kernel function for K(.). For the
choice of bandwidth, I follow Li and Zhao (2009) and numerically minimize the
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finite sample integrated Mean Square Error (MSE) of the locally linear estima-
tion via simulation5 and optimally choose h. All the estimation results in this
paper are based on this optimal bandwidth.
Finally, to estimate an options-implied risk neutral pdf, I need the risk-free
Treasury rates (see equation 3.2). Using the nominal Treasury term structure
data set of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007), I obtain the risk free n-period
yields and I derive the oil pdfs under the forward measure6. Therefore, with
this method, I can construct the probability on a single day at a single maturity
from options at different strike prices.
Once I estimate these distributions, I can easily obtain their summary measures,
particularly the options-implied moments and extreme percentiles. The odds
of observing a large number of outliers and high variability in the moment
measures in a highly liquid market such as crude oil is less likely. However, I
still observe large jumps particularly higher order moments of options-implied
pdfs. Therefore, rather than estimating the moments of the estimated pdfs,
I compute the quantile counterparts of these magnitudes as the benchmark
because the quantile moments are more prone to outliers. Specifically, defining
the options-implied cumulative distribution as F (X) and the quantile associated
with the probability level p as q(p)7, I define the quantile based moments, i.e.
5The exact numerical algorithm that I use to calculate the bandwidth is provided in Pan
(2012).
6A forward measure is an equivalent martingale measure similar to risk-neutral measure.
However, rather than using the uncertain money market rate as in risk neutral measure, it
uses the non-random forward rates to discount future payoffs. I use the forward measure
rather than risk neutral one throughout the paper.
7Notice that, for the notational simplicity, instead of writing the cumulative distribution
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median, volatility, skewness and kurtosis in equations 3.5 and 3.6 respectively8.
MED = q(50) IVOL = q(75)− q(25) (3.5)
SKEW =
(q(90)− q(50))− (q(50)− q(10))




In this study, I use daily futures on Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude
oil and options on these futures contracts that were traded formerly at New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and now under the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) Group. This exchange offers institutional features that allow
traders to transact anonymously. Futures contracts traded in this market are
for delivery at Cushing, OK and traditionally, they have been the most liquid
and the largest volume market for crude oil trading. Similar to the NYMEX oil
futures, the options written on them are by far the most liquid options market
where underlying is a commodity futures.
Trading for futures contracts ends 4 days prior to the 25th calendar day preced-
ing the delivery month. If the 25th is not a business day, trading ends on the
fourth business day prior to the last business day before the 25th calendar day.
On the other hand, options written on these futures expire in three business
as Ft,T (X), I suppress the maturity and the time so write it as F (X). This is true for q(p)
as well. Finally, the relationship between q(p) and F (X) can be represented as follows:
p = P (x ≤ q(p)) = F (q(p)) ⇒ q(p) = F−1(p)
8When abstracting from these outliers (i.e. after I trim above and below 5% of daily
moments data), the options-implied moments derived from quantiles and usual methods are
highly correlated. This is particularly true for the lower-order moments, such as mean and
volatility. After trimming the series for outliers, the average pairwise correlation is equal to
0.95 for the mean and 0.92 for the volatilities over the entire sample. On the other hand, the
correlation for skewness and kurtosis decline to 0.85 and 0.78, respectively.
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days prior to the expiration date of futures contract. Furthermore, these op-
tions are American-style contracts and at the expiry date, the payoffs of these
options are settled in cash9.
To reduce data and pricing errors, I clean the data by removing options that
are priced at 1 cent as very cheap options might add too much noise to the
estimation of the options-implied pdf10. While the constrained least squares
estimation step of Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003) method partially irons this
problem out, this noise can be still be a serious problem especially if we move
further away form the center and approach the tails of the pdf (e.g. see Høg and
Tsiaras (2011), Christoffersen, Jacobs, and Chang (2013), and Datta, Londono,
and Ross (2015)).
Even after I clean the data, the number of options and their moneyness11 range
remain quite large. Table 3.1 reports that there are 43 calls and 50 puts ma-
turing in a month, but there are only 31 calls and 30 puts maturing in a year.
Figure 3.1 shows that rather than being stable, the number of options traded
display an upward trend through time. For example, before 2000s, the available
strike prices often cover 20 to 25 US dollars range with increments of 1 dollar
whereas recently the coverage increases to 200-250 US dollars with increments




10The options on WTI futures are priced with increments of 1 cent, so 1 cent is the minimum
price of an option if that option is traded in the market at any point in time.
11In this context, moneyness is defined as the relative position (so a ratio) of the price of
an underlying asset, which is the oil futures, with respect to the strike price of a call option
or a put option.
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of 50 cents (see Figure 3.2)12. Furthermore, call moneyness ranges from an aver-
age daily minimum of 0.84 to an average daily maximum of 1.27 for the options
maturing in a month. This means that market participants can, on average,
hedge against price changes between a roughly 15 percent decrease and 25 per-
cent increase in the price of oil during the next month. Not surprisingly, the
moneyness range of calls widens as the maturity of options increases, reflect-
ing the differences in market participants opinions or hedging needs for future
crude oil price developments. Broadly speaking, the put options have similar
characteristics as the calls which are shown by Table 3.1.
3.3 Estimation Results
This section presents empirical regularities regarding the oil pdfs. I first report
the stylized facts, specifically time series and cross sectional properties of the
options-implied moments of oil futures. Next, I analyze changes in market par-
ticipants’ beliefs about oil price movements around major market events as well
as their systematic reactions to U.S. macroeconomic news announcements. Fi-
nally, I study the accuracy of these risk-neutral distributions as density forecasts
and their information content in point forecasting oil prices.
12The increase in the range spanned by options with minimum and maximum strikes got
accelerated even more after 2006. Anecdotal reports suggest that there is an influx of cash by
financial institutions to oil options and futures markets in all maturities especially after 2006.
Clearly, this tendency also coincides with the “Financialization (Master’s) Hypothesis”. This
hypothesis postulates that the financialization of oil leads to influx of cash to oil futures and
options market, which in the end affect the real price of oil in physical oil markets (for further
discussions on this channel, see Fattouh, Kilian, and Mahadeva (2013)). While the validity of
this hypothesis is still unresolved in the literature, the widening in the moneyness of options
would suggest the recent influx of cash in oil futures and options markets.
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3.3.1 Options-Implied Risk Neutral Moments: Some Styl-
ized Facts
Crude oil options are by far the most liquid and actively traded options among
other commodities. Surprisingly, crude oil options have not been studied in
detail13. Indeed, the literature (to the best of my knowledge) lacks stylized facts
regarding the descriptive properties of distribution of oil futures as implied by
options.
Figure 3.3 displays the recent behaviour (2000 and onwards) of the volatility,
skewness and kurtosis of the options-implied oil pdfs in daily frequency for 30
and 90 days fixed-horizon maturities. Clearly, there are only a handful of ex-
treme events in the crude oil market that sharply increases the implied volatility.
Not surprisingly, the Great Recession is one of them, and during this period, the
level of implied volatility reached its highest level in its history. Furthermore,
the implied volatility of oil experienced a sharp increase due to supply inter-
ruptions or geopolitical tensions such as the Libyan production interruptions in
2011 or U.S. tensions with Iran in 2012.
Another source of information about the options-implied pdfs is the time series
behaviour of skewness and kurtosis (also documented in Figure 3.3). First, both
of these moments are time-varying, similar to the implied volatility. Having said
that, the kurtosis experiences several hikes which suggests a higher probability
of extreme events. Combined with the empirical behavior of skewness, higher
order options-implied moments can provide useful insights about the market
13There are handful of recent papers using crude oil options data to document the behavior
of options-implied pdfs or compare the predictive performance of different pdf fitting methods,
such as Høg and Tsiaras (2011); Pan (2012); Datta, Londono, and Ross (2015).
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participants’ perception of oil price risk. For instance, when the price of crude
oil reached its peak in the early second half of 2008 (before Lehman Brothers
declared its bankruptcy in September 2008), market participants were assigning
increased probability to a major decline in oil prices. In particular, during the
second half of 2008, kurtosis reached fresh highs whereas skewness reached new
lows compared to their historical values strongly indicating higher probability
of a left extreme event.
The last piece of information provided in Figure 3.3 is the average term structure
behaviour of empirical moments of oil pdfs. First, there is a volatility premium
for longer maturities in the implied volatility of oil, which is on average true
for the oil futures as well (Alquist, Kilian, and Vigfusson, 2013). Second, the
skewness is negative on average and it decreases as we move further along in
the term structure of skewness. This possibly represents the increased price of
hedging the tail risk as we move farther in the future (Bakshi, Kapadia, and
Madan, 2003).
Alternatively, Table 3.2 confirms the average term structure behaviour in the
higher order moments of oil pdfs that is shown in Figure 3.3, such as the volatil-
ity risk premium and the decreasing skewness in the term structure. However,
unlike the mean or the implied volatility, skewness and kurtosis have lower
autoregressive coefficients. As confirmed in the forecasting regressions in sub-
section 3.3.4, this is likely an indication of the richer information content in the
skewness about the empirical behaviour of future oil prices.
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3.3.2 Option-Implied Pdfs and Important Market Events
In this subsection, I present two case studies that focus on rapid and unexpected
changes in market sentiment proxied by the reaction of options-implied pdfs of
oil futures: (i) the fall in Libyan crude oil production and (ii) the unantici-
pated announcements of future large-scale asset purchases (or QE) programs.
Assuming risk neutrality, the estimated fixed-maturity options-implied pdfs re-
flects market participants’ beliefs about the oil futures for different maturities at
any point in time. However, risk neutrality is a strong assumption and caution
should be taken in interpreting these densities as representing actual (physical)
probabilities of future events14.
3.3.2.1 Libyan Oil Production Disruptions in 2011 and 2013
Oil prices increased because of two major conflicts that broke out and escalated
in Libya in 2011 and 2013. During both of these episodes, particularly from
mid-February to end of April in 2011 and beginning of June to mid September
in 2013, crude oil prices experienced visible jumps (see Figure 3.5). These jumps
coincided with news related to increasing probability of lasting interruption to
Libyan oil supply such as the first reports of production cuts (February 23), the
low (or even no) exports (March 7), and sabotages of oil fields (April 8) in 2011.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that oil price increases particularly in February and
March do lead to a minor increase in volatility but major increases in skewness
and the 95th percentile of the risk-neutral distribution. On the other hand, when
oil prices reached $115 in early April, volatility, skewness, and kurtosis started
14There is a vast amount evidence for asset prices showing that observed asset returns do
not follow risk-neutral dynamics, which are therefore not directly observable.
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to decline, which suggests a decreasing probability of a spike in oil prices. In
other words, further price increases were seen as less likely according to market
participants. This means that the sabotage of oil fields in April 8 did not lead
to any change in the distribution.
In 2013, oil prices experienced similar jumps as in 2011 due to another wave of
turmoil in Libya. For example, these jumps in oil prices (see Figure 3.5) align
with another round of increased civil strife (July 5), entire port blockades by
militias (August 12), and partial resolution of decline in port activity in Libya
(September 10). Interestingly, these events follow exactly the same pattern as
the ones in 2011. The ones in July 5 and August 12 lead to increases in the
volatility and the skewness, whereas the September 10 do not lead to any visible
change in these moments (see Figure 3.4 for the daily reaction of these pdfs).
3.3.2.2 Quantitative Easing Announcements in the US
Oil pdfs can also help to clarify how sudden changes in monetary policy can
affect the beliefs of oil market participants about the future path of oil prices.
For example, after the recent financial crises, the Federal Reserve launched sev-
eral rounds of monetary policy expansion mechanisms such as buying a large
volume of Treasury securities (known as QE2) and extension of the maturity of
the Feds Treasury holdings as well as the reinvestment of maturing mortgage-
backed securities (known as QE3). These programs were publicly announced in
several steps in the speeches of the chairman and the FOMC statements that are
published by the Fed. Here, I focus on only four of these statements/speeches
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about the introduction of these programs which are arguably the most impor-
tant ones15. These dates are August 10, 2010 (FOMC meeting) and August
27, 2010 (chairman Bernanke’s speech in the annual Jackson Hall conference)
for the QE2 program, and August 26, 2011 (chairman Bernanke’s speech in the
annual Jackson Hall conference) and September 27, 2011 (FOMC meeting) for
the QE3 program.
Figure 3.7 shows the effect of important QE2 announcements on crude oil pdfs.
As in Glick and Leduc (2012), I confirm that (important) QE2 announcements
lead to a decline in mean of option-implied crude oil pdfs. However, these de-
clines become less apparent for longer maturities. For instance, as shown in
Figure 3.7, the decline in the mean is less obvious for 90 day maturities as op-
posed to the 30 day fixed maturity risk-neutral pdf. Alternatively, Rosa (2013)
and Basistha and Kurov (2015) show that the effects of unconventional mone-
tary policies could be attenuated if identification of these shocks are achieved
with daily rather than intraday data. It is true that the options-implied analysis
has the drawback of using daily data, but they are helpful to understand how
certain percentiles of the distribution react to QE type announcements. For
instance, Figure 3.7 shows that not only the mean but also the volatility and
skewness of the oil pdfs react to those announcements. On the other hand, these
announcements lead to a decline in the skewness but an increase in the volatility
of crude oil prices (Figure 3.8) for all maturities. Combining the increase in the
15Wright (2012) identified 21 of such announcement dates for the US among which 7 are
treated as the most important ones for the introduction and implementation of QE2 and QE3
programs. Here, I pick only 4 of them and document the behaviour of oil pdfs just before and
after these dates. However, the ones that I haven’t included in my analysis delivered roughly
similar results as the ones I study in this paper.
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5th (from $57 to $61) and 95th percentiles (from $93 to $95), the results seem to
be consistent with the view that QE2 announcement decreases the possibility
of major decline in crude oil prices (below $60) but increase the possibility of a
major increase.
3.3.3 Events that Move Crude Oil Pdfs
It is hard to disentangle causality in macroeconomics and finance. One promis-
ing approach to solve this is to make use of the public information and approach
the causal identification problem by looking at the high frequency reaction of
asset prices on macroeconomic news announcements. Typically, in a small win-
dow around a major news announcement, the surprise component will dominate
all other available information, so the recovered effect will be the an important
insight of the surprise on financial market participants’ beliefs.
Most researchers exploiting event study methodology use short windows around
the data release; typically 30 to 60 minutes. This aligns with the empirical evi-
dence as the jump in conditional mean following a news announcement happens
typically within 10 minutes (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003).
Accordingly, I relate the changes in the moments and extreme quantiles of the
options-implied oil pdf to 24 leading macroeconomic news announcements. Due
to data availability, however, the window size that I use in this analysis is daily.
In subsection 3.3.2, I document a few case studies that focuses on rapid and
unexpected changes in oil pdfs. Alternatively, rather than focusing on just
handful of announcements, one can examine the systematic reactions of these
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pdfs to macroeconomic surprises. In this subsection, I move in this direction
and complement the previous analysis with an event-study exercise. The goal is
to recover the reaction of higher order moments and percentiles of risk-neutral
oil pdfs to these surprises.
Table 3.3 lists the announcements, their frequency and units. For all announce-
ments, the surprise component is measured as the difference between real-time
actual value less the median expectation from the survey conducted by Money
Market Services (MMS) on the previous Friday before the data release. The





βisit + εt (3.7)
where xk,n,t(q) is either the moment (the mean, volatility, skewness or kurtosis),
5th (if q = 5), or 95th (if q = 95) percentile of the pdf over the next n months
as of day t, sit denotes the surprise component of an announcement of type i, I
denotes the total number of announcements (24 in my case) and finally ∆ is the
difference operator. Similar to Kitsul and Wright (2013), I run this regression
over all days when there is at least one news announcement and the surprise
is set to zero for news types for which there is not an announcement on that day.
The reaction of the options-implied mean, volatility, skewness and kurtosis are
shown in Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, respectively. To complement this analysis,
I also provide the responses of the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the pdf to the
macroeconomic surprises in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 respectively. For example, the
effect of one percent PPI surprise on the mean of the distribution is reported
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as 0.707 at 3 months horizon (see Table 3.4). This means that if the PPI is
realized in one percentage point above expectations, then the mean of the oil
pdf derived from options maturing in 3 months will fall by $ 0.71.
All the parameter estimates of the conditional mean to 24 macroeconomic an-
nouncements in Table 3.4 are insignificant at shorter horizons and only some
of these estimates have the signs predicted by the theory. This perfectly aligns
with Kilian and Vega (2011) where they test the identifying assumption that
energy prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates
by using an event-study approach and regressing daily energy price returns on
U.S. macroeconomic news16. On the other hand, some of the macroeconomic
surprises have significant effects on the conditional mean at longer maturities
(6 months or more)17. For instance, as can be seen from Table 3.4, positive sur-
prises to Non-Farm Payrolls, ISM Manufacturing, Industrial Production, GDP
advanced estimate and PPI all have significant effects on the mean of the fixed
horizon pdfs with horizons 6 months or more.
Surprisingly, U.S. macroeconomic announcements have significant effects on
some of the higher order moments of the oil pdfs at various maturities. While
16One weak point about Kilian and Vega (2011)’s exercise is the window size, which is a
day in their study. However, Rosa (2013) showed that using an hour as the window, it is
possible to show macroeconomic surprises have significant effects on energy prices.
17The importance of this discussion goes back to the problem of whether energy prices are
predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates. In the VAR or SVAR models
including energy prices as a variable, the most commonly used identifying assumption is that
energy prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroeconomic aggregates (see Kilian
(2009) and the references therein). Kilian and Vega (2011) investigate the validity of this
hypothesis the spot oil prices or 1 month oil futures. However, they did not worry about
whether oil futures prices are predetermined in longer maturities of the oil futures as none of
these VAR models use futures with maturities beyond 1 month.
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implied volatility of the oil pdfs is generally unaffected by U.S. macroeconomic
surprises (as documented in Table 3.5), some of these news surprises have sig-
nificant effects on skewness of the oil pdfs. Better than expected data (that
indicates stronger growth for US economy) increases the skewness of the oil
pdfs, which indicates an increased probability of the extreme values on the
right tail. For instance, the effect of one percent real GDP growth surprise on
the skewness of risk-neutral distribution is reported as 0.024 at the 3 months
horizon (see Table 3.6). While this is a big surprise in terms of real GDP growth,
the increase in skewness is non-trivial as well, because the change in skewness
is slightly higher than one third of its standard deviation.
Related to studying the effect of macroeconomic announcements on moments,
one can also examine their effects on the upper and lower extreme values of the
oil distribution. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the effects of the U.S. macro news on
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the pdfs respectively. Positive aggregate demand
surprises such as real GDP growth, Initial Jobless Claims, Non-Farm Payrolls,
Retail Sales, and Capacity Utilization significantly raise the 95th percentile of
the distribution. This finding is also true for forward-looking indicators such as
Chicago PMI, Consumer Sentiment, and Business Outlook Survey (BOS). On
the other hand, besides the real GDP growth surprises, the 5th percentile does
not respond to macroeconomic surprises. Thus, it seems that the right extreme
percentile is more sensitive to macroeconomic surprises than the left one.
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3.3.4 Forecasting with Oil Pdfs
This subsection assesses the information that one can extract from these pdfs in
two dimensions. First, I investigate their performance as density forecasts and
I compare them with density forecasts generated by standard time-series mod-
els. Second, I evaluate whether information that can be obtained from these
risk-neutral densities is valuable in point forecasting of future oil prices. This
assessment is based on standard predictive regressions in the context of both
in-sample and out-of-sample exercises.
Typically, the predictive regression exercises in this literature rely on monthly
oil futures data. While this approach is useful, it does not utilize all available
information from oil futures. More importantly, statistical tests using daily
data will have more accurate size and higher power as one can pool the daily
information both from oil futures and options markets. This approach does
have some drawbacks, however. For instance, the price of a futures contract
for delivery in h months can never be exact. In fact, as we approach to the
maturity, the number of days remaining decreases. Additionally, it is not easy
to work with daily data due to its sparse nature in many days. Despite the
drawbacks of using daily data, in this subsection I conduct forecasting exercises
at the daily frequency in order to achieve two things: (i) obtain all available
information from both of these markets and (ii) to be consistent with previous
parts of the paper.
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3.3.4.1 Evaluating Density Forecasts
The forecast densities of crude oil are based on either time-series methods or
options on WTI oil futures. Time-series models use only past return informa-
tion and I consider 2 fairly popular GARCH models. Specifically, I estimate the
historical densities from Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedas-
ticity Model (GARCH) (1,1) and an Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) (1,1)
models. The exact formulation of these models are provided in equations 3.8
and 3.9 respectively.
rt = κ+ ρ1rt−1 + σtεt





εt ∼ N(0, 1)
















εt ∼ N(0, 1)
where r denotes either the daily return of WTI Spot price. I assume that
GARCH(1,1) and EGARCH(1,1) correctly capture the dynamics of the oil
prices. However, to inspect the adequacy of our standard GARCH model struc-
ture, I also try higher order models as well. For this purpose, every time I
estimate the GARCH(1,1) model, I test whether the standardized errors are
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uncorrelated using the Ljung-Box test. When one of these tests indicated a re-
jection of the null I have included additional parameters in the mean/variance
equations and selected the best model according to the Bayesian Information
Criterion18.
In order to construct the GARCH and EGARCH based density forecasts, I use
the following procedure. For each observation time t, at which a forecast den-
sity corresponding to some future time t+ h must be estimated, I estimate the
parameters of each model by maximum likelihood with all the available data
up to (and including) day t. Next, I draw a random number from the standard
normal distribution and multiply it by σt to generate a new εt residual, which
is then used to update the conditional variance equation and define the simu-
lated logarithmic return and corresponding asset price. Repeating this process
h times provides the terminal price of the reference asset at time t+h. In order
to get a smooth estimate of the forecast density, I simulate 10000 terminal prices
similarly and fit a Gaussian kernel density in order to obtain the required den-
sity19. Notice that I provide time-series density forecasts using oil spot prices,
and compare the performance them with the corresponding risk-neutral distri-
bution.
To compare the out-of-sample predictive ability of time-series model (either
18There are few occasions in the sample where a higher order model would be preferable.
Nevertheless, I chose to maintain our standard GARCH(1,1) model because the rejections are
sporadic and unsystematic, so that the end user would probably be reluctant to temporarily
switch from one specification to another.
19As in Rosenberg and Engle (2002), I choose bandwidth equal to 0.9 N−1/5Σ where Σ is
the standard deviation of the simulated terminal values, and N is the number of simulations
(10,000 in this case).
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EGARCH or GARCH) against risk-neutral pdf, I used the predictive likelihood
(AG) test proposed by Amisano and Giacomini (2007). Assuming ft(Yt+h) and
gt(Yt+h) are two competing forecast densities where h and Yt+h are denoting the
number of out-of sample periods and the realized price of the underlying asset
as of time t+ h respectively, the difference in the predictive likelihoods is equal
to
∑h
i=1 log(ft(Yt+h))− log(gt(Yt+h))20. Specifically, the AG-test statistic takes










where σ̂ is the Newey-West HAC consistent estimator for the asymptotic vari-
ance.
Table 3.10 provides the AG-test results for the time-series based density fore-
cast using daily returns of spot oil prices and risk-neutral distribution. In Table
3.10, I evaluate the performance of these models for maturities 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12
months in the second to sixth columns. A positive significant AG-test statistic
20Notice that, options-implied pdfs are only available for so-called calendar forecast, i.e.
forecasts for the 7 business days before the expiration of the future contract. This means
that as we approach to maturity, the dispersion of density forecasts mechanically shrink. Due
to this problem, in subsection 3.3.1, I present fixed-horizon options-implied pdfs. There, I
interpolate these pdfs across time as well (see subsection 3.2.1 for details of the interpolation).
However, risk-neutral densities that I use for density forecast evaluation in this sections are
not interpolated across time, i.e. they are in altering horizons. For example, the horizon for
risk-neutral pdf maturing in a month is between 1 to 22 business days whereas for 3 months
maturity, it is between 45 to 66 business days. Since I evaluate these density forecasts in
real-time, I have not interpolated these density forecasts across time. Specifically, I take h
as multiples of 22 business days for maturity horizons. Specifically, as I assess these time-
series sand options implied densities in 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months maturities, I take h =
22, 66, 132, 198, 264 days respectively.
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displays that risk-neutral density significantly outperforms the relevant time-
series model in the given horizon whereas a negative significant AG-test does
the other way round.
Overall, two results stand out from Table 3.10. First, in shorter maturities, there
is an evidence in favor of risk-neutral distributions in delivering better density
forecasts compared to time-series methods. However, at relatively longer hori-
zons, i.e. 6, 9, and 12 months, it seems that risk-neutral distributions provide
equally good or only slightly better density forecasts as their time-series coun-
terparts. The main reason for the difference in the performance of risk-neutral
density in different horizons might be the liquidity of the options market. In
particular, for the horizons that options are heavily traded, risk-neutral distri-
butions do fairly well compared to time-series based methods. Assuming the
coverage of the strike prices is an indicator of liquidity at any given point time,
options maturing in 1 and 3 months are better compared to others (as in Figure
3.2). Alternatively, as the risk premium at shorter maturities is close to zero,
risk-neutral distribution is almost the same as the physical distribution so it ac-
curately reflects the market participants beliefs about future oil prices. In fact,
several studies have shown superior performance of risk neutral pdfs in other op-
tions markets (see for instance Gemmill and Saflekos (2002); Shackleton, Taylor,
and Yu (2010)).
3.3.4.2 Evaluating Point Forecasts
As an alternative for treating risk-neutral densities as density forecasts and
comparing them with usual time-series based density forecasts, one can assess
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how valuable the information content of these pdfs are in forecasting future oil
prices. Accordingly, in this subsection I investigate their information content by
predictive regressions in the context of an in-sample as well as an out-of-sample
forecasting exercises.
In-Sample Analysis: While out-of-sample performance is more relevant for
practical forecasting purposes, in-sample regressions are also informative and
have the advantage of exploiting the full sample. Therefore, it is useful to eval-
uate the in-sample performance of information content of risk-neutral densities
of oil. To investigate whether the higher order moments contain information
about future inflation realizations, I rely on regressions in the spirit of Mincer
and Zarnowitz (1969) as in equation 3.11.
St+h = αh + βh F
h
t + γh IVOL
h
t + δh SKEW
h
t + Ch Zt + εt+h (3.11)
where St+h denotes the realized future oil prices at some future date t + h, F
h
t
denotes oil futures at the same horizon h, IVOL and SKEW are the volatility
and the skewness of computed from risk neutral pdfs. In all of the following
regressions, I use the usual controls Zt, i.e. general or sub indices (Goldman
Sachs Commodity Indices) of Commodity Prices to control for the general ten-
dency in commodity markets, Baltic Dry Index to control for global demand
conditions, the Crack Spread (the difference between products and crude oil
prices) to control for oil related product markets, and the lagged value of the
realized oil prices. All these controls are at the daily frequency and available in
Bloomberg.
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While the purpose of these regressions is to evaluate whether an expected value
of a target variable incorporates all available information, here I use them to
evaluate the information content of the quantile moments in forecasting oil
prices. In order to do that, first I need a good enough estimate for the expected
value of future oil prices. Since the analysis is conducted in daily frequency and
there is a widespread tendency to use oil futures as the conditional expectation
or the best predictors of future oil spot prices, I use the futures oil prices, i.e.
F ht as an estimate for the conditional expected values of future oil prices in
equation 3.1121.
The empirical results for the regression specification 3.11 are reported in Table
3.11 at 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months horizons. As a reference point, in the first
column in Table 3.11, I regress the realized future oil prices on the oil futures.
In columns 2 and 3, I add implied volatility and skewness indicators one by one.
The dispersion in the implied volatility measure has a negative and significant
impact on the future oil prices, whereas the skewness, after taking into account
expected inflation, has a positive and significant impact on future oil prices.
Notice that including both implied skewness and volatility separately helps de-
creasing the root mean square error (RMSE) at various horizons.
21Typically, researchers forecasts of crude oil from surveys such as the Bluechip or the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), but they are available only at monthly (or quarterly)
frequencies and their quality is questioned in several papers. Even though there is a massive
evidence showing that surveys are very good in forecasting inflation (see Faust and Wright
(2013) for a recent review), for crude oil prices evidence usually can go to the other way (see
Alquist, Kilian, and Vigfusson (2013) for a recent survey). Furthermore, many institutions
such as ECB, IMF, and several central banks are using oil futures as their forecasts of oil
prices. Therefore, I choose the futures oil prices as the estimates of conditional expectation.
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In the forth column of Table 3.11, I include both of these variables in the same
regression. It is interesting to note that these variables are significant at both 1
month and 3 months horizons, but beyond, only skewness remains significant.
In terms of RMSE ratios, it seems skewness leads to larger declines as opposed
to volatility. Furthermore, the fifth and sixth columns in Table 3.11 report
the results when one adds the controls Zt including both volatility and skew-
ness. Overall, these controls qualitatively do not alter the results in columns 2-4.
Several researchers argue that volatility helps to explain macroeconomic cycles
and oil price dynamics (e.g. Hamilton (2003); Baumeister and Peersman (2013),
and Jo (2014)). These papers show that ignoring the effects of oil price volatil-
ity can distort the effectiveness of a policy designed under the presumption of
linearity in the oil price-economic activity relationship. The findings in Table
3.11 go one step further and suggests that the oil price skewness contains infor-
mation about future oil prices beyond the usual indicators such as oil futures,
oil price volatility and a set of standard high frequency indicators extensively
used in the literature. This is true even at the one year horizon22.
These results are also important in economic terms as well. The tail risk or
the volatility regarding the oil prices are important risks which may have disas-
trous impacts on macroeconomic dynamics. These risks, however, are not fully
22One particular reason that I don’t go beyond one year maturity is the liquidly concerns
regarding the crude oil options market. For instance, in the CME there were in total 425
options (both call and put with different strike prices) that have been traded in January 2012
that will expire within a month. On the other hand, there were only 65 options that have
been traded in the CME that have a maturity of one year at the same time. While I don’t
have exact volume of these options but there is no reason for maturities one year or more to
be very liquid.
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incorporated in the futures prices alone. It may be that oil futures are biased
indicators of expected future spot prices and there is no reason to expect them
to pool all the information in the economy. In fact there are several compelling
reasons and evidences for why oil futures should be the biased estimators of
future oil prices. For example, assuming inventories of crude oil serve to avoid
interruptions of the production process or to meet unexpected shifts in demand,
oil importers may either want to hold inventories or buy oil futures to insure
themselves against adverse movement in the oil prices as in Alquist and Kilian
(2010). In their model, an increase in the oil price volatility and skewness, which
is an indication of an increased probability of a spike in oil prices, could lead
spot oil prices to overshoot. Alquist and Kilian (2010) show that oil futures will
also increase but not as much as the spot price, so the futures spread (the differ-
ence between the oil futures and the spot prices) can be viewed as an indicator
of fluctuations in the spot price of crude oil driven by shifts in precautionary
demand or risk premium for oil. Alternatively, one can interpret the skewness
and volatility as indicators of risk premia or precautionary demand as well as
the indicators of a increased probability of a spike in oil prices.
Out-Of-Sample Analysis: The previous analysis involved in-sample predic-
tion performance. Now, I complement this exercise with an evaluation of the
out-of-sample performance of the skewness and volatility measures estimated
from risk-neutral densities of crude oil. More precisely, I use a set of reference
models in which I incorporate the skewness and volatility measures to construct
pseudo out-of-sample forecasts. For each case, I compare the performance of
each model that includes these measures with the one that does not.
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In the literature, several studies have shown that oil futures usually cannot im-
prove the no change, i.e. random walk, forecast in monthly frequency but the
results do alter for some maturities (such as 6 months or 1 year) at the daily
frequency (Alquist, Kilian, and Vigfusson, 2013). Typically, models performing
well out-of-sample are usually parsimonious as parameter proliferation tends to
deteriorate out-of-sample forecast accuracy. Therefore, I consider three simple
univariate specifications as in Alquist, Kilian, and Vigfusson (2013), but unlike
their work, I slightly modify these models in order to test whether the infor-
mation content of options-implied moment is valuable in forecasting oil prices.
Specifically, I augment all of these models with the volatility and the skewness
derived from oil pdfs. The models that I use for the forecasting horserace are:
(i) the “Random Walk (RW)” without drift (equation 3.12), (ii) the “Futures
Model (FM)” that assumes oil futures are the best available predictors of future
oil prices (equation 3.13), and (iii) the “Futures Spread (FS) Model” that uses
futures spread and the spot price of oil as the predictors of future oil prices
(equation 3.14).
Ŝt+h|t = St + γ1IVOLt + γ2SKEWt (3.12)
Ŝt+h|t = F
h







+ γ1IVOLt + γ2SKEWt (3.14)
where F ht denotes the current nominal price of the futures contract that matures
in h periods, St i the current spot price of oil, VOLt denotes the volatility, and
SKEWt denotes the skewness computed from options-implied distribution.
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I compare the performance of these reference models (presented in equations
3.12 - 3.14) that incorporate measures of oil price risk with the models without
the oil price risk measures. For example, I forecast future oil prices based on
both the RW model with oil price risk measures (equation 3.12) and RW model
without oil price risk measures (a version of equation 3.12 where γ1 = γ2 = 0).
Then, I compare the performances of both of these models to assess if the
oil price risk measures improve the forecast performance compared to the RW
model that does not include them. I follow this procedure for the FM and the
FS models as well.
Table 3.12 assesses the predictive accuracy of all three forecasting models against
the benchmark model for horizons of 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. The forecast
evaluation period is January 4, 2004 to May 22, 2014 whereas the initial es-
timation window starts from January 2, 1991 for maturities 1 to 9 months,
whereas it starts from January 2, 1996 for options maturing in 12 months. For
each model, I report the results for the MSPE ratio for the model including the
skewness and the volatility as the explanatory variables relative to the model
that does not include them as explanatory variables. However, since the assess-
ment of which forecasting model is accurate may depend on the loss function
of the forecaster (Elliott and Timmermann, 2008), for each horizon I also test
whether a forecast correctly predicts the sign of the change in the spot price fol-
lowing the success ratio statistic of Pesaran and Timmermann (1992). Finally,
the p-values for MSPE ratio test is constructed based on Clark and West (2006).
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Columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 show that adding skewness and implied volatility
to the models presented in equations 3.12 - 3.14 produces lower MSPE than
the appropriate model without these measures. For instance, options-implied
moments leads to an improvement of 5 to 10 % reduction in the Futures Model
(equation 3.13 and row three in Table 3.12) in 1 to 3 months horizons. This is
also true for Random Walk and Futures Spread models as well. Options-implied
moments once again lead to improvements in the forecast performance and these
improvements are more visible (in terms of reductions in MSPE) especially at
1, 3, and 6 months horizons. In terms of statistical significance, the models
including volatility and skewness as additional variables (as opposed to the one
that do not include them) are significant at not all but in most of the horizons.
In particular, option implied moments improve the forecasting performance of
all 3 of the empirical models especially in 3, 6 and 12 months horizons. The
improvements are slightly more visible in terms of success ratios. In particular,
these options-implied moments are quite helpful in predicting the right direction
of the change in the future spot prices.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I use the options on WTI crude oil futures to construct daily
risk neutral probability densities for oil prices between August 1990 and May
2014. Using these oil pdfs, I first derive their higher order moments and ex-
treme percentiles. Second, I examine changes in market participants’ beliefs
about oil price movements around a few important events. Complementary to
this analysis, I study the systematic reactions of these summary statistics to
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announcements regarding US macroeconomic fundamentals. While the bulk of
the movement in these pdfs cannot be tied to the surprise component of macroe-
conomic news announcements regarding U.S. fundamentals, skewness and the
95th percentile of these pdfs are significantly related to these announcements.
Third, I find that oil pdfs based on market information perform better than
density forecasts based on standard time-series models, especially at shorter
horizons. Finally, I show that different components of oil price risks (implied
volatility and skewness) have valuable information for the future realizations of
oil prices. Specifically, taking into account of volatility and skewness improves
the point forecasts of oil prices.
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Note: This Figure shows the average number of available American put and call options written on the WTI
futures that are traded in CME Group in monthly frequency. The options that are plotted in Figure 3.1 are
only ones that are maturing within 1, 3, and 6 months. These are the options that I use to estimate risk
neutral pdfs in Section 3.3 which includes both out-of-the-money puts and out-of-the-money calls as explained
in section 3.2.2. The sample period is between January 1990 and May 2015.
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Figure 3.2: WTI Spot Price and Options Coverage (Min and
Max)








































Note: This Figure shows the WTI futures available for delivery at Cushing, OK and both the minimum and
maximum strike price of options (that are used to estimate risk-neutral pdfs in Section 3.3) within 1, 3, 6,
and 12 months expiration. The strike prices of options as well as the future prices are quoted in monthly
frequency, so they are computed by taking the averages of daily strikes (for options) and prices (for futures). To
calculate the monthly minimum and maximum strike prices, however, I first find options with the minimum
and maximum strike prices each business day, then take daily averages of strike prices of these options.
Therefore, the options with highest and lowest strike prices may not be traded everyday (For instance, if the
price of a option is equal to 1 cent, it is deleted from the sample, so the min/max strike prices may be different
for consecutive days).
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Figure 3.3: Higher Order Moments of Option Implied Pdfs
















































































































Note: Figure (3.3) displays the time series and the average term structure of options-implied higher order moments. The moments of the options-implied oil
pdfs are percentile moments and the exact formulas to compute these moments are defined in equations 3.5 - 3.6 in Subsection 3.2.1. The figures that are in
the first row show the time series whereas the ones in the second row show the average cross-sectional (term structure) dynamics of options implied moments.
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Figure 3.4: Reaction of Options-Implied Pdfs During Libyan Civil War I: 2011























































































































































Note: Figure (3.4) shows a set of information extracted from the PDFs several days before and after the major news related to Libyan civil war in 2011. Figure
3.4 includes 6 panels. The first row documents the reaction of option implied pdfs to these major news for a fixed maturity of 30 days whereas the second row
shows for a fixed maturity of 90 days. Since the option implied pdfs have the fixed horizon structure, I interpolate the data across maturities as explained in
the Section 3.2.1. In each Figure, the pdf in blue corresponds to the distribution function one business day before the news whereas the one is red corresponds
to the day of the news (for all trading days, the trading ends at 5 pm in Eastern Time). Finally the vertical lines in each figure are the median value of each
pdf at the particular trading day. The pdfs are estimated using the local polynomial regression method as in Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003).
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Note: Figure (3.5) show time series in interpolated 1 and 3 months fixed maturities in the option implied moments only in 2011 and 2013 respectively. The
first column shows the interpolated 30 and 90-day futures price, the second column shows implied volatility moments, and finally the last column shows the
skewness for the option implied distributions. The vertical lines in the first row are important events explained in section (3.3.2) (as in Datta, Londono, and
Ross (2015)): the first reports of interruptions in production (February 23), the halting of exports (March 7), and the sabotaging of oil fields (April 8). The
figures in the second row are the corresponding figures for 2013 and the important dates are second round of increased production interruptions (July 5), major
slowdown news in the exports to Europe (August 12) and finally major decline in production once again September 10. The moments are computed using
equations 3.5 - 3.6 in Subsection 3.2.1, which are computed from the oil pdfs that are estimated using the local polynomial regression method as in Ait-Sahalia
and Duarte (2003).
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Figure 3.6: Reaction of Option Implied Pdfs During Libyan Civil War I: 2013





























































































































































Note: Figure (3.6) show a set of information extracted from the PDFs several days before and after the major news related to Libyan civil war in 2013. Figure
3.6 includes 6 panels. The first row documents the reaction of option implied pdfs to these major news for a fixed maturity of 30 days whereas the second row
shows for a fixed maturity of 90 days. Since the option implied pdfs have the fixed horizon structure, I interpolate the data across maturities as explained in
the Section 3.2.1. In each Figure, the pdf in blue corresponds to the distribution function one business day before the news whereas the one is red corresponds
to the day of the news (for all trading days, the trading ends at 5 pm in Eastern Time). Finally the vertical lines in each figure are the median value of each
pdf at the particular trading day. The pdfs are estimated using the local polynomial regression method as in Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003).
157
Figure 3.7: Reaction of Option Implied Pdfs to QE2
Announcements













































































































Note: Figure (3.7) show a set of options-implied moments extracted from the PDFs several days before and
after the major news related to QE2 and QE3 announcements in 2010 and 2011. It has 4 panels and documents
the reaction of option implied pdfs to 2 important QE2 related events: FOMC statement in August 10, 2010
where the Fed committed to keep its benchmark interest rate close to zero for an “extended period”, and
Bernanke’s August 27, 2010 Jackson Hall speech where he names “conducting additional purchases of longer-
term securities” as a tool, “is prepared to provide additional monetary accommodation through unconventional
measures”. The first row documents the reaction of option implied pdfs to these major news for a fixed maturity
of 30 whereas the second row shows 90 days. Since the option implied pdfs have the fixed horizon structure,
I interpolate the data across maturities as explained in the Section 3.2.1. In each Figure, the pdf in blue
corresponds to the distribution function one business day before the news whereas the one is red corresponds
to the day of the news (for all trading days, the trading ends at 5 pm in Eastern Time). Finally the vertical
lines in each figure are the median value of each pdf at the particular trading day. The pdfs are estimated
using the local polynomial regression method as in Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003).
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Note: Figure 3.8 shows options-implied moments extracted from the PDFs several days before and after the major news related to Quantitative Easing
Announcements. Figure (3.8) includes 6 panels. The first row documents the reaction of option implied pdfs to these major news for a fixed maturity of 30
days whereas the second row shows for a fixed maturity of 90 days. Since the option implied pdfs have the fixed horizon structure, I interpolate the data across
maturities as explained in the Section 3.2.1. In each Figure, the pdf in blue corresponds to the distribution function one business day before the news whereas
the one is red corresponds to the day of the news (for all trading days, the trading ends at 5 pm in Eastern Time). Finally the vertical lines in each figure are
the median value of each pdf at the particular trading day. The vertical lines in the first row are important events explained in section (3.3.2). The pdfs are
estimated using the local polynomial regression method as in Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003).
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Options on WTI Futures
Contracts
Calls Puts Min. Call Max. Call Min. Put Max. Put
Maturity: 1 Month
Mean 42.79 49.91 0.84 1.27 0.81 1.24
Std Dev. 31.64 36.49 0.19 0.61 0.18 0.45
Min 5 3 0.14 1.12 0.22 0.95
Max 168 216 1.12 3.23 1.02 2.69
Maturity: 3 Months
Mean 47.70 43.73 0.69 1.52 0.62 1.42
Std Dev. 38.34 39.55 0.19 0.51 0.17 1.04
Min 4 6 0.65 1.09 0.20 0.73
Max 232 219 1.24 2.84 1.12 3.89
Maturity: 6 Months
Mean 38.33 36.19 0.62 1.63 0.61 1.59
Std Dev. 23.05 23.30 0.18 0.47 0.17 0.80
Min 3 5 0.56 0.65 0.21 0.43
Max 231 200 1.50 2.44 1.32 3.59
Maturity: 12 Months
Mean 31.46 30.90 0.86 1.55 0.65 1.17
Std Dev. 19.24 16.74 0.17 0.48 0.16 0.32
Min 4 5 0.29 0.79 0.24 0.45
Max 170 184 1.92 2.72 1.60 3.46
Notes: This table shows a set of summary statistics for the availability of put and call options for the
maturities with 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. Columns 2 and 3 report the summary statistics for the total number
of options available for the estimation of the pdfs whereas Columns 4 to 7 report the summary statistics for
the minimum and maximum degree of moneyness (calculated as a ratio between the option’s strike price and
the underlying WTI futures price) for the options available for estimation. The sample period runs from
January 1990 to May 2015 for options maturing in 1, 3, and 6 months, March 1991 to May 2015 for options
maturing in 9 months and finally November 1996 to May 2015 for options maturing in 12 months.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Option Implied Moments
from Oil Pdfs
Relevant Moment: Mean
1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
Average 48.897 49.664 52.835 51.670 54.175 59.797 65.461
Stdev. 34.010 33.854 32.542 31.191 30.862 30.879 31.088
Rho 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NObs 4931 4768 4048 3896 3606 3112 2643
Relevant Moment: Implied Volatility
1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
Average 12.081 16.913 24.252 28.457 29.655 32.256 35.666
Stdev. 3.205 6.460 10.238 12.725 13.928 15.552 18.306
Rho 0.968 0.989 0.989 0.982 0.982 0.987 0.984
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
NObs 4931 4768 4048 3896 3606 3112 2643
Relevant Moment: Skewness
1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
Average -0.034 -0.070 -0.151 -0.183 -0.200 -0.238 -0.250
Stdev. 0.050 0.066 0.118 0.155 0.166 0.176 0.199
Rho 0.942 0.943 0.957 0.875 0.890 0.931 0.903
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.030) (0.019) (0.014) (0.028)
NObs 4931 4768 4048 3896 3606 3112 2643
Relevant Moment: Kurtosis
1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
Average 2.372 2.439 2.410 2.400 2.464 2.483 2.552
Stdev. 0.294 0.395 0.445 1.908 1.566 0.595 0.673
Rho 0.973 0.981 0.977 0.974 0.982 0.830 0.876
(0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.032) (0.026) (0.075) (0.046)
NObs 4931 4768 4048 3896 3606 3112 2643
Notes: Table (3.2) reports the descriptive statistics for options-implied moments computed from crude oil
pdfs, which are estimated using the local polynomial regression method as in Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003).
The moments of the options-implied oil pdfs are calculated using equations 3.5 - 3.6 which are displayed in
Subsection 3.2.1. This Table reports the Average, Stdev (standard deviation), Rho where the latter being the
first order autocorrelation coefficient for all four moments computed from oil pdfs. The numbers reported in
parenthesis below the Rho statistic are the Newey-West adjusted standard deviations for the Rho coefficients
of each moment. The columns of table reports these statistics for maturities 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months.
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Table 3.3: US Macroeconomic News Announcements
Data Release Source Frequency Units
CPI (Core) BLS Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Capacity Utilization Fed - Board Monthly Percent of Capacity
Chicago PMI ISM Monthly Percent
Consumer Confidence Conference Board Monthly Index
Durable Goods Orders Census Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
ECI Civilian Workers Census Quarterly Percent Change (QoQ)
Existing Home Sales NAR Monthly Millions
Factory Orders Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) BEA Quarterly Percent Change (QoQ), AR
Hourly Earnings BLS Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Housing Starts Census Monthly Thousands
ISM ISM Monthly Index
Industrial Production Fed Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Initial Claims ET Admin. Weekly Thousands
Leading Economic Indicators Fed - Philadelphia Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Univ. of Michigan Monthly Index
New Home Sales Census Monthly Hundred Thousands
Nonfarm Payrolls BLS Monthly Thousands
PCE BEA Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
PPI (Core) BLS Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Fed - Philadelphia Monthly Index
Retail Sales Census Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Retail Sales x Autos Census Monthly Percent Change (MoM)
Unemployment BLS Monthly Percent
Notes: In Table (3.3), CPI is the Consumer Price Index, PMI is the Purchasing Managers Index, ECI is
the Employment Cost Index, ISM is the Institute of Supply Management, PCE is the Personal Consumption
Expenditures, PPI is the Producers Price Index, and Retail Sales X Autos is the Retail Sales Excluding
Automobile sales are Data Sources. On the other hand, BLS is the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census is
the Bureau of the Census, Fed-Board is the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Fed - Philadelphia is the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, NAR is the National Association of Realtors, UoM is the University of
Michigan, ET Admin. is the US. Employment and Training Administration. Finally, for the units, MoM is
the Month over Month, QoQ is the Quarter over Quarter, and the AR is the annualized rate.
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Table 3.4: Event Study Regression: The Mean on Macro
Surprises
Data Release 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
CPI (Core) -0.981 1.107 0.450 -2.199 4.632 9.598 -4.584
(-0.197) (1.144) (0.313) (-1.110) (1.569) (1.165) (-1.559)
Capacity Utilization 1.512 0.557 0.666 1.608 0.507 2.492 0.690
(0.410) (1.130) (1.086) (1.906) (0.638) (1.153) (0.641)
Chicago PMI -0.013 -0.059 -0.008 -0.045 -0.013 -0.043 -0.092
(-0.067) (-1.571) (-0.224) (-1.246) (-0.273) (-0.757) (-1.527)
Consumer Confidence 0.074 0.004 0.005 0.017 0.004 -0.112 0.033
(1.292) (0.226) (0.227) (0.755) (0.093) (-1.854) (0.483)
Durable Goods Orders 0.034 -0.059 -0.052 0.028 0.025 0.441 0.051
(0.299) (-1.441) (-1.434) (0.356) (0.275) (2.093) (0.656)
ECI Civilian Workers -0.045 -0.178 -0.017 -0.641 0.842 -0.736 -2.759
(-0.008) (-0.300) (-0.024) (-0.750) (2.042) (-0.493) (-1.878)
Existing Home Sales -0.074 0.239 -0.324 0.045 -0.726 -2.072 -2.054
(-0.028) (0.315) (-0.406) (0.049) (-0.315) (-1.235) (-0.999)
Factory Orders -0.503 -0.139 -0.381 -0.389 -0.211 0.051 0.543
(-0.463) (-0.980) (-1.716) (-1.739) (-0.749) (0.121) (0.653)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) -0.476 0.088 0.552 0.634 0.929 0.883 1.106
(-0.276) (-1.441) (2.434) (5.463) (4.450) (7.467) (4.933)
Hourly Earnings -5.086 -0.598 -0.543 -0.439 -2.837 -0.423 0.690
(-0.231) (-0.784) (-0.527) (-0.353) (-1.501) (-0.270) (0.270)
Housing Starts -8.460 0.018 -0.325 -0.452 6.615 -3.424 -3.504
(-0.709) (0.017) (-0.165) (-0.206) (1.574) (-1.071) (-1.137)
ISM Manufacturing -0.401 0.118 0.043 0.133 0.272 0.138 0.193
(-0.574) (1.857) (2.039) (2.759) (2.293) (3.268) (3.174)
Industrial Production -0.232 -0.097 0.136 -0.261 0.484 0.541 0.558
(-0.087) (-0.186) (0.208) (-0.360) (3.399) (5.239) (4.379)
Initial Claims -0.197 -0.007 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.027
(-0.261) (-2.106) (-0.286) (0.311) (-0.453) (-0.878) (-1.454)
Leading Economic Indicators 2.740 -0.061 -0.512 0.650 -0.818 -0.671 -0.477
(0.376) (-0.092) (-0.832) (0.779) (-0.268) (-0.697) (-0.493)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment 2.220 -0.048 -0.010 -0.072 0.003 -0.199 -0.461
(0.892) (-0.604) (-0.170) (-1.196) (0.022) (-1.562) (-1.857)
New Home Sales -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.025 0.003
(-0.584) (-0.288) (-0.643) (0.713) (-1.331) (1.537) (0.449)
Nonfarm Payrolls -0.016 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002
(-1.402) (1.898) (2.115) (0.741) (2.500) (3.139) (0.461)
PCE 0.814 0.271 0.751 0.174 1.535 1.980 -0.239
(0.925) (0.627) (1.174) (0.232) (1.110) (1.252) (-0.108)
PPI (Core) 0.770 0.707 2.251 1.199 -2.201 -0.704 0.797
(0.976) (2.077) (2.093) (2.130) (-1.698) (-0.488) (0.803)
Philadelphia Fed BOS -0.017 0.081 0.028 0.073 0.040 0.039 0.040
(-0.131) (3.061) (1.533) (2.509) (0.875) (0.965) (2.043)
Retail Sales -0.178 -0.047 -0.207 0.419 0.726 3.762 0.297
(-0.138) (-0.159) (-1.300) (0.610) (0.807) (1.062) (0.540)
Retail Sales (Excl. Autos) -1.364 0.454 0.283 0.558 0.006 -2.774 1.267
(-0.886) (1.304) (1.053) (0.728) (0.010) (-0.750) (3.185)
Unemployment -7.311 0.639 0.401 2.471 8.506 -1.447 1.787
(-0.876) (0.704) (0.397) (1.100) (1.133) (-1.239) (1.157)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the regressions of daily changes in the options-implied mean of crude
oil prices over different horizons (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months) onto macroeconomic surprises. The implied
volatility values are defined in terms of dollar amounts and the units of macroeconomic surprises are given
in Table (3.3). T-statistic values computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis
and the bold numbers are significant at least at the 5% level. For the explanation of macroeconomic variables,
see Table (3.3).
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Table 3.5: Event Study Regression: The Volatility on Macro
Surprises
Data Release 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
CPI (Core) -1.153 -0.141 -0.144 3.816 -0.148 6.851 -4.341
(-1.052) (-0.231) (-0.178) (1.276) (-0.065) (2.043) (-1.148)
Capacity Utilization -0.412 0.685 0.853 1.623 2.255 1.337 1.223
(-0.305) (1.646) (2.726) (1.533) (2.329) (2.206) (1.679)
Chicago PMI -0.013 0.026 0.012 -0.087 -0.020 -0.037 0.011
(-1.493) (0.658) (0.476) (-1.891) (-0.403) (-0.729) (0.204)
Consumer Confidence 0.015 -0.001 0.022 -0.025 0.009 0.001 -0.123
(1.714) (-0.150) (1.419) (-0.832) (0.260) (0.032) (-1.593)
Durable Goods Orders 0.002 -0.003 0.018 -0.077 0.050 -0.045 -0.171
(0.224) (-0.285) (0.644) (-1.741) (0.422) (-0.827) (-0.635)
ECI Civilian Workers 0.031 -0.187 -0.911 3.661 2.421 -0.482 -5.618
(0.168) (-0.429) (-0.851) (1.605) (1.647) (-0.339) (-1.684)
Existing Home Sales -0.155 0.057 -0.086 0.820 -0.168 -3.112 -1.265
(-0.599) (0.153) (-0.151) (0.415) (-0.177) (-1.046) (-2.755)
Factory Orders -0.032 -0.018 0.340 0.478 0.360 -0.503 -1.117
(-0.624) (-0.153) (1.849) (1.141) (0.792) (-0.804) (-1.104)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) 0.021 0.023 -0.033 0.103 0.133 0.119 -0.064
(1.954) (1.090) (-1.180) (0.964) (1.292) (1.955) (-1.011)
Hourly Earnings -0.135 -0.371 0.138 -1.283 -1.778 -4.768 -7.037
(-0.691) (-1.239) (0.160) (-1.391) (-1.046) (-1.556) (-2.280)
Housing Starts -0.988 -1.512 -0.624 -3.011 -2.701 -1.618 5.503
(-0.483) (-0.893) (-0.612) (-0.783) (-1.367) (-0.489) (0.653)
ISM Manufacturing -0.000 0.018 0.012 0.066 0.178 -0.040 -0.160
(-0.003) (0.348) (0.352) (1.137) (1.995) (-0.403) (-0.840)
Industrial Production 1.129 -0.570 -0.494 -0.309 -0.982 0.357 1.405
(0.656) (-1.551) (-1.710) (-0.556) (-2.493) (0.652) (2.409)
Initial Claims -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.001 -0.015 -0.028
(-1.560) (-0.979) (0.224) (-2.781) (-0.185) (-1.017) (-1.517)
Leading Economic Indicators -0.422 1.474 -0.284 0.577 -0.480 -2.145 3.300
(-0.843) (1.595) (-0.361) (0.615) (-0.529) (-0.990) (2.815)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment 0.010 -0.036 -0.097 0.020 -0.117 0.079 0.076
(0.291) (-1.206) (-1.711) (0.364) (-0.809) (0.690) (0.689)
New Home Sales -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 0.002
(-0.177) (-1.268) (0.838) (0.867) (-0.926) (-0.190) (0.473)
Nonfarm Payrolls 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.863) (-0.303) (-0.509) (-1.108) (-0.888) (1.494) (1.155)
PCE -0.109 0.140 -0.838 1.169 -1.896 1.056 -0.624
(-0.722) (0.698) (-0.959) (0.943) (-1.393) (1.124) (-0.534)
PPI (Core) -0.471 0.124 -0.495 -0.974 -0.027 0.421 -0.722
(-0.752) (0.716) (-1.322) (-0.577) (-0.027) (0.339) (-1.275)
Philadelphia Fed BOS -0.066 0.029 -0.020 0.008 -0.017 0.016 0.029
(-2.778) (1.105) (-0.695) (0.320) (-0.728) (0.641) (1.538)
Retail Sales 0.091 -0.008 -0.392 -0.312 0.102 -0.309 -1.423
(0.426) (-0.135) (-2.962) (-1.507) (0.166) (-0.518) (-0.678)
Retail Sales (Excl. Autos) -0.028 -0.109 0.765 0.379 0.700 0.480 2.058
(-0.093) (-1.054) (3.433) (1.244) (1.304) (0.876) (0.852)
Unemployment 0.314 0.430 -0.072 1.933 2.694 1.409 5.974
(1.515) (1.166) (-0.101) (0.604) (1.606) (0.444) (1.502)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the regressions of daily changes in the options-implied volatility of
crude oil prices over different horizons (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months) onto macroeconomic surprises.
The implied volatility values are defined in terms of dollar amounts and the units of macroeconomic sur-
prises are given in Table (3.3). T-statistic values computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and the bold numbers are significant at least at the 5% level. For the explanation of
macroeconomic variables, see Table (3.3).
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Table 3.6: Event Study Regression: The Skewness on Macro
Surprises
Data Release 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
CPI (Core) 0.030 -0.016 -0.005 -0.121 0.028 0.052 0.046
(1.197) (-1.593) (-0.329) (-1.374) (0.320) (0.631) (0.662)
Capacity Utilization 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(1.027) (3.050) (3.369) (3.660) (4.213) (2.189) (0.063)
Chicago PMI -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.000
(-0.369) (0.689) (0.897) (1.188) (0.883) (0.091) (-0.315)
Consumer Confidence 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.142) (-0.381) (1.145) (-0.251) (0.727) (0.542) (-0.263)
Durable Goods Orders 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.008 -0.000
(0.055) (1.039) (0.313) (-0.532) (-0.657) (1.267) (-0.031)
ECI Civilian Workers -0.001 -0.006 -0.034 0.041 0.059 0.036 0.056
(-0.180) (-0.848) (-0.794) (0.448) (1.943) (2.175) (0.792)
Existing Home Sales 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.009 0.002 0.008
(1.336) (2.958) (0.374) (0.357) (3.004) (2.520) (0.449)
Factory Orders 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.023 0.013 0.022 0.045
(0.507) (-1.608) (-0.228) (-1.222) (0.735) (1.699) (1.306)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) 0.015 0.024 0.026 0.038 0.040 0.033 0.010
(2.142) (3.039) (4.012) (2.902) (3.833) (4.524) (2.550)
Hourly Earnings -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.052 0.067 0.012 0.021
(-0.436) (-0.419) (0.208) (2.026) (1.817) (2.563) (2.041)
Housing Starts -0.044 -0.032 0.022 -0.035 0.018 0.151 -0.067
(-1.907) (-1.500) (1.149) (-0.330) (2.121) (1.030) (-0.434)
ISM Manufacturing -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.007
(-0.614) (-0.481) (1.324) (-0.912) (0.703) (-1.146) (0.863)
Industrial Production -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.014 0.001 -0.033
(-0.644) (-0.544) (-0.333) (0.749) (1.060) (0.097) (-1.620)
Initial Claims 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.993) (-1.253) (0.330) (0.056) (-0.679) (0.444) (0.523)
Leading Economic Indicators 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.020 0.023 0.026 -0.010
(0.443) (0.424) (0.297) (0.695) (1.316) (0.413) (-0.444)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(-1.147) (0.538) (1.618) (0.701) (-0.767) (-0.755) (-0.550)
New Home Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.382) (2.141) (0.995) (-0.322) (-0.259) (0.907) (-0.021)
Nonfarm Payrolls 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.013
(3.969) (4.145) (4.138) (3.478) (0.626) (4.205) (4.234)
PCE -0.006 0.003 -0.012 -0.020 0.040 0.072 -0.045
(-1.467) (0.413) (-1.219) (-0.546) (0.883) (1.753) (-0.513)
PPI (Core) -0.006 0.000 -0.005 -0.062 0.000 0.004 -0.005
(-0.853) (0.070) (-0.821) (-1.395) (0.001) (0.147) (-0.360)
Philadelphia Fed BOS 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(1.861) (2.177) (-0.605) (0.944) (-0.072) (1.736) (-0.719)
Retail Sales 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.003 -0.018 0.086
(2.713) (0.700) (-0.406) (1.647) (0.183) (-0.986) (0.996)
Retail Sales (Excl. Autos) 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 0.019 0.036 -0.004 0.110
(1.304) (-0.640) (-0.520) (2.639) (2.574) (-0.168) (1.091)
Unemployment 0.007 0.007 0.004 -0.061 0.008 0.118 0.137
(1.661) (1.039) (0.327) (-1.054) (0.099) (1.216) (1.288)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the regressions of daily changes in the options-implied skewness of
crude oil prices over different horizons (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months) onto macroeconomic surprises.
The implied volatility values are defined in terms of dollar amounts and the units of macroeconomic sur-
prises are given in Table (3.3). T-statistic values computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and the bold numbers are significant at least at the 5% level. For the explanation of
macroeconomic variables, see Table (3.3).
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Table 3.7: Event Study Regression: The Kurtosis on Macro
Surprises
Data Release 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
CPI (Core) 0.030 -0.028 -0.068 0.069 0.272 0.069 -0.140
(0.659) (-0.577) (-1.326) (0.760) (2.813) (0.455) (-0.491)
Capacity Utilization -0.046 0.018 0.037 0.003 -0.066 0.003 -0.033
(-1.400) (0.489) (1.270) (0.116) (-1.378) (0.060) (-0.533)
Chicago PMI -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.001
(-1.283) (-1.064) (-0.817) (1.695) (-0.846) (-0.678) (0.183)
Consumer Confidence 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.009
(0.704) (0.981) (-1.274) (0.525) (-0.499) (0.858) (2.494)
Durable Goods Orders -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 0.010
(-0.361) (-0.932) (-0.041) (0.065) (-0.737) (-0.170) (0.983)
ECI Civilian Workers -0.009 0.002 0.013 -0.118 -0.016 -0.020 0.043
(-0.596) (0.107) (0.343) (-1.219) (-0.272) (-0.223) (0.664)
Existing Home Sales -0.058 -0.044 -0.064 -0.019 0.097 0.214 0.223
(-1.172) (-1.573) (-1.144) (-0.293) (0.912) (1.245) (0.925)
Factory Orders 0.003 -0.003 -0.021 0.003 0.015 0.016 0.006
(0.423) (-0.229) (-2.648) (0.064) (0.589) (0.411) (0.105)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.009 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.159) (-0.345) (0.322) (-0.892) (1.005) (-0.274) (-0.462)
Hourly Earnings -0.047 0.094 0.041 0.226 0.073 0.212 0.456
(-1.876) (2.194) (1.237) (0.734) (0.516) (0.740) (1.087)
Housing Starts -0.002 -0.199 0.066 -0.420 0.142 -0.077 -0.008
(-0.041) (-1.547) (0.959) (-0.512) (0.812) (-0.436) (-0.021)
ISM Manufacturing 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.025 0.008 0.011 0.005
(0.289) (0.786) (0.341) (1.156) (0.846) (1.181) (0.563)
Industrial Production -0.016 -0.004 0.006 -0.017 0.032 -0.086 -0.121
(-0.838) (-0.127) (0.275) (-0.519) (0.890) (-1.658) (-1.191)
Initial Claims 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(1.094) (0.141) (0.386) (-0.516) (-1.400) (0.055) (-0.557)
Leading Economic Indicators 0.016 -0.029 0.067 -0.119 0.077 -0.040 -0.016
(0.479) (-0.638) (1.862) (-1.058) (1.510) (-0.817) (-0.359)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment -0.001 -0.001 -0.014 0.005 0.009 -0.009 -0.002
(-0.417) (-0.249) (-0.731) (0.499) (1.130) (-0.815) (-0.307)
New Home Sales 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.049) (0.288) (-1.529) (1.247) (-0.371) (-0.130) (-0.593)
Nonfarm Payrolls 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.159) (1.021) (2.590) (1.157) (-0.116) (-0.877) (-0.975)
PCE 0.002 -0.017 0.009 0.101 0.037 0.079 0.052
(0.140) (-0.954) (0.274) (0.469) (0.523) (1.009) (0.834)
PPI (Core) 0.016 0.010 0.026 -0.021 0.007 -0.085 -0.127
(0.770) (0.512) (0.905) (-0.373) (0.232) (-1.219) (-1.012)
Philadelphia Fed BOS -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(-1.297) (1.760) (1.523) (2.297) (-0.554) (0.438) (-0.853)
Retail Sales -0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.027 -0.006 -0.038 -0.079
(-0.906) (-0.252) (0.111) (1.050) (-0.424) (-0.834) (-0.831)
Retail Sales (Excl. Autos) 0.000 0.006 0.005 -0.098 0.024 0.093 0.145
(0.004) (0.414) (0.294) (-1.536) (0.881) (1.289) (1.012)
Unemployment 0.023 -0.010 0.021 -0.083 -0.296 1.131 -0.343
(1.102) (-0.295) (0.647) (-0.698) (-1.495) (0.944) (-1.514)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the regressions of daily changes in the options-implied kurtosis of
crude oil prices over different horizons (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months) onto macroeconomic surprises.
The implied volatility values are defined in terms of dollar amounts and the units of macroeconomic sur-
prises are given in Table (3.3). T-statistic values computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and the bold numbers are significant at least at the 5% level. For the explanation of
macroeconomic variables, see Table (3.3)
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Table 3.8: Event Study Regression: The 5th Percentile on Macro
Surprises
Data Release 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
CPI (Core) 4.774 1.505 0.857 -6.052 0.181 -8.718 3.707
(1.933) (1.089) (0.601) (-1.423) (0.100) (-1.112) (0.603)
Capacity Utilization 1.350 -0.230 -0.673 0.001 -0.465 -1.188 0.213
(0.606) (-0.284) (-1.075) (0.001) (-0.484) (-0.566) (0.225)
Chicago PMI 0.036 0.061 0.032 0.071 0.076 -0.135 0.095
(1.843) (1.106) (1.721) 0.298) (1.329) (0.651) (2.960)
Consumer Confidence -0.034 0.018 -0.041 0.028 -0.032 -0.118 0.123
(-1.024) (0.738) (-1.594) (0.723) (-0.704) (-1.308) (1.067)
Durable Goods Orders -0.045 -0.027 0.075 0.044 0.092 0.025 -0.031
(-1.338) (1.733) (2.289) (-1.771) (-1.912) (-0.394) (0.394)
ECI Civilian Workers -0.160 0.324 1.158 -2.980 -1.088 -0.777 1.397
(-0.245) (0.413) (0.934) (-1.028) (-0.790) (-0.517) (0.294)
Existing Home Sales 0.809 -0.824 0.488 -0.625 -2.472 1.030 0.439
(0.726) (-0.644) (0.389) (-0.219) (-1.388) (0.985) (0.844)
Factory Orders 0.040 0.098 -0.649 -0.962 -0.216 -0.138 2.264
(0.206) (0.314) (-1.976) (-1.269) (-0.423) (-0.277) (1.331)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) 0.092 0.119 0.029 0.140 0.160 0.186 -0.029
(4.319) (3.995) (1.047) (2.990) (3.089) (2.772) (-0.557)
Hourly Earnings -0.598 -0.733 -1.348 -0.605 -0.730 5.431 3.881
(-0.830) (-0.906) (-0.957) (-0.413) (-0.567) (1.087) (0.764)
Housing Starts -0.383 -1.537 2.895 1.153 0.857 6.286 -4.384
(-0.142) (-0.398) (1.173) (0.298) (0.376) (1.642) (-0.818)
ISM Manufacturing 0.081 0.187 0.091 -0.011 -0.012 0.104 0.423
(1.340) (2.495) (1.191) (-0.152) (-0.177) (0.988) (1.366)
Industrial Production -1.985 0.812 0.631 1.217 0.900 -1.493 -1.298
(-0.787) (0.825) (1.025) (1.468) (1.030) (-0.970) 1.069)
Initial Claims 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.010 -0.004 -0.008
(0.306) (-2.750) (-1.899) (0.127) (-1.730) (-0.766) (-1.219)
Leading Economic Indicators 0.387 -1.523 -0.299 2.199 1.623 2.861 -1.794
(0.284) (-1.043) (-0.354) (0.902) (1.971) (0.993) (-1.956)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment -0.058 0.049 0.098 -0.026 0.172 0.118 -0.188
(-1.189) (1.228) (2.559) (-0.698) (-3.762) (-2.223) (-1.933)
New Home Sales 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 0.046 -0.004
(0.159) (0.334) (0.051) (-0.510) (-0.720) (1.097) (-0.681)
Nonfarm Payrolls 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.000 -0.001
(0.266) (1.099) (1.164) (0.846) (0.974) (0.083) (-0.270)
PCE 0.319 0.467 0.886 -1.215 0.899 -2.464 2.163
(0.526) (0.684) (0.609) (-0.716) (1.095) (-0.970) (0.986)
PPI (Core) 0.805 0.299 0.705 -1.186 1.062 3.000 2.039
(0.847) (0.694) (1.430) (-0.431) (1.728) (1.958) (2.940)
Philadelphia Fed BOS 0.213 -0.126 0.088 0.074 0.007 0.052 0.018
(1.606) (-1.894) (1.427) (2.192) (0.290) (1.995) (0.620)
Retail Sales -0.200 -0.203 -0.045 0.507 -0.701 -1.350 5.661
(-0.431) (-1.030) (-0.229) (1.043) (-1.199) (-2.272) (1.226)
Retail Sales (Excl. Autos) 0.495 0.659 0.015 -0.290 0.642 1.160 -6.206
(0.624) (2.155) (0.050) (-0.447) (1.126) (1.836) (-1.153)
Unemployment 0.292 0.031 1.437 2.581 -2.199 -5.254 -6.326
(0.401) (0.042) (1.299) (1.323) (-1.434) (-0.991) (-1.554)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the regressions of daily changes in the options-implied 95th percentile
of crude oil prices over different horizons (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months) onto macroeconomic surprises.
The implied volatility values are defined in terms of dollar amounts and the units of macroeconomic sur-
prises are given in Table (3.3). T-statistic values computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and the bold numbers are significant at least at the 5% level. For the explanation of
macroeconomic variables, see Table (3.3)
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Table 3.9: Event Study Regression: The 95th Percentile on
Macro Surprises
Data Release 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M 15M 18M
CPI (Core) 2.396 1.106 0.757 0.613 3.776 -3.737 -2.193
(1.859) (1.170) (0.725) (0.323) (1.242) (-0.993) (-0.443)
Capacity Utilization 0.745 0.544 0.595 0.647 0.806 1.052 1.359
(1.143) (1.015) (1.180) (2.040) (2.041) (0.647) (0.905)
Chicago PMI 0.066 0.074 0.067 0.066 0.091 0.059 0.144
(2.330) (2.080) (2.340) (1.835) (1.517) (1.467) (1.388)
Consumer Confidence 0.012 0.012 -0.014 0.020 -0.043 -0.063 0.217
(0.843) (0.772) (-0.791) (0.725) (-0.518) (-1.606) (1.426)
Durable Goods Orders 0.051 0.076 0.119 0.083 -0.176 0.040 0.392
(1.930) (2.684) (3.285) (2.135) (-1.214) (0.727) (1.584)
ECI Civilian Workers -0.149 0.217 0.664 -0.723 0.278 -2.180 -5.208
(-0.238) (0.322) (0.929) (-0.998) (0.123) (-1.050) (-1.043)
Existing Home Sales 0.015 -0.339 0.104 0.052 -0.457 -0.162 0.570
(0.022) (-0.430) (0.147) (0.053) (-0.424) (-0.115) (0.387)
Factory Orders -0.030 -0.012 -0.382 -0.381 -0.351 0.029 3.263
(-0.191) (-0.067) (-1.600) (-0.907) (-0.275) (0.061) (1.469)
GDP (Advanced Estimate) 0.053 0.082 0.035 0.168 0.304 0.020 -0.052
(2.634) (3.498) (1.449) (5.889) (4.482) (0.669) (-1.066)
Hourly Earnings -0.839 -0.555 -1.411 -1.299 -0.678 -0.622 -19.667
(-1.256) (-0.756) (-1.665) (-1.110) (-0.355) (-0.285) (-1.889)
Housing Starts -2.356 -1.102 -0.523 1.538 -0.522 7.897 0.554
(-1.059) (-0.586) (-0.219) (0.859) (-0.135) (1.191) (0.090)
ISM Manufacturing 0.077 0.222 0.087 0.108 0.228 0.099 0.138
(1.315) (1.759) (1.219) (1.130) (2.419) (0.679) (0.865)
Industrial Production -0.181 -0.119 0.157 -0.732 -1.506 0.132 -1.574
(-0.183) (-0.195) (0.323) (-1.011) (-1.708) (0.117) (-1.304)
Initial Claims 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.014 0.023 0.048 0.116
(4.825) (3.660) (4.376) (4.562) (3.329) (1.996) (2.586)
Leading Economic Indicators -0.508 -0.021 -1.109 3.906 1.824 -0.258 3.295
(-0.767) (-0.023) (-1.031) (1.330) (1.394) (-0.137) (2.527)
Michigan Consumer Sentiment 0.038 0.039 0.047 0.113 0.866 0.121 -0.075
(1.332) (1.328) (1.200) (3.022) (2.201) (1.523) (-0.832)
New Home Sales 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.006 -0.006
(0.145) (-0.231) (0.048) (0.021) (-1.349) (2.392) (-0.926)
Nonfarm Payrolls 0.011 0.014 0.023 0.012 0.022 0.028 -0.002
(2.496) (3.572) (3.955) (1.845) (1.591) (2.911) (-0.631)
PCE 0.220 0.321 0.408 0.310 -0.963 0.431 0.720
(0.509) (0.717) (0.632) (0.371) (-0.525) (0.258) (0.862)
PPI (Core) -0.042 0.568 0.693 1.334 2.500 7.544 0.133
(-0.072) (1.945) (1.745) (1.841) (1.488) (1.737) (0.093)
Philadelphia Fed BOS 0.040 0.035 0.072 0.041 -0.039 0.164 0.015
(1.497) (1.477) (3.938) (1.687) (-1.106) (1.526) (0.374)
Retail Sales 0.164 0.358 0.786 0.110 0.416 2.569 -1.766
(1.573) (4.186) (5.147) (0.700) (1.483) (6.512) (-1.744)
Retail Sales (Excl. Autos) 0.576 0.729 1.102 0.533 1.392 3.692 -0.026
(1.528) (2.279) (2.664) (1.217) (1.753) (3.157) (-0.017)
Unemployment 0.879 0.943 1.664 2.475 -1.840 -2.399 -3.700
(0.869) (0.778) (1.218) (1.165) (-1.075) (-1.333) (-0.526)
Notes: This table reports estimates of the regressions of daily changes in the options-implied 95th percentile
of crude oil prices over different horizons (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 months) onto macroeconomic surprises.
The implied volatility values are defined in terms of dollar amounts and the units of macroeconomic sur-
prises are given in Table (3.3). T-statistic values computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and the bold numbers are significant at least at the 5% level. For the explanation of
macroeconomic variables, see Table (3.3)
168
Table 3.10: AG-Test Results of Oil Spot Prices: Time Series
Density Forecasts vs. Forward Density
Models 1M 3M 6M 9M 12M
f : Forward 2.82 3.02 1.44 1.95 1.01
g: GARCH (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) (0.011) (0.213)
f : Forward 3.01 2.75 1.49 1.34 1.21
g: EGARCH (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.102) (0.143)
Notes: This Table reports the AG-Test results for the forward density vs the time series forecast density.
1. The time series models that are used to generate these densities are either GARCH and EGARCH
models (see the equations (3.8) and (3.9) for the exact parametric assumption for these models
respectively). The returns of oil spot prices for the GARCH and EGARCH models at maturities 1,
3, 6, 9 and 12 are computed using the oil spot prices.
2. The AG test statistic is computed using equation (3.10) presented in Subsection 3.3.4.1.
3. Due to calendar forecast nature of options-implied pdfs, the number of days in the same maturity
class have different days. Specifically, 1 month maturity includes all options with horizons ranging 1
to 22 business days, 3 months maturity includes all options with horizons ranging 45 to 66 business
days, 6 months maturity includes all options with horizons ranging 111 to 132 business days, 9
months maturity includes all options with horizons ranging 177 to 198 business, and finally 12
maturity includes all options with horizons ranging 245 to 264 business days. The corresponding
time series density forecast perfectly aligns with this calender forecast nature of the options-implied
pdfs. The values in parenthesis are p-values and the bold numbers are significant at 5% level or less.
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Table 3.11: The Effect of Oil Price Risk on Oil Price
Realizations
No Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Month
Futures 1.013 1.105 0.998 1.052 0.739 0.708
(41.091) (43.875) (47.073) (39.982) (8.531) (10.177)
Volatility -0.345 -0.271 -0.189
(-6.143) (-4.168) (-3.121)
Skewness 11.345 8.892 4.775
(8.195) (6.781) (4.712)
R2 0.578 0.593 0.614 0.626 0.618 0.649
RMSE Ratio 0.994 0.981 0.977 0.951 0.947 0.935
3 Month
Futures 0.993 1.009 0.984 0.972 0.711 0.693
(32.355) (34.196) (36.621) (31.288) (7.112) (5.121)
Volatility -0.391 -0.304 -0.217
(-5.489) (-4.637) (-2.989)
Skewness 11.727 8.788 4.838
(9.332) (7.332) (5.211)
R2 0.491 0.503 0.539 0.561 0.545 0.593
RMSE Ratio 1.003 0.987 0.975 0.967 0.974 0.949
6 Months
Futures 0.985 0.993 0.973 0.961 0.697 0.676
(29.912) (31.882) (33.929) (28.911) (11.349) (7.955)
Volatility -0.207 -0.157 -0.094
(-3.621) (-2.155) (-1.211)
Skewness 9.933 7.323 3.992
(8.112) (6.277) (4.199)
R2 0.488 0.503 0.539 0.561 0.545 0.593
RMSE Ratio 0.979 0.962 0.949 0.937 0.942 0.911
12 Months
Futures 0.961 0.982 0.969 0.952 0.653 0.631
(25.453) (26.123) (26.997) (27.212) (13.211) (9.855)
Volatility -0.217 -0.145 -0.101
(-5.166) (-2.003) (-1.257)
Skewness 10.737 8.112 4.122
(9.677) (8.219) (5.221)
R2 0.414 0.420 0.429 0.445 0.501 0.521
RMSE Ratio 0.951 0.945 0.933 0.929 0.921 0.902
Notes: OLS estimation of equation (3.11). The options-implied volatility and skewness are computed using
equations ?? and 3.6 that are derived from pdfs, which are estimated using the local polynomial regression
method as in Ait-Sahalia and Duarte (2003). The controls include general or sub indices (I used Goldman
Sachs commodity indices) of Commodity Prices, Baltic Dry Index, the Crack Spread, and lagged oil prices.
Estimation involves overlapping horizons, so standard errors are obtained via a HAC Newey-West procedure.
I use a Bartlett kernel and a bandwidth of k1, with k the forecasting horizon (where k = 22business days ×
#of months). The sample runs from January 3, 1990 to May 22, 2014 for 1, 3, and 6 months maturities,
March 17, 1991 to May 22, 2014 for 9 months maturity and finally November 13, 1996 to May 22, 2014 for 12
months maturity.
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Table 3.12: Out of Sample Forecast of Nominal WTI Price of Oil
1M 3M 6M 9M 12M
MPSR SR MPSR SR MPSR SR MPSR SR MPSR SR
St 0.952 0.534 0.931 0.523 0.943 0.531 0.966 0.527 0.977 0.519
(0.009) (0.040) (0.053) (0.072) (0.077) (0.012) (0.063) (0.007) (0.000) (0.003)
F ht 0.946 0.553 0.959 0.521 0.961 0.525 0.934 0.531 0.939 0.533







0.923 0.567 0.934 0.573 0.942 0.551 0.965 0.527 0.954 0.559
(0.002) (0.021) (0.031) (0.019) (0.057) (0.009) (0.031) (0.013) (0.000) (0.011)
Notes: The forecast evaluation period is January 4, 2004 to May 22, 2014 whereas the initial estimation window starts from August 8, 1990. The sample
runs from January 3, 1990 to May 22, 2014 for 1, 3, and 6 months maturities, March 17, 1991 to May 22, 2014 for 9 months maturity and finally November
13, 1996 to May 22, 2014 for 12 months maturity. Fht is the futures price that matures in h periods. All Mean Square Prediction Error results are presented
as ratios relative to the model without the skewness and volatility variables. The success ratio is defined as the fraction of forecasts that correctly predict the
sign of the change in the price of oil. Results that are statistically significant at the 10% level are shown in boldface. All tests of statistical significance refer
to pairwise tests of the null of equal predictive accuracy with the same model without the skewness and volatility variables. Since all the models are nested,
model comparisons with estimated parameters are obtained Nested model comparisons with estimated parameters are based on Clark and West (2006). The
success ratio is defined as the fraction of forecasts that correctly predict the sign of the change in the price of oil. The sign test in the last column is based on
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992).
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 SPF Data
A.1.1 Survey Designs for Deflator Inflation and Output
Growth
Table A.1: Survey Design for Deflator Inflation
Sample Period 68Q4-73Q1 73Q2-74Q3 74Q4-81Q2 81Q3-85Q1 85Q2-91Q4 92Q1-Present
Target Variable GNP Deflator (YoY Inflation) GDP Deflator (YoY Inflation)
Number of Bins 15 6 10
Bin Width 1 % 2 % 1 %
Maximum Value 10 % 12 % 16 % 12 % 10 % 8 %
Minimum Value -3 % -1 % 3 % 4 % 2 % 0 %
Note: This table is provided by the Philadelphia Fed. The left and right extreme bins are by construction open-ended, i.e. top or bottom
coded.
Table A.2: Survey Design for Output Growth
Sample Period 81Q3-91Q4 92Q1-09Q1 09Q2-Present
Target Variable GNP (YoY Growth) GDP (YoY Growth)
Number of Bins 6 10 11
Bin Width 2 % 1 %
Maximum Value 6 %
Minimum Value -2 % -3 %
Note: This table is provided by the Philadelphia Fed. The left and right extreme bins are by construction open-ended.
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A.1.2 Some Characteristics of the SPF and SPF Respon-
dents
Table A.3: Descriptive Characteristics of the SPF Data
Current Deflator Inflation Current Output Growth
Total Surveys 6539 4197
Quarter Average 36 32
Quarter Average (≥ 5) 35 31
Quarter Average (≥ 10) 34 29
Notes: Table A.3 presents total and quarterly average (based on several criteria) number of probabilistic
surveys both for current period deflator inflation and output growth utilized in this study. This table excludes,
however, any respondent (i) who at a given horizon do not report density forecast probabilities (ii) whose
assigned probabilities for the histogram that do not sum to unity, and (iii) who participated just once in the
survey. Table A.3 shows: (i) the average number of surveys (quarter average), (ii) the average number of
surveys with forecasters participating at least 5 times or more (i.e. quarter average (≥ 5)), and (iii) the average
number of surveys with forecasters participating at least 10 times or more (i.e. quarter average (≥ 10)).
Table A.4: Classification of Micro Subjective Forecast
Histograms for Inflation
Total Lowest Extreme Highest Extreme Both Extremes None
Case1 283 19 0 NaN 264
Case2 1492 125 0 0 1367
Case3 4683 691 86 137 3769
Table A.5: Classification of Micro Subjective Forecast
Histograms for Output Growth
Total Lowest Extreme Highest Extreme Both Extremes None
Case1 270 8 28 NaN 234
Case2 1010 50 41 0 919
Case3 2896 301 268 191 2136
Notes for Tables A.4 and A.5: Case 1 and Case 2 refer whether a respondent to SPF attaches positive
probability to one or two bins respectively. On the other hand, Case 3 refers to surveys where a forecaster
assigns positive probabilities to more than two bins. In addition, I further categorize each case based on
whether an observation has a positive probability on either (or both) of the extreme bins or not. The total
number of micro observations is equal to 6539 and 4197 in current year inflation and output growth empirical
forecast density histograms respectively.
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Figure A.1: Frequent Entry/Exit Patterns of Experts
(a) Output Growth





























































































Note: Figures A.1b and A.1a show experts’ participation patterns for the whole sample and the chained
sub-sample both for inflation and output growth. The whole sample includes all 6539 surveys of inflation
and 4197 surveys of output growth, which are presented as the solid (black) lines in figures A.1b and A.1a.
The chained sample includes all forecasters who participate current quarter only if she participated in the
previous quarter as well. It is shown as the dashed (blue) line both for inflation and output growth. Finally,
the shaded regions are quarterly difference in the survey sizes of chained and whole surveys, which can be
read from left-axis.
Figure A.2: Total Participation of Experts
(a) Output Growth













































Note: Figures A.2a and A.2b indicate the number of responses for probabilistic current inflation or output
growth by each forecaster over the sample for inflation and output growth separately. Each bin corresponds
to multiple of 5 responses, so an expert participated 13 times to the SPF lies in the third bin (from the left)
in figure A.2a or A.2b.
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% of Forcasters (left axis)
Average Prob. % (right−axis)
(a) Current Output Growth






















































% of Forcasters (left axis)
Average Prob. % (right−axis)
(b) Current Inflation
Note: Figures A.3a and A.3a show the frequency of forecasters that assign non-zero probabilities to lowest
open-ended bin (light blue bar with the values can be read on the left-axis) and average probability weight
attached to that lowest open-ended bin (solid red line with the values can be read on the right-axis) for output
growth and inflation forecast density histograms respectively. The shaded blue bars are recessions defined
according to the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
Figure A.4: Panel Compositon: Chained vs. Composite Samples

























(a) Current Output Growth


























Note: Figures A.4a and A.4a show the percentage difference in average (cross-sectional) standard deviation
between the chained sample (includes all forecasters who participate current quarter only if she participated
in the previous quarter as well) and composite sample (that consists of all forecasters). Therefore, if the
the difference is positive, the average standard deviation in the chained sample is greater than the average
standard deviation for the composite sample.
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A.1.3 Deterministic Seasonality Estimates for Current Inflation and Output Growth
Table A.6: Inflation Uncertainty: Estimated Deterministic Seasonal Dummies
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Estimation Type S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Micro Breaks 1.01 0.67 0.74 0.98 0.80 0.98 0.61 0.70 0.89 0.75 0.96 0.52 0.72 0.84 0.70 1.04 0.56 0.57 0.76 0.57
(0.93, 1.09) (0.59, 0.75) (0.60, 0.88) (0.89, 1.07) (0.76, 0.84) (0.90, 1.05) (0.53, 0.70) (0.55, 0.84) (0.80, 0.98) (0.71, 0.80) (0.88, 1.03) (0.44, 0.61) (0.58, 0.86) (0.75, 0.93) (0.66, 0.74) (0.96, 1.11) (0.48, 0.64) (0.43, 0.71) (0.67, 0.85) (0.53,- 0.61)
Micro No Breaks 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.53
(0.69,0.77) (0.64,0.72) (0.59,0.67) (0.54,0.63)
Macro Breaks 0.71 0.85 0.92 0.85 0.72 0.67 0.78 0.86 0.76 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.90 0.73 0.61 0.75 0.71 0.78 0.63 0.49
(0.67,0.76) (0.79,0.91) (0.77,1.07) (0.76,0.93) (0.70,0.74) (0.63,0.71) (0.72,0.84) (0.69,1.03) (0.69,0.84) (0.65,0.70) (0.62,0.70) (0.61,0.74) (0.75,1.05) (0.65,0.81) (0.59,0.64) (0.71,0.79) (0.64,0.77) (0.63,0.92) (0.55,0.71) (0.46, 0.51)
Macro No Breaks 0.77 0.72 0.67 0.53
(0.74, 0.80) (0.69, 0.75) (0.64, 0.70) (0.57, 0.64)
Notes: Table A.6 presents estimated deterministic seasonal dummies based on 4 different regressions where inflation uncertainty is the dependent variable.
The sub-samples are: 1968Q4-1974Q3 (S1), 1974Q4-1981Q2 (S2), 1981Q3-1985Q1 (S3), 1985Q2-1991Q4 (S4) and 1992Q1-2013Q3 (S5). Unlike table A.1, S1
combines 1968Q4-1973Q1 and 1973Q2-1974Q3 periods as latter period does not have enough observation to identify deterministic seasonal effects. Regressions
are either estimated with micro (unbalanced panel) data (including forecaster fixed effects and dropping the forecasters participated only once) or the macro
(aggregate) data (cross sectional average) dropping the forecasters participated only once). For each of the micro and macro regressions, I regress inflation
uncertainty on either the full sample (no breaks) or the 5 different sub-samples (breaks) explained above. 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th lines provide point estimates
whereas following lines provide the 90% asymptotic confidence intervals for the relevant point estimates.
188
Table A.7: Output Growth Uncertainty: Estimated Seasonal Deterministic Dummies
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Estimation Type S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Micro Breaks 1.09 0.83 0.90 1.04 0.76 0.86 0.92 0.65 0.74 0.73 0.47 0.58
(1.00, 1.18) (0.78, 0.89) (0.80, 0.99) (0.95, 1.13) (0.71, 0.82) (0.76, 0.96) (0.83, 1.01) (0.60, 0.70) (0.64, 0.84) (0.64, 0.82) (0.42, 0.52) (0.48,- 0.68)
Micro No Breaks 0.85 0.79 0.68 0.45
(0.79,0.91) (0.73,0.85) (0.62,0.74) (0.44,0.56)
Macro Breaks 0.97 0.84 0.85 0.94 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.48 0.53
(0.90,1.04) (0.81,0.87) (0.79,0.91) (0.87,1.00) (0.74,0.80) (0.76,0.86) (0.75,0.89) (0.62,0.68) (0.65,0.75) (0.57,0.70) (0.44,0.51) (0.48, 0.59)
Macro No Breaks 0.88 0.83 0.71 0.45
(0.85, 0.92) (0.79, 0.86) (0.68, 0.75) (0.50, 0.57)
Notes: Table A.7 presents estimated deterministic seasonal dummies based on 4 different regressions where inflation uncertainty is the dependent variable.
The sub-samples are: 1981Q3-1991Q4 (S1), 1992Q1-2009Q1 (S2) and 2009Q2-2013Q3 (S3). Regressions are either estimated with micro (unbalanced panel)
data (including forecaster fixed effects and dropping the forecasters participated only once) or the macro (aggregate) data (cross sectional average) dropping
the forecasters participated only once). For each of the micro and macro regressions, I regress inflation uncertainty on either the full sample (no breaks) or
the 3 different sub-samples (breaks) explained above. 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th lines provide point estimates whereas following lines provide the 90% asymptotic
confidence intervals for the relevant point estimates.189
A.2 Additional Results on Other Uncertainty
Indices
Table A.8: Uncertainty Measures: Correlation with other
variables
Regressors
U: CPI IP NBER FFR S&P500 Employment
π SCU 2.649 -0.376 0.067 -0.014 -0.169 -0.151
(4.660) (-3.732) (11.786) (-4.332) (-3.689) (-1.297)
∆y SCU 3.183 -1.225 0.078 0.017 -0.401 -1.245
(3.170) (-7.418) (11.494) (3.125) (-5.625) (-7.074)
VXO 49.534 -19.418 3.502 0.167 -21.835 3.931
(1.409) (-0.824) (3.274) (0.366) (-2.086) (0.168)
Google -47.475 -360.628 10.927 -8.706 -93.330 -342.967
(-0.111) (-3.585) (2.560) (-3.271) (-3.228) (-2.145)
CRSP 0.332 -0.120 0.013 0.000 -0.034 -0.016
(2.169) (-1.339) (3.957) (0.319) (-0.922) (-0.178)
Profits 4.817 -2.983 -0.009 -0.030 -0.524 -2.837
(1.078) (-1.778) (-0.134) (-0.979) (-1.140) (-1.295)
QIQR 0.429 -0.111 0.013 0.001 -0.041 -0.023
(3.071) (-2.226) (5.628) (1.229) (-1.883) (-0.375)
π Disagree 3.143 -0.734 0.123 0.026 -0.625 -0.209
(1.018) (-0.752) (2.524) (1.242) (-2.406) (-0.166)
∆y Disagree 5.992 -1.908 0.161 0.001 -0.512 -1.101
(1.305) (-2.167) (3.817) (0.028) (-2.092) (-1.059)
Note: Bivariate regression analysis. Entries are slope coefficient estimates, t-statistics utilizing newey-west
robust standard errors of regressions for various empirical uncertainty measures involving a constant and a set
of macroeconomic variables as single regressors. For the exact definitions of empirical uncertainty uncertainty
measure see figure A.5. All macroeconomic variables are HP-detrended with a smoothing parameter that is
equal to 129600 in quarterly frequency.
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Figure A.5: Cross-Correlograms: Uncertainty vs Industrial
Production

































































(c) The SCUs and VXO
Note: This figure displays the cross correlations between various uncertainty proxies against deviation of HP-
detrended industrial production (with a smoothing parameter that is equal to 129600) in quarterly frequency.
These correlations are computer for +/- 8 window of leads and lags for the relevant uncertainty proxy. The
negative values are lagged whereas positive values are lead (future) uncertainty against deviation of industrial
production from its HP-filtered trend. The empirical uncertainty measures are: (i) inflation and output
growth SCU estimates (figure A.5c), (ii) implied stock market volatility index derived from options written
on S&P100 stock market index extended by actual monthly returns volatilities of S&P500 for pre 1986 period
following Bloom (2009), i.e. VXO (figure A.5c), (iii) the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (Baker, Bloom,
and Davis, 2012), i.e. EPU (figure A.5a), (iv) the within-quarter cross-sectional spread of profit growth rates
normalized by average sales (Bloom, 2009; Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry, 2012),
i.e. Profits (figure A.5a), (v) the interquartile range of the industrial production growth for manufacturing
industries (Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry, 2012), i.e. QIQR (figure A.5a), (vi)
the within quarter cross-sectional standard deviation of firm-level stock returns for rms with 500+ months of
data in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (Bloom, 2009), i.e. Profits (figure A.5a), (vii) the cross
sectional standard deviation of mean probabilistic forecasts for inflation or output growth from the SPF, i.e.
Inf. Disagree and Growth Disagree (figure A.5b).
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Figure A.6: The SCUs and Other Uncertainty Proxies






































































Note: Commonly used Uncertainty Indices Against the SCUs: This plot shows the inflation and output
growth SCU estimates against various empirical uncertainty measures which are explained in figure A.5. All
uncertainty measures are presented in standardized units and the horizontal (green) lines corresponds to 1.65
standard deviations above the unconditional mean of each series (which has been normalized to zero). The
vertical lines correspond to the 9 heightened uncertainty episodes identified as dates in which VXO index
exceeds 1.65 standard deviations above its hp-filtered mean in quarterly frequency (Bloom, 2009). Bloom
(2009) identified 17 heightened uncertainty episodes in monthly frequency but some of these episodes are
washed out in quarterly frequency. The shaded grey bars are recession quarters defined according to the
NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
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Table A.9: Major Stock Market Volatility Shocks
Monthly Frequency
Max. Volatility Date First Volatility Date
October 1962 October 1962
November 1963 November 1963
August 1966 August 1966
May 1970 May 1970
December 1973 December 1973
October 1974 September 1974
November 1978 Novermber 1978
March 1980 March 1980
October 1982 August 1982
November 1987 October 1987
October 1990 September 1990
November 1997 November 1997
September 1998 September 1998
September 2001 September 2001
September 2002 July 2002
February 2003 February 2003
October 2008 August 2007












Note: Following Bloom (2009), the major uncertainty episodes are chosen as
those with stock-market volatility more than 1.65 standard deviations above
the hp-detrended (λ = 129600 for monthly and λ = 1600 for quarterly data)
mean of the stock-market volatility series. Some of the spikes in stock market
volatility are either 1 month/quarter episodes whereas others span more than
1 month/quarter. Quarterly VXO index is calculated by taking monthly
averages. This smooths some volatility spikes that are visible in the monthly
data, leaving less spikes in quarterly VXO series.
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A.2.1 Decomposing VIX into Uncertainty and Risk Aver-
sion
Following Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013), one can decompose VIX index
into two separate components: risk aversion and uncertainty. VIX index repre-
sents the option implied expected volatility on the S&P500 index with a horizon
of 30 calendar (22 trading) days. This is an “implied” or “risk-neutral” volatil-
ity as opposed to the actual (or the “physical”) volatility. The main difference
between actual and the implied volatility is that the physical volatility would
use the actual state probabilities to arrive at the physical expected volatility
whereas the implied one would be adjusted for the price of risk. While VIX
contains information about the the stock market uncertainty, it conceptually
harbor information about the risk and risk aversion, i.e. Variance Premium,
as well. Fortunately, Carr and Wu (2009) show that the time-varying variance







where VIX is the VIX Index, VP is the variance premium1, RV22t+1 is the realized
variance over the next month (22 trading days). In equation A.1, VIX index is





) is not, so it should be estimated. I estimate it
in three steps. First, I compute the current monthly realized variance by using
squared 5-minute returns of the S&P500 index for the period January 3, 1994 -
December 2013. Next, using daily data I project the future (1 month ahead) re-
alized monthly variances onto a set of current instruments including the squared
VIX, the dividend yield, real three-month T-Bill rate. Finally, I conduct a fore-
casting horserace between 8 different models2 suggested by Bekaert, Hoerova,
and Lo Duca (2013), and pick the model that gives the minimum root mean
square error. The coefficient estimates of the winner model from this forecasting








1Similar to Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013), I take the negative of variance premium
so the estimated variance premium tends to increase with risk aversion.
2These models are: one-variable model with either the past realized variance or the squared
VIX; a two-variable model with both the squared VIX and the past realized variance; three-
variable model either with the past dividend yield or the real three-month T-Bill rate; and
a four-variable model adding the past real three month T-Bill rate; two models that do not
require estimation, i.e. half-half weights on the past squared VIX and past realized variance
or the past realized variance.
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where RVAR is the monthly realized variance and the standard errors reported
in parentheses are corrected for serial correlation using 30 Newey and West
(1987) lags. The fitted values from equation A.2 is the estimated conditional
variance measure of “uncertainty”. Using equation 6, the difference between
squared VIX and the conditional variance from above regression is the esti-
mated measure of “risk aversion”.
The quarterly averages of the square roots of resulting estimates are presented
in figure A.7 along with four heightened uncertainty episodes (following Bloom
(2009)) and US recessions that overlaps with the sample period. While the
resulting uncertainty and risk aversion estimates have a 80 % correlation, their
dynamics for some of the heightened uncertainty episodes are different from
each other. According to table 1.4, on average, time-varying in risk aversion
can explain 27% of the fluctuations of the VIX index. However, the explana-
tory power of time-varying risk aversion jumps to 50% during the height of the
LTCM crisis in 1998Q2. Similarly, in the height of debt-ceiling crisis in US (July
2011, i.e. 2011Q3), there is a similar jump in the explanatory power of risk aver-
sion. Notice that, both of these dates are identified as heightened uncertainty
episodes by Bloom (2009). While it is possible to decompose VIX index into
uncertainty and risk aversion for the whole sample period (1968Q4 - 2013Q3)
in this paper3, it seems risk aversion component of the VIX index is an impor-
tant determinant particularly during heightened uncertainty episodes. Bekaert,
Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) demonstrates that unlike the risk aversion, the
uncertainty component of the VIX index is closely related to the business cycle
fluctuations. However, the risk aversion component is strongly associated with
the monetary policy or the stock market fluctuations, not with the business cy-
cle dynamics. In that, identifying heightened uncertainty episodes by the VIX
index can be misleading as during some of these episodes (i.e. the LTCM or
the US debt-ceiling crises) the rise in the VIX index substantially explained by
the rise in the risk aversion instead of the stock market uncertainty. Yet, this
seems to be another reason for why VIX index is a noisy estimate of economic
uncertainty.
3The data for VIX index published starting from 1990.
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Figure A.7: Risk Aversion and Stock Market Uncertainty












Note: This figure presents the decomposition of the squared VIX into two components (quarterly averages
of monthly figures in percentage points): the square root of expected stock market variance (stock market
uncertainty) and the residual, i.e. the square root of risk aversion proxy (the difference between the squared
VIX and uncertainty from equation 6. The sample period is January1994 September 2013. The shaded blue
bars are recessions defined according to the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee and the vertical black
lines are the identified uncertainty dates according to Bloom (2009).
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Aggregate Dynamics after Monetary
Shocks
B.1.1 Aggregate Dynamics in Empirical Model I after
Monetary Shocks
Here, we report our findings on aggregate dynamics in Empirical Model I after
monetary shocks.
Aggregate dynamic responses are displayed in Figure B.1 over five years at the
quarterly and monthly frequencies. It is evident from this figure that a higher
monetary shock in developing economies, relative to one in the United States, is
associated with a short-lived increase in the level of output in the former relative
to that of the United States. It quickly falls again to the level of the undistorted
path. Similarly, the real exchange rate exhibits a temporary upward movement
after the shock, indicating a temporary depreciation in the real exchange rate
against developing economies. At the quarterly (monthly) frequency, our results
for Empirical Model I suggest that the real exchange rate stays depreciated
relative to its undistorted path for about 6 quarters (12 months) after the shock.
It can also be seen that the real exchange rate exhibits hump-shaped dynamics
after the shock. These dynamics are also found by Clarida and Gali (1994) and
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) for the bilateral real exchange rates between the
United States and other developed countries. Lastly, a positive monetary shock
causes the price level in developing economies to rise relative to the price level
in the United States on impact.
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Figure B.1: Impulse Responses to Monetary Shocks in Empirical Model I
Quarterly
(a) Yi − Y∗

























(c) Pi − P ∗













(d) Yi − Y∗


























(f) Pi − P ∗












Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The solid
lines indicate the estimated point-wise impulse responses. The area between the dashed lines
shows the 90% confidence interval estimated using the Bayesian method suggested by Sims
and Zha (1999).
B.1.2 Aggregate Dynamics in Empirical Model II after
Monetary Shocks in the United States
We have discussed aggregate dynamics after an expansionary domestic monetary
shock in developing countries in Empirical Model II in Section 2.2.2. This
section, on the other hand, discusses our findings on aggregate dynamics after
an expansionary monetary shock in the United States in Empirical Model II.
The results are presented in Figure B.2. Following a monetary shock in the
United States:
• output in both developing economies and the United States stays above
its undistorted level for about a year;
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Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The solid
lines indicate the estimated point-wise impulse responses. The area between the dashed lines
shows the 90% confidence interval estimated using the Bayesian method suggested by Sims
and Zha (1999).
• the real exchange rate appreciates on impact, and compared to the undis-
torted path, it stays appreciated for about 9 months; and,
• the price level in both developing economies and the United States con-
temporaneously rises.
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B.2 Calibration of Models’ Parameters
Table B.1: Calibration and Estimation
Parameters Description Values Source
θp Price elasticity of demand for varieties within the same sector 11 Bresnahan (1981)
θw Wage elasticity of labor demand 4 Huang and Liu (2002)
σc Inverse of elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 5 Hall (1988)
σn Inverse of Frisch-elasticity of labor supply 1 Carvalho and Nechio (2011)
σa Inverse of the elasticity of capacity utilization with respect to the rental rate of
capital
0.01






The elasticity of the adjustment cost technology for investment with respect to
It
Kt
-0.75 Devereux and Hnatkovska (2011)
Θ′Ȳ Elasticity of interest rate to net foreign assets -0.01 Devereux and Smith (2005)
ρ Elasticity of substitution between the home- and foreign-goods 1.5 Carvalho and Nechio (2011)
η Elasticity of substitution between different sector-goods 1 Carvalho and Nechio (2011)
χ Labor share in GDP 0.66
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005)
β Discount factor 1.03−
1
12




k Price-stickiness in sectors See text Carvalho and Nechio (2011)
fk Expenditure share of sectors See text Carvalho and Nechio (2011)
δ Monthly rate of depreciation on capital 0.008 Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)
ρz The persistence in nominal spending growth shocks 0.32 See text
τ Relative size of the foreign-country 1000 See text
sc % Share of final consumption expenditure in GDP 66 See text
si % Share of investment in GDP 20 See text
ω Share of home-exports invoiced in the home-currency 0.05 See text
ω∗
∗
Share of home-imports priced in the foreign-currency 0.95 See text
ψ Share of home-country imports in GDP 0.35 See text
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Figure B.3: Consumer Prices Inflation and the Turkish Lira Share in
External Trade in Turkey
(a) TL Shares in
External Trade





















TL Share in Exports
TL Share in Imports
(b) Consumer
Prices Inflation

















Note: Our calculations are based on the Turkish Statistical Institute data. In Panel A, the
dotted lines with circles and the dashed lines with multiplication signs indicate the share of
TL-denominated exports in total Turkish exports and the share of TL-denominated imports
in total Turkish imports, respectively.
B.2.1 Asymmetry in Currency Invoicing in International
Trade between Developing and Advanced Economies
It is a well-known fact that there is an asymmetry between developing and
advanced economies in regards to the currency in which exports and imports
are denominated. Indeed, while exports and imports are largely denominated
in home currencies in advanced economies, they are largely denominated in
foreign currencies in developing economies. For example, in their study of
pricing decision of the exports and imports in the United States, Gopinath and
Rigobon (2008) report that 97% of exports and 90% of imports are priced in
the United States dollar. To exemplify the pricing practices of exporters and
importers in developing economies, we look at exports and imports by currency
in Turkey. In Figure B.3, we illustrate the share of exports (imports) priced
in the Turkish Lira(TL) in total exports (imports) as well as the inflation in
consumer prices between 1996 and 2012. Inflation is measured as the percentage
change in CPI over the last twelve months. It is notable that the remarkable
success in bringing down inflation has produced only a modest rise in the shares
of TL denominated exports and imports over the recent years. Indeed, the shares
of TL-denominated exports and imports have stayed at very low levels below
5% during this period. Our conjecture is that this finding holds generally for
all developing economies and currency invoicing in international trade happens
largely with the foreign currencies in this group.
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B.3 The One- and Multi-Sector Models’ Dy-
namics with a Taylor-Type Rule
In this section, we analyze aggregate dynamics in the one- and multi-sector
models without investment by considering a Taylor-type interest rate rule in
the home- and foreign-country instead of considering exogenous nominal spend-
ing growth. In doing so, we assume that in addition to the international foreign
bond (Bt+1), there is a domestic bond (Dt+1) which is traded only domestically,
supplied in zero net supply and pays a gross nominal interest of Rt. The in-
terest rates in the home-country (Rt) and in the foreign-country (R
B∗
F,t) are set
according to the following rules:
R̂t = φπ × πt + φy × Ŷt + εrt
where εrt = ρrε
r
t−1 + ηt and ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η)
R̂B





t ∼ N(0, σ2εr∗ )
(B.1)
The coefficients for the foreign-interest rate rule reflect the estimates of the
Taylor-rule coefficients in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) for the Volcker-
Greenspan periods. The coefficients in the home interest-rate rule, on the other
hand, have to be estimated since we do not have the estimates of the reac-
tion function of the monetary authorities under inflation-targeting in develop-
ing economies. Two cases are considered when estimating the parameters. The
first is that εt is a white-noise (ρr = 0). The second is that the shock to the
home-interest rate can be persistent (ρr > 0). In the first case, the estimated









. Let f(P) denote the impulse response functions of
the price level, output, the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate in
developing economies for some P between the 0th and 12th months. We estimate
P as the classical minimum distance estimator and denote it with P̂(Ân):
P̂(Ân) = argmin
P
(ĥn − f(P))′Â′nÂn(ĥn − f(P)) (B.2)
where Ân is the weighting matrix used. ĥn shows the impulse response func-
tions of the price level, output, the nominal and real exchange rates in the actual
economies between the 0th and 12th months. Lastly, n stands for the sample
size of the data used to estimate the VAR-based impulse response functions.
Since using different weighting matrices would yield different estimators, P̂ is
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Table B.2: Estimated Parameters of the Taylor Rule
Transitory Shocks Persistent Shocks
One-Sector Multi-Sector One-Sector Multi-Sector
φπ 1.00
∗ 1.00∗ φπ 1.12 1.64
(0.004) (0.002)
φy 0.24 2.00
∗ φy 0.15 1.52
(0.14) (0.035) (0.990)
ρr 0 0 ρr 0.61 0.79
(0.006) (0.004)
Obj. Func. 619.36 1986.26 Obj. Func. 78.80 65.41
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote estimated model-based standard errors. The
numbers with an asterisk indicate that standard-errors are not reported since the estimates of
the parameters are close to either its lower-bound or its upper-bound as discussed in Footnote
1. Obj. Func. indicates the value of the objective specified in (B.2).
written as a function of Ân. As a weighting matrix, we choose the widely-used
diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are given as the inverse of standard
deviations of empirical impulse responses.(See, for example, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003)). This weighting
matrix ensures more precisely estimated impulse response functions are given
more importance than the less precisely estimated ones.1
Table B.2 shows the estimated parameters of the Taylor rule specified in B.1.
Allowing persistence in the shocks to the interest rate in the home-country sig-
nificantly improves both the one- and multi-sector models’ performance as it
leads to a sharp fall in the weighted distance between the model- and VAR-
based impulse response functions (See Obj. Func. in the table). Figure B.4
visualizes this. In Panel A of this figure, the impulse response functions of the
aggregate variables to an expansionary white-noise shock to the home-interest
rate rule in (B.1) are illustrated. Both the one- and multi-sector models are
incapable of explaining the aggregate dynamics when shocks to the interest rate
in the home-country are transitory.
1To do the estimation, the lower and upper bounds for the parameters have to be entered




, we set the lower and upper
bounds as [1.00,2.14], [0,2.00],[0,0.99], respectively.
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Next, we consider that the shocks to the interest-rate in the home-country are
persistent. Panel B of Figure B.4 shows the model- and VAR-based impulse
response functions with a persistent interest-rate rule. It is clear from this
figure that with such a high persistence in the shocks, the dynamics of the price
level, output and the nominal and real exchange rates after the monetary shock
in both the one- and multi-sector models align quite well with those found in
the data. While the model-based impulse-response functions in both the former
and the latter stay within the 90% confidence intervals for the panel VAR-
based impulse response functions, it is evident that the latter is more successful
than the former in explaining the movements of output, the real and nominal
exchange rates in the actual economies following the monetary shock.
204
Figure B.4: One- and Multi-Sector Models with a Taylor-Type Rule
Panel A: Transitory Shocks (ρr = 0)
(a) P





















































Panel B: Persistent Shocks (ρr > 0)
(e) P





















































Note: Our calculations are based on the IMF’s International Finance Statistics. The dotted lines with pentagrams and the dashed
lines with squares indicate the model-based impulse response functions in the one- and multi-sector models, respectively. The solid
lines show the estimated point-wise panel-VAR-based impulse response functions. The area between the dotted lines shows the 90%
confidence interval estimated with the method suggested by Sims and Zha (1999).
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